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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the nature of moral thinking 
and thus to arrive at some conclusions as to the nature of moral 
thinkers. My starting point is that investigation of the ways we think 
in moral terms, particularly with respect to the way that the truth of 
thoughts constrains the claims we can make in moral discourse. That 
is, I want to start with the ways of thinking and the sorts of claims we 
make in moral terms, and see what those ways of thinking and claims 
tell us about the sorts of people we are and the environment we find 
ourselves in. This approach depends on a picture of our interaction 
and connection with our environment in conceptual terms that allows 
us to investigate one part of this interaction, our language and 
thought, and use it to give us information about the other parts of the 
interaction, the thinkers and what is thought about. The important 
element of this interaction is that it is an interaction responsive to the 
truth of the beliefs we hold and the claims we make. This requires me 
to defend the thesis that moral language and thought can be 
candidates for truth, and that the truth they respond to is not some 
particular truth relative to moral discourse, but truth tout court, as it 
applies to all discourses. Using the distinction I claim is made in 
moral language and thought between moral judgments and their truth 
I show that we need to be able to recognise moral agents as engaged 
or embedded in a network of personal relationships that are made up 
of commitments, responsibilities and expectations. It is these 
personal relationships that provide both justification and motivation 
for moral action and this is sufficient for morality. 
This thesis is dedicated to 
Derek, David and Peter 
Introduction: The self, an identity problem 
"Who was that lady I saw you with last night?", runs the old joke. "That was no lady, 
that was my wife". When talking to people and thinking about people we assume that 
we are capable of identifying and re-identifying them. Terms like 'that lady', 'I', 'you' 
and 'my wife' all identify people, and the last, at least, re-identifies someone. The 
joke works at all on the assumption that the respondent can both identify the person he 
was with last night and re-identify her as the same person as his wife. It also assumes, 
though this may not be so immediately obvious, that he can identify himself as both 
the person now addressed, and the person who was somewhere last night and that his 
interlocutor can do the same. So, in order to talk about and think about people, we 
need to be able to identify and re-identify them. We need to be able to recognise 
people and answer such questions as 'Who is that?' We also need to be able to do this 
when the person in question is ourselves. We do not usually ask such questions about 
ourselves as 'Who am I?', 'What do I mean by 'myself?' or 'What is it that is really 
me?', except, perhaps, in moments of crisis. Our very use of such terms as 'I', 'me', 
'my' and 'mine', however, presuppose that we know who it is we are talking or 
thinking about. 
In the past, philosophers have thought that in order to answer the question of 
how we identify and re-identify ourselves and others we need to know what the 
essence of being human is. To be able to identify and re-identify anything, people 
included, there must be something that remains the same throughout all changes, 
something that is that thing, regardless of what happens to it. So we must know what 
it is that counts as a person to be able to tell one person from another, and to re-
identify people in general. As with physical objects in general, we believe we can 
identify persons through time. even though their characteristics change. There has 
often been a feeling. however, that the criteria we use to identify and re-identify 
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physical objects in general and other persons in particular are different from the way 
we identify ourselves. 
It is argued that we identify physical objects and other persons by description of 
their characteristics and by their being linked to their past histories. Thus I identify 
the swivel chair in my lounge because it has in general tenns the characteristics it had 
previously, that is it is in the same position as it was yesterday, is mostly black and 
has its cushion tom by the cat, and because I can trace its history. If, the next time I 
look at that chair it is green, or if someone could show me that, although it looked the 
same, it had been replaced by a replica, then I would not call it the same chair. 
Similarly with people, I re-identify them by physical description, behaviour, 
temperament and also by their having a continuous history. With people however, 
there is the added complication of the mental or psychological element, what we 
might be tempted to call the inner life, and with respect to each person's identification 
of himself it seems to be this that is important. When I identify myself, I do not seem 
to rely on a physical description, and the continuous history which plays its part in this 
identification does not seem to be the same sort of history as that I would use for the 
identity of physical objects. It is a history told from the inside not the outside. I do 
not seem to use external criteria to identify myself at all. It seems possible to be sure 
who I am by relying totally on internal evidence. 
This contrast between the internal and the external view has lead people to take 
one of two positions on personal identity: that a person is identical with their body or 
with their mind. When we look initially at how we identify others it seems we use 
their bodily identity as a criterion. Witnesses identify criminals by whether they have 
the same body, by what they look like, I recognise my friend at a distance by her 
physical appearance. In general our experience of actual people leads us to believe 
that identity of the body goes with identity of person, although cases of multiple 
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personality disorder may cause problems for us. 1 So we appear to need the continuity 
and existence of a physical body to enable us to identify people. Yet intuitively we 
want to say that this is not enough. After all dead bodies are not people and we are at 
least willing to entertain the idea that a person might somehow change his body and 
yet still remain the same person. Thought experiments such as Descartes,2 imagining 
himself without a body, Locke's3 prince and cobbler, Putnam's4 brain in a vat, 
Parfit's5 teletransportation and Williams,6 body swapping all appeal to our intuitions 
about how we would feel under such conditions. In using our intuitions we are often 
asked to put ourselves in the place of those in the thought experiment and think what 
things would be like. Descartes' Meditations are all told from the first person point of 
view, Parfit's and Williams examples explicitly ask us to consider things from the first 
person perspective, and although this is not the case for Locke or Putnam, nonetheless 
what seems to make such examples ones we could consider is the temptation to put 
ourselves in the place of the person described. 
If we approach such thought experiments from the first person point of view, 
from the inside, then the temptation is to think that what counts when identifying and 
re-identifying people is how things look to them, and this is not in terms of physically 
identifying the body but more to do with their thoughts, memories, feelings, their 
history told from the inside. Thus it feels as if the internal view of the self is the 
essential one, and that it can perhaps be divorced from the external physical object 
1 For discussion of how this can affect our concept of a person see Kathleen V 
Wilkes. Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments (Oxford: 
Clarendon. 1988) chapter 
2Rene Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy. trans by John Cottingham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989) 
3John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. abridged and ed. by John 
W Yolton (London: J Dent. 1993) Chapter 27 
4Hilary Putnam. Realism. Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1981) p. 1-21 
5Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1984) 
6Bemard Williams. -The Self and the Future' in Problems of the Self: Philosophical 
Papers 1956-1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1973) pp. 46-63. 
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that is the body. Thought experiments and the ways in which we identify ourselves 
lead us in the direction of the mental criterion, to take selves to be mental entities that 
are contingently associated with particular bodies, but can perhaps exist without them 
or with other bodies. This idea is, of course, essential to such notions as life after 
death and re-incarnation which assume that the self can be associated with different 
bodies or with no body at all. There are, however, problems with taking the mental 
criterion, our memories, our character, our history told from the inside, as the essential 
criterion. Firstly, as Strawson points out, we cannot individuate a purely mental self 
as the subject of experience.7 The conception of a set of mental attributes is 
derivative from the conception of a person as a whole. Secondly there are two 
problem with memories as a criterion: if I am only what I remember then if I forget 
that I have done something, it looks as if it was not I who did it, and do we count as 
memories only genuine memories or are apparent memories included as well? In fact. 
for both problems we need the bodily criterion. To have a concept of a continuing 
person through the bits of my history which I have forgotten, or when I was 
unconscious or asleep we need to identify me with my body. Of course, to the 
individual his stream of consciousness seems continuous, but he would surely agree 
that it was him who was unconscious on the operating table or asleep in the bed. If it 
was not, where did 'he' go, or did 'he' cease to exist for a time? To distinguish 
between genuine and apparent memories, we appear to need the bodily criterion. If I 
am wrong to identify myself as the child who got lost at the fair - that particular family 
story was something that happened to my sister - this is because the person who was 
lost was the one who has the 'body' that was lost. 
Further, if we take the picture of minds using or inhabiting bodies that motivates 
views such as Locke's in his example of the prince and the cobbler, we find that they 
are not as straightforward as they appear at first. If we extend Locke's example and 
7p F Strawson. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen. 
1979) Part 1. chapter 4. 
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suppose that the mind of the cobbler were in the prince's body, presumably Locke 
feels that we would identify the person who looked like the prince as the cobbler, 
because his memory, and perhaps his behaviour patterns, were the cobblers. But what 
happens if we push this story a bit further? What if we ask the person we have 
identified as the cobbler, on account of his mental attributes, to make or mend a pair 
of shoes? Will his hands have the required skill because the mind 'directing' them has 
the knowledge of cobbling? Or would the person with the cobblers body do a better 
job? And how would the results of this experiment affect our identification of the 
people concerned? Perhaps neither of them could make or mend a pair of shoes. 
Would we then say that one had forgotten the skills of cobbling and the other had 
never learnt them, or vice versa? We might, of course, be inclined to think that the 
person who remembered what actions were needed to mend shoes would be able to 
retrain his new body to do the job, while the one whose body was trained for the job 
could not expect his body to teach him how to cobble. But even if the cobbler in the 
prince's body did take up cobbling as a practice again, would we say he was the same 
cobbler? It seems that for some of the attributes that make someone the person they 
are, we would have to count combined physical and mental attributes. Cobbling, 
playing the piano or driving the car do not appear to be either strictly physical or 
strictly mental attributes. 
It looks as if neither the physical nor the mental criteria are enough on their own. To 
some extent we might be inclined to say that the person we are, the personality we 
develop, is formed by the experiences we have. Although I didn't have to develop 
certain skills, or political opinions, or moral or religious positions, yet the fact that I 
have developed the ones I have, that I have become the person I am, is due to the 
circumstances in which I have grown up, the experiences that have come my way. 
The cobbler need not have been a cobbler, he might have been a fanner, but surely he 
is as much a cobbler, as he is Joe Bloggs, father of two daughters, inhabitant of 23 
Acacia A venue and staunch supporter of the local Methodist church. All these 
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descriptions are (or may be) true of him, and if none of them actually applied to him, 
in what sense could we say he was the same person. 
If this is the case, if the person someone is depends to some extent on the 
circumstances in which he or she has found themselves, then this seems to tie together 
the two ideas we came up with at first. The answer to who someone is seems to be an 
answer both to the question of what it is to be them rather than someone else, and 
what it is that enables us to identify and re-identify them. But neither of these ways of 
looking at the person can be seen independently of how they are situated and how they 
arrived there. A person is not something independent of the experiences he has had, 
even though those experiences were not forced on him. Moreover, those experiences 
are not just to do with the physical side of the person, although they come through the 
physical situations in which he finds himself. They also seem to be concerned with 
the social, legal, financial, moral, religious and any other types of situations in which 
he finds himself. All these contribute to making him the person he is, and I think 
there is a need to identify the individual, on different occasions, by his situation in 
these non-physical spheres. It is the location of the person, the self in some of these 
spheres that I want to explore in this thesis. 
My exploration begins, however, from a different starting point to that stated above. 
Most of the above explorations of the self have started with the concept we have of a 
person and have either tried to analyse it, or to see how we would intuitively extend it 
in unusual cases. I also want to start with the concepts we have, so to speak. but I do 
not want to ask how we identify ourselves and others, nor even what conceptions we 
have of persons. Instead I want to find out, given that we do, in fact, identify 
ourselves and others, what are the necessary conditions for being able to do this. The 
approach to this problem that I want to use is through thought and language. We think 
and talk about people in all sorts of different ways. We attribute all sorts of properties 
to ourselves and other people: physical. mental, social, moraL religious and economic 
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properties. Every time we attribute a property to someone, we pick that person out 
and say something about them. It may be that occasionally we fail to pick out 
anything, as in Russell's example of 'the present king of France'8 when no such king 
exists, or as in 'the archbishop of the Church of England', when there are two such 
archbishops. Apart from such cases, however, we do seem to succeed fairly often in 
picking people out in thought, and this seems to involve identifying them somehow, 
and identifying them in many different spheres. We talk about 'the man over there', 
'the Prime Minister', 'the local bank manager', 'our parish priest' and 'the person lowe 
money to'. So there are many types of discourses, many types of ways of thinking 
about people, and therefore contexts, in which we succeed in identifying people. 
I will not be initially concerned, however, with how we identify ourselves and others 
in such discourses, although some indications of that may emerge. My general 
approach is to consider the discourses we use, the ways we have of thinking about 
ourselves and our environment, and ask what the conditions must be that allow us to 
think and talk in these ways, what constraints there are on such ways of thinking and 
talking, and hence how these constraints can show us what sort of things we are, what 
sorts of abilities we will need and what sort of situations we are bound to inhabit. 
This approach may be worrying to some, since I am aiming to find out what sort of a 
world we are in and what sort of things may be found in it by looking at the language 
we use, and for those who feel that our language could be totally divorced from 'the 
world' and its 'contents', whatever they might be, such an approach would seem to be 
mistaken. I hope to justify this approach in my first chapter, by considering Frege's 
Context Principle and the guidance it may give us in this respect. There I consider 
two pictures of the way that conceptualising subjects, their concepts and what I will 
loosely call the world may be related. I maintain that a picture which allows the 
8Bertrand Russell. 'On Denoting' in The Philosophy oj Language. 2nd edn .. Ed. by 
A.P. Martinich (Oxflrd: Oxford University Press. 1990) pp. 203-211. 
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subject and his concepts to be independent of the world is incoherent and that our 
concepts are developed in response to the world and our place in it. Because of this, I 
argue that we can use our concepts, our ways of thinking about things to tell us 
something about what we are like and what the world we inhabit is like. To do this 
we will need some way of assessing how our concepts work, and this is found in the 
distinctions we make in thinking about things, between how things seem to us and 
how they really are. That is, I think that the distinction between our judgments and 
the truth of them is an instrument we can use to tell us something about the nature of 
those judgments and how they can be made. The truth judgment distinction is 
something that, although I have denied that it makes sense when applied wholesale to 
all of our concepts, can nevertheless be very useful when applied within our 
conceptualisati on. 
This might be thought to raise three problems. The first is that if truth is to do with 
how our thoughts relate to the world, we cannot get outside our thoughts to check if 
they do so. Various responses to this have been to try to produce theories of truth 
which will explain how we can apply the concept true. My approach is to admit quite 
freely that we cannot get outside our concepts to see if they are true, in fact if my 
picture of the interrelation of subject, concepts and world is true getting outside would 
not help. What is required is to be able to claim that we make the truth/judgment 
distinction from inside our conceptualisation, and that all we need to consider is under 
what conditions we make the distinction. To do this I utilise Wiggins' marks of truth, 
which are indications of the conditions under which we predicate truth of beliefs.9 To 
see how this might work I consider how the twin notions of truth and rationality work 
in thinking about the material world. 
9David Wiggins, Needs. Values. Truth: Essays in the Philosophy oJ Value. Aristotelian 
Society Sectes, Vol. 6. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1991). particularly Essay N. Truth 
as Predicated of Moral Judgment. 
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The second problem is that this approach will only work if we allow that the ways of 
thinking about things that we are considering are subject to the truth/judgment 
distinction, that is that they are concerned with and subject to the constraints of truth. 
The area I am specially concerned with in my thesis has notoriously been thought not 
to be the sort of discourse or thought that is concerned with truth. People have 
thought that because there is so much disagreement in moral judgments, that either 
they are not judgments at all, but expressions of sentiment or attitudes 10, or that truth 
in such cases is relative to the particular moral system or environment within which 
the judgments are made 11. In chapter 2, therefore, I discuss whether it is possible to 
hold a position with respect to moral thought that allows for true and false moral 
judgments. I argue the case for what I call a sophisticated moral realist, against the 
positions of moral realist and moral constructivist. My claim is that moral realism as 
traditionally understood makes too strong requirements on moral judgments, because 
both it and moral constructivism derive from the first world picture discussed in 
chapter one. If facts about the world can be beyond our grasping then their truth is 
beyond our ability to assign it to judgments about those facts. The moral 
constructivists response to this is to claim that moral truths are not about the world but 
about human beliefs, but this I argue, disqualifies them as truths, since at some level 
they are not subject to the truth/judgment distinction. The sophisticated moral realist, 
however, holds that truth is within our grasp, and that moral judgments can be 
candidates for truth, which is recognised by Wiggins' marks of truth. 
lOHume. of course. is the founding father of such views in A Treatise oj Hwnan 
Nature, ed. by LA Selb-Bigge. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Claendon. 1990). but is followed by 
emotivists such asC L Stevenson. Ethics and Language (London: Yale Uni\'ersity 
Press. 1944) and prescriptivists such as R M Hare, The Language oj Morals (Oxford: 
Clarendon. 1952). 
11 For example Edward Westermark. The Origin and Development oj the }\Ioral Ideas. 
2 vols. (London: Macmillan. 1906) and Mehille J Herskovits. }\Ian and His \Vorks: the 
science oj cultural anthropology (New Yord: Knopf. 1948) 
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The third chapter addresses the third problem about truth, which is whether truth is 
relative to a discourse or a particular way of thinking. I approach this through a 
discussion of Crispin Wright's claim that all assertoric discourse have a truth 
predicate, specific to the discourse, which arises out of, but differs in extension from, 
the norms of warranted assertibility of that discourse.1 2 This makes truth relative to 
particular discourses and claims that there is no need for any realist, or presumably 
sophisticated realist, picture to maintain the applicability of truth to judgments. I 
argue that the substantial truth Wright claims to find in the norms of assertoric warrant 
does not arise out of them but is assumed by Wright. If there really is this sort of 
substantial truth as a norm of the discourse, then it is not generated by the discourse 
but by the discourse's subject matter, and in this sense is external to the discourse. In 
this sort of discourse, which I call a Non-Minimal discourse, the norms of warranted 
assertibility arise out of truth, and there is no reason to assume that this is a separate 
type of truth for each discourse. The only sense in which truth would be relative to a 
discourse is that the discourse may only be concerned with some aspects of our 
relation to our environment, so it may be concerned with a particular set of truths. 
This does not, however, require that truth as such is relative to the discourse, only that 
the discourse may be concerned with some truths, not all the truths there are. 
Having established that the truth/judgment distinction is one that can be applied in 
moral discourse and thought, and that if so applied it will reflect how the things that 
those ways of thinking and talking are about, I then go on in chapter 4 to consider 
what application of the distinction will require. Wiggins' central point is that use of 
the concept true requires us to be sensitive to various aspects of our environment, an 
environment that is common to thinkers of this sort. I consider that in making moral 
judgments and decisions in general, one of the things it is important to get right is the 
situation within which the decision is made and the relationships between those in that 
12Crispin Wright. Trnth and Objectivity (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
1994) 
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situation. I also consider in this chapter how we identify the actions we consider in 
moral judgments and decisions. I use as a model for the application of my 
methodology the work of Gareth Evans. 13 He uses the truth/judgment distinction in 
discussion of thought about material objects to investigate what abilities we need to 
develop to think about such things. I use his ideas of the Fundamental Ground of 
Difference and the Generality Constraint to show that making judgments about actions 
requires us to identify the agents and others as part of a network of relationships 
involving commitments, responsibilities and expectations. 
In chapter 5 I develop this approach and consider in detail the nature of the 
relationships involved and the abilities we require to identify those relationships 
objectively. Again I compare the situation with that described by Evans with respect 
to the material world. I argue that we need both an egocentric and an objective 
understanding of the relationships we are involved in. The nature of these 
relationships, their commitments, responsibilities and expectations, if it is to be 
correctly judged and understood by us, requires us to be the sort of things that actually 
engage in such relationships and to feel the pull of those commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations. During the course of this chapter I consider the 
problems caused for my approach by those who do not feel the pull of such 
relationships (the amoralist), and those for whom the pull is not strong enough to 
motivate action (weakness of will). I also consider what role, if any, desires have in 
such judgments and decisions. I conclude with a discussion of whether consideration 
of these relationships and their role in personal decision-making is sufficient for what 
has traditionally been considered to be morality, and conclude that, while it does not 
fit what have often been considered to be the requirements of moral behaviour, it does 
not generate universal principles or laws, it nevertheless fits the purpose of moral 
behaviour and moral systems. 
13Gareth Evans. The Varieties of Reference. ed. by John McDowell (Oxford: 
Clarendon. 1991) 
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Although I may not have discussed very much the particular concepts we have of 
persons or moral agents, I hope that what emerges from my thesis is a picture of 
people in moral terms that fits with the position I was discussing above, but with a 
somewhat firmer basis for that position. The self or person is not identified purely by 
a bodily criterion, although that plays its part, nor by a mental criterion, although that 
develops out of its history. The picture we have is of a self which is not capable of 
being considered as an isolated individual, but as embedded in a variety of contexts, 
which are an inescapable part of it. What makes someone the person they are is the 
personal relationships they are part of, the commitments and responsibilities they take 
on, and the ways they develop and respond to them. 
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Chapter 1: The Context Principle 
In this chapter my aim is to show how analysing the concepts we use could help us 
understand ourselves, others, both people and things and the relations between us. 
This is a stronger view than the one that says our concepts can reveal what we take 
ourselves to be. What I am hoping to do is to discover, from the sort of concepts we 
use and the way that we use them, how we are actually related to the sorts of things we 
conceptualise and what both we and they are like. My point is that the concepts we 
use could only be used by particular types of things about particular types of things. 
To take a simple example, to conceptualise things as having a particular shape we 
need to be the sorts of things that perceive shapes in one way or another, and they 
need to be the sorts of things that have a shape. If we were incapable of perceiving 
the shape of things, or if there was no shape that things were, it is hard to see how we 
would develop or use shape concepts. We would not know how or when to use shape 
concepts, what sorts of things might have shapes and what might not, whether we 
were right or wrong to think of something as having this or that shape. So our 
capacities for thinking in tenns of shapes is not separable from an account of what it is 
for things to have shapes and our sensitivity to them. 
This, of course, is much too fast. There may be ways of conceptualising things that 
don't reflect or respond to the way things are. For example, the whole area of magic 
and witchcraft is a way of conceptualising things which, with the exception of fiction, 
we would reject as mistaken. So there will have to be ways of sorting out to which 
sorts of conceptualisation this methodology can be applied. Before that, however, I 
want to consider in more detail what analysis of our use of concepts might be 
supposed to give us infonnation about. Then I want to think about how we could 
proceed with this analysis, and finally investigate the implications this methodology 
has for some other notions such as our understanding of truth and rationality. 
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1.1 The Nature of Conception 
There are those who would say that I have set myself an impossible task; that this 
seems to be an attempt to use concepts to get to something beyond those concepts. If 
there were something beyond our concepts, this would be something we could never 
have access to, and could never say or know anything about. The best we could be 
able to do on this account is to say that we think our concepts mirror, or reflect, or 
correspond to some external reality, but we can never know what it is like, or how 
well our concepts represent it to us, because we can never get outside our conceptual 
system to check. Even if we could somehow access reality in some other way, this 
would just be via some other way of conceptualising, and would therefore be open to 
the same objections: we would not have accessed reality as it really is, but only some 
conception of it which may be more or less accurate. How could we ever hope to get 
outside any conceptual system to understand reality 'as it is in itself if this means as it 
is independently of any way of conceptualising it. 
The problem that is raised here, and perhaps also alluded to in the first paragraph, 
arises out of a distinction between reality and ourselves as they are in themselves 
independent of any conception of them, and those same things as we take them to be, 
that is as our conceptualisations present them to us. It seems that I am trying to gain 
knowledge of the self, and reality, independent of the concepts used by that self: as if 
knowledge of something as it really is must be knowledge of it independent not only 
of my conceptualisation of it, or of human conceptualisation of it, but of any 
conceptualisation of it. The idea is that if reality is conceptualised differently by 
different subjects, then how it really is must be independent of any and all 
conceptualisations of it. 
I think this is a mistake, and that the mistake becomes apparent when we consider 
what it would mean for reality to 'be some way' independent of any conceptualisation 
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of it. I think this idea of reality as being some particular way in itself independent of 
any conception of it is something that arises when we take some ideas further than 
they can reasonably be taken. We start, for example, with the idea that I can be wrong 
in my thinking about something, perhaps compared to everyone else's thinking about 
it. In this sense I would be wrong if I said that Britain is a republic. Now this idea of 
being wrong makes sense, if you like, because there is something to compare it to, that 
is the correctness of the fact that as everyone else knows, Britain is a constitutional 
monarchy. We have to be careful here not confuse the point I am making with an 
epistemological point. It is not that, in order to assess my mistake as a mistake I need 
to look at what the majority opinion is and measure my assertions against that. That 
would give a concept of mistake that would not allow the majority to be wrong at all, 
and thus the claim that concepts might fail to match up to reality at all would fall at 
the first fence. The point is that for there to be possibility of being mistaken about the 
constitution of Britain there must be the possibility of being right about it. If I am 
making the sort of claim which can be mistaken, it must be possible for it to be the 
sort of claim which could succeed. So the important point about the idea of 
comparison is not that we compare to everyone else's thinking, but that we compare to 
correct thinking. 
This allows us to go a step further and consider the idea of everyone being wrong 
about something, perhaps compared to their correct understanding of other things. 
Here we might say that everyone was wrong when they thought that the world was 
flat, and they were wrong because the concept of the world as an approximately oblate 
spheroid fits in better with our understanding of physical theory, our experience of 
travelling around the world, and pictures of the world we have from space. Even if 
everyone thought that the world was flat, they would not be correct to do so. The 
shape of the world did not change between the times when everyone. or most people. 
thought it was flat, and nowadays when most people think it is not. If. however, we 
try to take the further step and say that e\'eryone could be wrong about e\'erything. we 
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run head on into the question of what it is to be wrong here. We seem to have no 
standard of correctness to compare our assertions to. We are not wrong compared to 
our current understanding of reality, because it is that current understanding of reality 
that is said to be wrong. Here it seems that what we are comparing this to, whether 
we realise it or not, is some other, better understanding of reality, either by us at a later 
stage, or by some other subject. 
Yet how would we be able to compare our conceptualisation of reality to some other 
conceptualisation of it? This only seems possible if we can understand, that is 
conceptualise, both points of view. We need in fact to have acquired other standards 
of correctness, another, different concept of correctness, before we can apply the 
concept of being mistaken to our entire conception of things. We cannot compare two 
conceptualisations and say one is better than another unless we have some background 
understanding against which to compare them, as we have in the two earlier cases. 
Further, this is not just saying that we cannot do the work of comparison, but that the 
very idea of comparing, of being right or wrong, makes no sense unless there is also 
some idea of there being some such background, and some criteria against which to 
make the comparison. But if we have the understanding, the background and criteria 
to compare the two conceptualisations, then it is not the case that we are wrong about 
everything, only that part of what we now understand is wrong compared to the rest. 
It is very tempting to think of the possibility of everyone being wrong about 
everything as just an extension of the possibility of everyone being wrong about 
something, and someone being wrong about everything. In both those cases, however, 
there is some comparison that makes sense of the notion of being wrong. In the first 
case the mistake is surely assessed against the correct usage of our other concepts (the 
world is not flat because of how flat applies to tables and plains). In the second case 
the idea seems to be that this person is mistaken in his use of all his concepts. 
Actually I am not sure that we can make sense properly of this last notion. since it 
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seems we would have to have some point of contact with someone. some shared 
conceptions, to even consider that he had a conception of reality worth criticising. 
However, the case of everyone being wrong about everything has nothing to be 
compared with that could allow its being classified as wrong: there is no sense in, nor 
possible understanding of the notion of wrongness here because there is no sense in, 
nor possible understanding of correctness either. 1 
There seems sometimes to be one further step it is possible to make in this extension 
of ideas, that is the idea that something could be other than any conception of it. We 
understand something being some way independent of an individual's or a group's 
conception of it by saying it is correctly conceptualised in some other way. Thus a 
conceptual system has some criteria for the use of a particular concept. We can also 
understand the criteria for the concept being wrong if the concept which uses those 
criteria doesn't fit with our experience accurately enough. It is under these conditions 
that we modify the criteria of a concept, that we change the definition of it, because 
we think the thing conceptualised is some way other than the way we have conceived 
of it. But what would it be for something to be 'some way' other than the way any 
subject conceived of it? Here we seem to be trying to conceptualise unconceptualised 
existence, to understand how something could be some way which is not any 
particular way of understanding it. 
The question here is not just whether we can describe or talk about something 
independently of some way of conceptualising it (which of course we cannot), but 
whether the very notion of something being as it is independent of any 
conceptualisation makes sense. This seems to insist that what we are trying to gain 
access to is unconceptualised by any system, and therefore unconceptualisable. If the 
essence of reality is not captured by any conceptualisation at all, (not just our 
1 For a similar point about the absolute conception see David McNaughton. Moral 
Vision. (Oxford: Black-well. 199-1), p.84. 
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conception, or all current conceptions, but any possible conception) then it must 
surely be such as not to be capable of being captured by any conceptualisation. It 
seems to suggest that what it is has nothing to do with whether it is conceptualised or 
not. I think we have to be careful here with respect to that phrase 'what it is'. It is 
easy to think of that as being the same as 'that it is'. While it makes sense to say that 
whether something exists should have nothing to do with whether it is conceptualised, 
or conceptualisable, that is a quite different thing from saying that what it is may be 
unconceptualised or unconceptualisable. The question is not whether whatever reality 
is could exist without our conceptualising it, after all it might have been the case that 
nothing capable of conceptualisation ever existed, but whether it could 'be some way' 
that was independent of any conceptualisation of it, whether it makes any sense at all 
to attempt to think of something, let alone everything, as being unconceptualisable, 
whether we understand how everything could be unconceptualisable, and therefore 
unconceptualised in this radical sense. That seems to require a revision in our concept 
of 'conceptualisation'. I suggest that we can by definition have no concept of what it 
would be for reality to be somehow different from any conceptualisation of it at all 
Thus, as in the less radical case above, it turns out that we cannot really make sense of 
the idea that reality might be somehow other than any conception of it. We have no 
background, in fact we are postulating the impossibility of any background, against 
which such a judgement could make sense, and therefore the impossibility of such a 
distinction being used. 
We have arrived then at the position that, although it seems as if we can understand 
the notion of all of reality being other than either our conceptual systems, or any 
conceptual systems present or could present it as, this notion is not in fact anything we 
would be able to claim, it is not something we could be right or wrong about. We can 
at best claim that part of a conceptual system could be mistaken, since the concept of 
bein cr mistaken relies on a complementary concept of correctness. If there is, b\' 
/:) 
definition, no standard of correctness with which conceptual systems could be 
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compared to assess their rightness or wrongness, then there can be no sense to the 
notion of being right or wrong. Note that this is not an argument to show that we 
could not understand something that we could not conceptualise, but that we cannot 
make use of the idea that everything covered by our conceptual systems, or all 
conceptual systems, might be wholly other than those systems show them to be. Such 
an idea has no content. 2 
If this is the case, then the objection raised at the start of this section has failed; it 
cannot be the case that the attempt to discover what reality and the self might be like 
by looking at our concepts is doomed from the start on the grounds that both these 
items might be totally other than the way our concepts present them, since they cannot 
be totally other than the way our concepts present them. Even if we allow the bare 
possibility that reality can be conceptualised totally differently by different subjects, 
that is that different subjects could have a conception of reality so different from one 
another that they had no common ground and so could not even recognise the other's 
conception as a conception of reality, this does not have to lead to its really being 
totally other than all those conceptions, but only to its really being able to sustain 
these different conceptions, that is to its really being capable of being conceptualised 
in these different ways. If beings had developed which only conceptualised the world 
in terms of sound concepts, and others had developed which only conceptualised it in 
terms of visual concepts, this does not seem to require the claim that the world is 
2The idea here is similar to the point made by Christopher Peacocke in his -The 
Limits of Intelligibility: A Post-Verificationist Proposal' in Philosophical Review. 97 
(1988) 463-96. His use of what he calls the switching tactic shows that the content 
of a thought cannot be divorced from the thinkers sensitivity to their environment. 
This would show how it would be impossible to give an individuating account of the 
content of the thought that our entire conceptual system is mistaken. as opposed to 
a thought that part of it is. So when I claim that this idea has no content. I want to 
suggest that this is an idea we could make no sense of. A similar point is made by 
John Mc Dowell in -Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following' in Wittgenstein: to Follow a 
Rule. ed. by Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 1981) p. 150. where he says "We cannot occupy the independent 
perspective that platonism envisages: and it is only because we confusedly think we 
can that we think we can make any sense of it." This idea of content is discussed in 
greater detail with reference to \Viggins' marks of truth in chapter 2. 
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wrongly conceptualised either way, but that it can be conceptualised both ways. Both 
conceptualisations may be incomplete, but to have an incomplete understanding of 
something is not necessarily to be totally wrong about it. Thus there is no content to 
the idea that reality and our selves might be totally other than the way our concepts 
present them, and therefore looking at our concepts should be able to give us some 
guide as to some of the characteristics of ourselves and the world we inhabit. 
1.2 Subject, Concept and World 
It might still be argued that although I have shown that what our conceptual systems 
are about cannot be wholly other than the way those conceptual systems present them, 
this would still be no use in revealing what our selves are like, but only what reality, 
or the world is like. The obvious answer to this is that we also conceptualise about 
ourselves, and that the same constraints on conceptualisation about ourselves apply as 
is the case with conceptualisation about reality in general. We are a part of that 
reality. The objection, however, seems to be based on a picture of the relation 
between subject, conception and object which we have already rejected. To help us 
see the problem I would like to consider two pictures of the way we think about 
ourselves as subjects conceptualising a world. 
The first is of a world which is the way it is, entirely independent of us or any other 
observers, which we view, as it were, through the spectacles of our concepts. These 
spectacles colour our perception of the objective world, and they are spectacles which 
we cannot remove, so we can never see the world as it is independently of us and our 
concepts. In this picture concepts represent or model the world for us, and we play the 
role of detached observers. This is the picture we have rejected by the arguments 
above. The world is not, and cannot be something totally other than our conceptions 
of it, and therefore cannot be at a distance from us in the way this picture seems to 
suggest. 
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The other possible picture is of much more inter-relation between the three elements. 
It would not, in this picture, be the case that an individual, or even humankind in 
general, would be independent observers of a world that is the way it is despite them. 
Some of the world is, after all, the way it is because of us, and we are to some extent 
the way we are because of the world. It would be a picture of an interaction between 
world and observer via the medium of concepts, but neither the world nor the observer 
would be capable of being understood independently of the other or of concepts. 3 To 
try and conceptualise the subject, and here I mean the individual subject, in total 
independence of the way we conceptualise the world, or vice versa, would be to claim 
that we have two entirely different sets of concepts, and would leave us with a 
question as to how we succeed in conceptualising ourselves, what standards of 
correctness we could possibly have for concepts about ourselves. This is not to say 
that the world is something we construct, in the sense of create from nothing, out of 
concepts, since that would see us as independently existing and the world as 
dependent on us and the same problem about conceptualisation would arise. Rather 
this picture shows both the world and ourselves as real objects, but not entirely 
separable, since we are not something independent of the world even though we tend 
to view it as something independent of us, and as something that could be conceived 
of in ways different from ours, and it is not wholly independent of us since we are a 
part of it. The way we perceive both ourselves, the world and the interaction between 
us is through the medium of conceptualisation, but the conceptualisation itself is part 
of that interaction. It is not that there is a observer and something to be observed and 
concepts setting up a model of the observed. Observer, observed and model (subject, 
3A similar picture of the relations between subject and world appears in Jonathan 
Dancy's Moral Reasons. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). Ch. 2. p.32-34. where he rejects a 
Cartesian picture. His approach starts from a different point but we converge on a 
cognitive extemalist picture of reasons for action being facts about us and our 
environmen t. 
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the world and concepts) are all inter-related. Concepts are not added onto our 
interaction with and involvement in the world, they are part of that interaction.4 
Since, however, subject and world are not separated from one another, and part of the 
interaction between them is in terms of language and concepts, then the concepts used 
by the subject say something, however inaccurately about both the world and the 
subject. World, subject and concepts are not separate from one another, and looking 
at anyone should therefore give us information about the others. Yet even this idea 
somehow distorts the image; it seems to suggest that we can look at language in 
abstraction from ourselves and the world and find out something about both of them. 
What we have to consider ourselves as doing is looking at the interaction of subject, 
world and language, not from outside this interaction, but from within it. This 
analysis would not be done independently of subject, world or language, or tell us 
anything about any of these three elements independently of the others, but it seems to 
me that it should be possible to reflect on the interaction as a whole through the forms 
it usually takes, and discover something about the way it relates the elements of itself 
to one another. 
There is need for caution here, however, since our new picture of the interrelation of 
subject, language and reality might lead us to think that we have lost any notion of 
objectivity here. At least with the old picture the world was separate from us and 
anything we discovered about it would be an objective discovery. Have we, in our 
new picture, sacrificed this objectivity and exchanged it for a wholly subjective world; 
does our interactive picture show us each subject alone with their own world and 
4-J'his point bears some similarity to John Campbell's discussion of causal 
indexicality and working concepts in Past.Space and Self (Cambridge. Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1995). section 2.2. Here Campbell shows that our interaction with the world 
requires the use of concepts that are related to our causal powers (causal indexicals) 
and concepts with causal significance (working concepts). Both of these types of 
concept are grasped not as a theoretical understanding of the causal properties of 
ourselves and others, they are not separable from our involvrnent with the world, but 
as a practical understanding in the course of our interaction with the world. 
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language? Our first world picture was criticised because it seemed to have no 
resources for saying that conceptualisation of the world could be wholly other than the 
way the world really was, although this was what it maintained. On the other hand, 
could our second picture be criticised for not allowing any understanding at all of how 
a subject might be wrong about the world. IT subject, language and world are all 
interlinked, then won't subject and world always fit with language? IT so, there seems 
to be no way we could say a subject might be wrong about the world; there might be 
no room for the concept of being mistaken. 
This is to go further, however, than our argument warrants. The rejection of the idea 
that reality may be so far from us that our conceptualisation could not grasp it does not 
entail moving it so close that our conceptualisation is hardly separable at all. We may 
have rejected a totally mind-independent reality, but this does not warrant accepting a 
totally mind-dependent reality5. In order to be able to retain the idea of being 
mistaken about things, we need a picture of a reality or world which contains us as 
subjects, and our conceptions of it which are one of our interactions with, or responses 
to it. Thus the world is not our creation, and therefore mind-dependent; what we find 
in the world is a result of the interaction between us, the world and our language. 
It is also worth bearing in mind that conceptualisation is not the whole of our 
interaction with the world. Perhaps in a sense it lags behind the rest of our interaction. 
We live in the world, and part of that living in the world is conceptualising it, but we 
also use concepts to stand back from our interaction with the world and describe it. In 
this sense concepts may be said to lag behind experience of and living in the world. 
We may develop ways of living, modify our interaction with the world, and thus need 
5Again as Campbell pOints out, see note 4. the objective world of objects and 
subjects with causal powers is essential to our understanding of ourselves and the 
world. and our practical interaction with it. It is. however. an objective world. 
despite our involvement with it. For more about the concept of mind-dependence or 
-independence as it applies to our concepts. see the discussion of Michael Luntley's 
distinctions in this respect in Chapter 2. 
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to develop new concepts to allow new ways of thinking about it. Concepts may not 
always adequately fit how we meet with and live in the world; we can discover new 
facets of that interaction, and even as we do so our interaction changes and moves on. 
So concepts are part of our interaction yet they can also stand back and comment on 
that interaction. Yet there is no access to the world independently of 
conceptualisation, independently of our or any other interaction with it. There may be 
other possible interactions with the world which would view it differently, and in this 
sense the world is independent of us. But these views of the world would not be any 
more objective or absolute than our view is. If we could come to understand them it 
would only be via a more complex interaction, a new way of living, involving the 
world, ourselves, others and some common concepts. There would be no conception 
of the world without interaction with it, and therefore no absolute conception of the 
world .. as it is in itself, unconceptualised by anyone or anything. Even a God's-eye 
view of the world would be a conception of some sort. Yet to say that there is no non-
conceptual encounter with the world is not to say that there is nothing to be 
encountered. Our encounter is with the world, not a figment of our imagination. 
These conceptions we have of the world may change, but they will do so in response 
to our experience of the world and not vice versa. What we are conceptualising is the 
world, because it is more than just ours as we conceive of it now, it can sustain our 
conceptions of it, but there seems no reason to assume our present one is the only 
conception it can sustain, and therefore our conception of it can and does change. 
So we have reached a position that what we conceptualise is not totally different from 
our conceptualisation of it. It is something capable of being grasped by our 
conceptual systems, and is in fact grasped by them and presented to us in a more or 
less accurate fashion. We can assess the accuracy of any claim. by an individual or a 
community, in tenns of the standards of correctness that our interaction with the world 
gives us. We have concepts which we may modify in the light of our already 
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conceptualised experience, and these concepts are about a reality which is capable of 
sustaining a variety of conceptions of it. 
1.3 The Discovery Process 
So how do we go about our task of discovering something about ourselves and our 
interaction with the world we live in via the medium of the concepts we use. I said 
above that I wanted to look at the fonns our conceptual interaction with the world 
usually take, to discover something about the nature of that interaction, about the way 
it relates the elements of itself to one another. What possibility will we have of 
discovering what we really are, and what is the force of 'really' here? It must be in 
terms of our interaction with the world and concepts, but still objective in that it is a 
discovery by that interaction, it is something that we do not personally create and 
cannot avoid. But what does 'our' mean here? Should we be looking at the 
individual's interaction with the world, at the community's interaction, or at humanity's 
interaction? If what we find in the world is to be real it must be somehow 
independent of the individual's private view of the world. The criteria for what is to 
count as real cannot surely be just what the individual thinks about the world. Even if 
there were only one individual who could conceptualise, on our picture of the 
interaction between subject world and concepts, the constraints on his concepts come 
not just from the individual but from the world as well. If the individual is part of a 
larger community that conceptualises the world in the same way, then this community 
and their concepts will be part of the world as well, and so part of what constrains the 
concepts used. We do not have here a picture of an individual subject, living in his 
own private world and interacting with it in tenns of his own private concepts. The 
world he lives in and is part of is larger than him. When he thinks about it. the ways 
he thinks about it will be constrained by how it is as well as by how he is. In this 
sense both the world and his concepts are public, and so his experience is also public: 
world. concepts and experience are all the sorts of things that are available to anything 
25 
that has his type of interaction with the world, whether or not there is anything else 
that has that type of interaction. The individual not only uses public concepts to think 
about and to communicate to others the truth about the world as he finds it, but the 
way that he finds it must be understood by him in terms of the concepts he is given or 
develops. This is another sense in which his concepts are pUblic. If he is part of a 
community who share the same subject/concept/world interaction, then his concepts 
will be acquired from his community via communication. 'We' or 'our' then refers to 
those who share the same sort of subject/concept/world interaction and so 
conceptualise the world in the same way The subject's concepts aim at revealing truth 
about the world both to him and to anyone who share his type of interaction with the 
world, but also at helping the individual to understand, formulate and organise his 
experience in the world. So the subject's interaction with the world both regulates his 
use of concepts, and is mediated through them. 
We must also bear in mind that regulation here is not by intersubjective agreement, it 
is regulation with respect to truth, a regulation which will distinguish between the 
truth of a situation and the judgements we make about it. That is, the individual, the 
group, community, or even all of humanity must be able to discover that they have 
been mistaken about things. We can agree as much as we like that the world is flat, 
that will not make it so. If we are both individually and en masse, subjects living in 
and interacting with a world, then even en masse the world is part of what constrains 
our conceptualisation of it. The very fact that we do change our ways of thinking 
about our environment and ourselves, and that those changes are in response to 
something, not merely random, show that the truth of how things are is not constituted 
by what we think about it, but can and does force changes on our ways of thinking. 
We are not just thinking or talking amongst ourselves about some figment of our 
imagination, we are involved in interacting with a common world in and through the 
medium of common concepts, and the way that world is limits what we can truly think 
about it and the ways we can actually interact with it. 
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This picture both of concepts being regulated by our experience and formulating our 
responses to that experience raises two questions. What notion of truth is being used 
here and how does truth regulate my and others conception of the world and allow a 
truth/judgement distinction? I will come back to the first question later on, but it 
seems that the answer to the second question will decide how independent or universal 
are the things that are discovered via this subject/concept/world interaction. Will what 
is discovered about us and our interaction be the same for everyone, or only relevant 
to particular groups? Is there an interaction common to humanity, to different 
societies, to a particular gender, a religious or an ethical community? How broadly do 
we take a type of interaction? If it is a way of thinking about and interacting with the 
world, how do we discover how people think? The obvious answer is that we do this 
by looking at how they behave and listening to what they say. Then, however, the 
problem of how to analyse different languages arises. Are any discoveries made on 
the basis of use of a common natural language or a sub-language or jargon? If we 
answer this question differently with respect to different fields of enquiry and different 
discourses, we may in the end discover things that will only exist for some groups and 
not others. It seems possible that only if people" speak the same language' will they 
find the same things in the world. So is it possible to find a language that we all speak 
in all circumstances, or can we find a way of looking at our different languages that 
will analyse them in the same way and thus provide a common ground for their 
assessment? The move has been made here from concepts to language on the basis 
that it is in language that I am discussing all this, and it is my and other people's 
language that gives me access to how they and I think about the world. Nonetheless it 
must not be forgotten that new ways of thinking cause us to modify our language, to 
invent new terminology and restrict or broaden old terminology. So the language we 
develop reflects and frames the concepts we use. 
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Talk about languages, sub-languages and jargons, and the notorious difficulties of 
translation make it apparent that we do not, in some sense all speak the same language 
in all circumstances. Yet if there are sub-languages, languages suitable to different 
areas of our lives, different ways of interacting with the world and one another, they 
seem, nonetheless, to be developments out of a common everyday sort of language 
that we all share. It may be that in certain areas of life people find it necessary to be 
precise about technical terminology, about the special elements of that sort of 
interaction, and thus find the need to develop, expand or restrict the application of 
terms, or even to develop new terms. All this is done, however, against a background 
use of language and concepts that we do seem to have in common. I want to argue 
that there are some ways of interacting with the world that are common to all of us, 
even if we speak a different natural language. We have some ways of interacting with 
the world, in terms of how we move around and negotiate the more obvious features 
of everyday life, which anyone that we are capable of recognising as interacting with 
and conceptualising the world will also have to have. That is not to say that there may 
not be ways of interacting with reality that we would not recognise, but this seems to 
be a bare possibility that cannot make any difference to us and our interaction with 
reality. Anyone, however, whom we can and do recognise as sharing our sort of 
everyday interaction with the world, has a common basis with us for exploring the 
possible differences of conception that we find useful or necessary. If we can start at 
this everyday discourse we may be able to move on from it into other more specialised 
discourses and see how they develop out of the everyday discourse; where they 
develop or depart from it. 
How are we to set about analysing this everyday discourse, our interaction with the 
grosser features of everyday life. If we look at language from a purely grammatical 
point of view then different natural languages may have different grammatical 
structures which would appear to show each language as relating to reality in different 
ways, as recognising different sorts of objects and relations. If. howe\"er. we attempt 
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to eliminate these differences by using some sort of logical analysis, how are we to go 
about it? 
1.4 The Context Principle 
The way I want to consider is to use a principle which Frege introduces as the second 
of three methodological principles in the Introduction to the Grundlagen6. These are:-
1) Always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the 
subjective from the objective. 
2) Never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the 
context of a proposition. 
3) Always to bear in mind the distinction between object and concept. 
These principles seem to set up three possibilities III sorting out the interrelation 
between subject, language and reality. 
The first sets up a distinction between entities that depend on our minds, and those 
that are mind independent, the former discoverable by psychological analysis and the 
latter by logical analysis. It introduces the familiar notion that what really exists is 
independent of what we think about the world or what we seem to discover in it. We 
have to be careful here, though, as to what is meant by 'we' here. Is the distinction 
being made between what an individual perceives as opposed to the rest of humanity, 
or his community, or between what human beings are inclined to see in the world and 
what is really there? The use of psychological and logical as separate areas of study 
suggests that what is psychological is not going to be applied solely to the individual 
subject, but to human ways of thinking. 
6Gottlob Frege. The Foundations of Arithmetic. trans. J L Austin. 2nd ed .. (Oxford: 
Blackwell. 1989). p. x. 
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The second principle, the Context Principle, suggests that, although we want to find 
out what words mean, and how language relates to the world, this is not possible if we 
consider the words on their own, it can only be done if the words are understood in the 
context of a proposition. Here again caution is required. Is the meaning of a word to 
be found in the context of one proposition in which it occurs, or in any proposition in 
which it occurs, or in the context of all actual or possible propositions it might occur 
in? Here the single proposition cannot be enough, for the word may be used in a non-
standard way, and if it is we will surely only discover this by measuring its usage in 
this sentence against the meanings of the other words in the proposition. If they all 
had their meaning given by their role in individual propositions, it is hard to see how 
we might grasp their meaning at all. This suggests that, at the very least, the meaning 
of a word must be found in the role it plays in a variety of propositions. In some sense 
the role a word can play in some new proposition is constrained by the role it has 
played in past propositions. Neither Humpty Dumpty nor we can make words mean 
anything we like. Whether this should be taken as far as constraining or being 
constrained by all possible propositions looks dubious. Word use develops, words 
often get used in ways which might at one time have been thought incompatible with 
their meaning; current uses of 'wicked' or 'cool' spring to mind. Here some of the past 
patterns of usage cease to constrain current usage, and new patterns develop. It is 
those new patterns that now give us the meaning of these terms, or sometimes both 
patterns are current and so meaning will depend on patterns of use in context. People 
may deplore the change of meaning of a word like 'gay' from happy to homosexual, 
but they cannot deny that its current meaning is found in its patterns of use. So quite 
how widely the field of propositions which constrain a word's use and give its 
meaning might be is open to debate, but it is surely wider than the individual 
proposition. 
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The third principle seems to be talking about a definable distinction between objects 
and concepts. In Frege's work an object is a complete entity as opposed to a concept, 
which is incomplete. That is, objects and concepts are what are referred to in 
language by names, or singular terms, and predicates respectively. Now a name can 
seem to stand on its own, it has nothing that needs to be added to it. A predicate, 
however, needs to be applied to something, it has a vacancy to be filled. Thus' ... is 
red' needs completing by some singular term such as 'this pen'. It is worth noting that 
this is not the way I have been using 'concept'. I am not restricting its use to 
predicates, but include singular terms and relations within its scope. In the way of 
thinking about language and thought used in this thesis, objects, as well as properties 
and relations, are the content of concepts, they are what concepts are about. 
These three principles combine the idea that what we find in the world is what exists 
independently of our perceiving it with the idea that whatever we find is discoverable 
only through looking at the role that terms referring to these things play in 
propositions, and therefore their role in language. The context principle, the second 
principle above, says that only by looking at the role words play in propositions can 
we find out their meanings, that is in Fregean terms, what they refer to. Only by 
looking at the relations of words to one another in propositions, can we see what sorts 
of objects and relations are recognised by our interaction with the world, what we 
think about and how we think about it. So the Fregean view is that this sort of logical 
analysis is possible; that all language is capable of logical analysis which will reveal 
through its structure how that language relates to reality. 
What do we mean by logical analysis here, however? If what is meant is reduction to 
some symbolism, to some other language in effect. there seem to be a number of 
difficulties. Classical logic seems too limited to translate, or represent. many of the 
things we want to say in everyday language, and although different types of logic have 
been developed in an attempt to expand the areas of natural language to which it 
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might be applicable, we do not yet seem to have an analysis in terms of symbolic logic 
which can cope with everyday language completely. Further, any reduction to 
symbolism regards as irrelevant the nuances of everyday language that contribute to 
its richness and its ability to express and reflect our experience in a variety of ways. 
Even if we could do the logical analysis, could we do it without antecedently 
assuming a specific relationship between subject, language and world that makes the 
analysis come out the way we want it to? It may seem that the obvious way to decide 
on what is a correct logical analysis of some language is to decide what are real 
objects and then only allow these to appear as the referents of singular terms in the 
logical analysis of that language, and similarly with predicates and relations. This, of 
course, will not do for our project of discovering what the real nature of our 
interaction with the world is. What we need is a way of ensuring a correct logical 
analysis independent of knowing what this is. So what will or could provide a 
criterion of correctness for our logical analysis? If symbolic logical analysis will not 
do, if we cannot reduce our everyday language to a symbolic language and read off the 
structure of the world and our place in it from the structure of this symbolic language 
and the role terms referring to us play in it, what sort of analysis can we carry out? 
I.S The Role of Truth 
Perhaps we can have recourse here to the constraints on language I mentioned earlier. 
In his paper "The Thought,,7, Frege says that the task of logic is "to discern the laws of 
truth.", "logic has the same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat." That is, 
truth is what logic is about. So a logical analysis will be an analysis with respect to 
truth. It does not have to be a reduction to symbols but it must preserve the distinction 
we make between what we judge to be the case and what truly is the case; it must 
preserve the truth/judgement distinction. Rather than reducing languages to symbolic 
7Gottlob Frege. 'The Thought'. in Scott and Soames. eds .. Propositions and Attitudes. (Oxford: O.lf.P .. 
1988) 
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logic our logical analysis could look at the patterns inherent in our use of lanruacre 
b b' 
which reflect the patterns inherent in our thinking; patterns that have reference to and 
are regulated by notions of truth and rationality. If, whatever the language we are 
talking, whatever group or community we are talking with, we are aiming to 
communicate truths about our experience of and interactions with the world, then 
there are going to be patterns discernible in our use of language that are related to 
truth. Our use of terms in our language will commit us to certain types of behaviour, 
including linguistic behaviour. Our possibilities of understanding one another to be 
making communications aimed at truth, or to be thinking about a common situation 
will also acknowledge certain notions of rational behaviour. This seems most readily 
apparent in our everyday interaction with the world, our talk about material objects 
and the ways we relate to them, and I think it is this sort of talk that forms the basis for 
our concepts of truth and rationality. 
If we say "That is a chair over there", then we are committed to all sorts of other 
behaviour if we are to be seen as rational and attempting to tell the truth. This 
includes anything from offering it to someone who needs a seat, to walking round it 
when we head in that direction, to expecting it to be there if we turn away and then 
look back at it. Similarly the way we explain other's or our own behaviour depends on 
how we think about things. If I draw up a chair for someone who comes into the 
room, then the explanation of my behaviour is that I thought they wanted to sit down, 
and I thought the chair was there for sitting on, even if I in fact say nothing. So what I 
am calling logical analysis is some analysis which looks at the things we say and do 
and asks what else our behaviour, including linguistic behaviour commits us to if we 
are aiming at truth in our communications and assuming rational behaviour in others. 
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If we make a distinction between the truth of a situation and a subject's judgement 
about it, what further judgements or behaviour are we committed to?8 
In doing this we must assume that truth is not just relative to some language or jargon, 
but is at least common to the subject/concept/world interaction: that we know what 
truth is, even if we cannot define it, and that it is something that does not change with 
changes in our type of discourse. When I say that it is common to a 
subject/concept/world interaction, this must not be taken as suggesting that if our 
interaction with the world, our ways of thinking about it, have changed then the truth 
has changed as well. The point is that truth regulates our thinking in tenus of the 
interaction we have with the world, but development of a new way of interacting does 
not require that the world has changed, so much as our way of understanding it has 
changed. If that is what has happened then the same truth will regulate this newly 
developed understanding. If truth were constituted by some discourse or way of 
thinking, if the truth of a situation were to be what the appropriate discourse or way of 
thinking says it is then we would have no hold on the idea that the discourse or way of 
thinking may itself have got things wrong.9 We must also assume that all the 
languages or jargons this logical analysis is attempting to analyse are in fact subject to 
the truth/judgement distinction. Thus, if we assume, as has been done in the past, that 
aesthetic or moral judgements, for example, are not candidates for truth, or are only so 
for a limited time or place, then the objects we might find by a logical analysis of 
these languages will not be objects for everyone, but only for some specific group of 
people at some specific period of time. I would like to postpone discussion of this 
latter point for the moment 1 0 and concentrate on the case of discourse about material 
Brhis idea is similar to the idea of canonical commitments that C Peacocke deals in 
more detail in his Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Aristotelian Society Series. Vol. 4. 
(Oxford: Blackwell. 1986). 
9For more about this question see the discussion of truth and objectivity in chapter 
3. 
lOSee the discussion of sophisticated moral realism in chapter 2 
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objects, since this will perhaps help us clarify our notions of truth and rationality, and 
the role they play in this analysis. 
It certainly seems to be the case that our view of truth will affect what objects we 
eventually discover in this process of analysis. A coherence view of truth, for 
example, may not produce objects other than linguistic objects, since truth may have 
reference only to the connection between our beliefs and not to the world at all. 
Whereas a correspondence theory would seem to require an ability to assess how 
things are in the world, independent of language. David Wiggins 11 has produced, if 
not a theory of truth, at least some marks of truth which link truth to the possibility of 
translation and understanding communication via an assumption of rationality. The 
idea is that the possibility of our understanding one another, in terms both of language 
and behaviour, depends on attributing true beliefs to others about an environment 
which we and they have in common. In discussing this he has produced five marks of 
truth which are minimal constraints on what count as true beliefs, that is his marks are 
marks of what we have to hold of the concept 'true' to use it for understanding others 
and our own language and behaviour. I think it possible that these are the sorts of 
constraints that would have to apply to an individual's thoughts about his situation, 
even if he were the only conceptualiser around, but as we are clearly not in that 
situation I shall not pursue this further. 
If this is the view of truth we are working with, and it is one which I think captures 
some of the essential elements of our understanding of truth, then to come up with 
objects recognised as such by others, we need to acknowledge a common rationality 
and a common type of subject/language/world interaction which allows us to link 
truth and language via logic. To use an earlier example, to explain the behaviour of 
11 David Wiggins. Needs. Values. Truth. 2nd ed.. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1991). 
Also see the more detailed discussion of Wiggins' marks of truth in chapter 2. For 
the n10ment I hope that an outline of his ideas will suffice. 
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someone who offers a chair to someone entering the room, we have to think that it is 
reasonable to offer a seat to someone under such circumstances and that the person 
who offers the chair is, like us, someone who both recognises the need for a chair, and 
recognises chairs. That is we have to see them as indulging in certain sorts of 
behaviour for which they have reasons we recognise, and as relating that behaviour to 
the circumstances we and they find ourselves in. 
Given this notion of truth we then have the question of what is the status of what is 
revealed to us by this logical analysis. The picture we rejected above of subject 
observing and commenting on a world totally independent of his conception of it 
seemed to produce an intuitive notion that what truth delivers to us is the world as it is 
independent of any conception of it. If this is not the case then what does truth deliver 
to us? Truth regulates the applicability of a particular type of subject's conception to 
the world, whether this conception is a correct conception by the standards of what 
conceptions are possible for that sort of subject, what conceptions fit or belong to that 
type of subject's interaction with the world. So truth does not deliver the world as it is 
independent of any conception, it relates an individual's token conception to the type 
of conception suitable for that individual's type of subject/concept/world interaction. 
If the subject's type of interaction changes then the way he truly conceptualises the 
world will have changed, but truth itself will not have changed, it will still be what 
relates his new conception to his mode of interaction with the world. This does not 
mean that truth delivers objects that are a product of a conception, as if the conception 
were independent of the world, what it delivers is the world as conceptualised by a 
particular type of interaction with it. If truth is something that ranges over many 
possible conceptions of a world that is also capable of sustaining this variety of 
conceptions then it seems that what truth delivers to us is something independent of 
particular conceptions, but perceived in a particular way by each conception. 
36 
1.6 Thinking about the material world 
To help clarify what I mean here I want to consider in general how we think about the 
material world, the world of medium sized physical objects and our place in it, to gain 
an understanding of rationality in this context and of how this type of analysis might 
work. As I said above, the everyday interaction that we have with the world, the 
discourse of material objects and our relations to them provides a basis for discovering 
our canons of truth and rationality. We see the world in terms of material objects and 
our reactions and relations to them are easily assessed both in linguistic and physical 
terms. We have a fairly clear idea of what is rational behaviour with respect to our 
relations to material objects; we get out of their way if they are heading for us, we use 
them in ways appropriate to their kind, we move them around or move around them in 
ways that suit our convenience, we know fairly clearly how to identify them and the 
sorts of things they might be expected to do. So can we use this mode of interaction 
with the world as a starting point? If we can use truth, and a concept of rationality 
derived from this mode of interacting, we can look at the patterns of use of this sort of 
language to gain an understanding of the world and ourselves in terms of material 
objects that could form a basis for moving on to understanding other modes of 
interaction that we have with the world. 12 
Do these notions of truth and rationality, however, gIve us a hold on our way of 
understanding things in material terms or are they just a product of this way of 
understanding? If they are just a product of this way of understanding things, would 
we be justified in moving on from this way of understanding or thinking about the 
world, to other different ways on the basis of this way? I argued above that truth was 
not a product of any particular way of thinking about the world, that it would continue 
12This is an approach that I develop in the latter half of chapter 4 and chapter 5 in 
an attempt to understand our moral interaction with the world based on Gareth 
Evans' methodology in investigating our interaction with the world of material 
objects. 
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to regulate any conception of the world as it and the subject/concept/world interaction 
it belonged to developed. Canons of rationality, however, might be relative to a 
particular way of thinking about the world. The sorts of rational reactions to and links 
between claims in material terms and material concepts are likely to be very different 
from the reactions to and links between, for example, mathematical concepts and 
claims. However, it seems likely that we will assess people as rational in general, at 
least initially, on the basis of their behaviour in and reactions to the material world , 
and only then will we feel capable of exploring other ways of thinking about things 
that they may have. 
This raises the question, however, of whether the world has to be seen in terms of 
material objects just because we see it that way. Is this true? If this is raising the 
question of whether we have to see the world this way the answer seems to be that we 
do, at least until and unless we learn to interact with it in other ways. We see the 
world in terms of objects, and perhaps basically in terms of material objects. Abstract 
objects perhaps are linked to material objects but we have a tendency to feel that the 
only real things are the objects that we bump into as we move around the world. We 
may talk about abstract objects in the same sort of way as we do about concrete ones, 
but we somehow feel that they don't really exist in the world. To say that, however, is 
to revert to the picture of the world as it really is independently of anyone's interaction 
with it. That is to say that even if there were no human beings, or perhaps even 
animals, there would still be rocks and trees in the world, but there would be no 
numbers or colours or nations or games or food. So the rocks and trees are what really 
count as objects. 
Do we really have a right to say this though? If, for example, we interacted with the 
world in terms of processes rather than objects we might be inclined to say that even if 
the world did not contain the processes that H'e are there \vould still be changings and 
crrowinos but not human life processes. In which case there would be no absolute 
b C' 
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sense In which we could say that there really are rocks and trees as opposed to 
changings and growings. The point is that if we are part of a subjectJIanguage/world 
interaction, then the sorts of objects produced by any interaction, provided that we can 
in some sense discover what they are, are all as real as the objects produced by any 
other interaction. Of course, if we came across someone who saw the world in terms 
of processes, or in some other way, it seems that if we were to understand them all it 
would have to be in terms that we could interpret as reacting to material objects. We, 
and presumably they also, would individuate these processes by means of the objects 
that were part of them. If we could not do this, I suspect that we would not even 
recognise these people as subjects conceptualising and interacting with the world and 
could therefore make no attempt to understand their species of interaction. So we, at 
present, have to see the world in terms of material objects. That does not, however, 
imply that everything that has an interaction with the world has to interact with it in 
terms of material objects, although it does imply that we would not recognise as an 
interaction with the world at all any interaction that we could not relate to our material 
object interaction. 
So we can only come to share another's conception of the world if we have some 
common ground with them. We need to have some basis whereby we recognise them 
as capable of communicating with us and vice versa, some canons of rational 
behaviour that we share. It seems that recognition of and reactions to material objects 
can and would have to, in our case at least, provide this basis. Whether this other 
thinks of the world in terms of objects or processes, or some other way entirely, unless 
we can understand their behaviour in terms of interaction with a world of material 
objects we would have no basis for communication with them, and thus no way of 
assessing either their rationality or the truth of their judgements. 
We still seem to be assummg, however. that even if this other responds to and 
interacts with material objects, he will be conceptualising the world in terms of the 
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same set of material objects that we do. Is this a fair assumption? If the world is 
conceptualised in terms of material objects, is there only one set of these objects that 
we and anyone else who conceptualises the world this way is bound to recognise, or 
might subjects who both conceptualise the world in terms of material objects, but use 
different faculties to recognise them, succeed in recognising different sets of such 
objects? Isn't it possible that other conceptions of the world could discover other 
objects either totally different from or in addition to the ones discovered by our 
conception? Isn't is arrogant of us to assume that the analysis of our view of the world 
will pick out the right objects, or even the only objects there are, even if we allow that 
different conceptions find different properties for these objects? Of course it might be 
argued that material objects just are the sorts of things we recognise by our senses of 
sight and touch, and that any things recognised by other senses, but not by ours will 
not count as material objects. Or can we argue that every conception of the world is 
picking out the same objects and attaching different properties to them? If so what 
happens if we come across a conception of the world which seems to recognise 
objects which we do not? 
If we are usmg something like Wiggins' "marks of truth" to help us analyse our 
language, this is dependent on the possibility of communication and the transmission 
of meaning. The only way, however, that we seem able to assess that is by assessing 
another's behaviour, both linguistic and other behaviour, in the light of our conception 
of the world. We need to have some common ground in order to communicate, but if, 
given this, he seems to react to the world in a way that doesn't fit our conception on it, 
do we have any basis for judging between our conception and his? In the case of the 
individual it seems that we judge him as psychotic or irrational. He seems to see 
some aspects of the world our way, he eats and drinks and walks around the furniture 
rather than through it, but he also, for example, consistently avoids objects that are not 
detectable by us at all. We just seem to write off those aspects of his experience that 
we cannot relate to as delusory. We explain his behaviour in terms of beliefs he has, 
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but we think he is mistaken in applying some of his concepts. If he avoids one comer 
of the room because he thinks there is a table there, but we can walk throu ah it then 
b , 
we have to see him as imagining the table. Think of a more common case such as a 
child's imaginary friend. We may comply with requests to leave room for them at the 
table, but we relegate them to the realm of the imaginary . We are humouring the 
child, not conceding the existence of a real, but invisible, intangible person. We 
explain the child's or the psychotic's behaviour in tenus or our 'correct' understanding 
of the world. 
Would this be a justifiable procedure in the case if a group of subjects? If we come 
across a group of people who, while agreeing with us on the general make-up of the 
world, claim to perceive a whole class of objects that we do not. Not only that, but 
they have a physical theory that encompasses these objects, and explains the world as 
we perceive it, at least as well as does our physical theory, and they claim that they 
have an extra faculty which allows them to perceive these objects. Would we then 
write off their experience? And if not, would we allow that they are perceiving 
objects which are not in any way detectable by us? 
It might be argued that the above scenarIO IS not intelligible, SInce if these 
'undetectable objects' playa part in their physical theory, then they ought to impinge 
on the objects that we recognise in a way that we can detect. If they are such that they 
do not, then it could be argued that, provided the new theory doesn't improve on our 
explanation of the world, there is no reason for us to attempt to incorporate into our 
model of the world, objects that do not impinge on it. But these objects do impinge 
on it in some way, since they provide an explanation for the behaviour of this group of 
people. We seem to have no other explanation for their behaviour except to class 
them as psychotic in some sense. 
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So what basis do we have for deciding whether they have access to a different 
conception of reality which includes objects ours does not and so is partially 
incomprehensible to us, or whether they are suffering from a group hallucination, or 
maintaining some obscure ritual? And if we are prepared to decide for the first 
option, why should the case of the individual be decided the other way? Is it that he 
does not even try to explain why we see things differently, and that if he or we could 
make a coherent attempt to encompass both viewpoints, then we would credit him 
with a different conception of the world? 
This cannot be the case, since this is surely one of the things that neuro-science is 
trying to do. If we succeed, however, in finding a physical or psychological 
explanation for the psychotic's condition, we seem unlikely to class him as rational but 
different on the basis of this explanation. We are going to regard his behaviour as a 
deficit in normal human functioning. Yet it seems arrogant to insist that our 
conception of the world is the only possible correct one, at least in the tenns of the 
objects it identifies. It may be that there are limits to a conception of the world that 
we can intelligibly hold, and that we would have to recognise those limits. I am not 
clear, however, that these have to be seen as limits applicable to all conceptions of the 
world. That, it seems, is what the first option outlined above does; it is happy with 
allowing other conceptions to identify new properties as long as they are attached to 
the old objects, but it doesn't want to allow new objects. 
If we were to attempt to analyse the language of this "aberrant" group of people. we 
would have a whole class of propositions for which we personally had no 
truth/judgement distinction. So it seems that either we have to accept their analysis of 
their language, which it seems likely will allow a class of objects we cannot recognise. 
Or we have to say that there are propositions in their language which we have to 
assess as false. or possibly meaningless, since we cannot assess them as true. 
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1.7 Possibility of Lack of Truth/Judgement Distinction 
If this is the case for some possible, but as yet undiscovered group of people, does it 
not cause a problem for analysis of our own conceptualisation. Can there be concepts 
like this in our own ways of thinking? Can it be the case that we can coherently 
conceive of things for which there is no truth/judgement distinction? If we can it 
seems that our project for discovering what is an object is going to be frustrated from 
the start. If truth is going to regulate our patterns of use of language and ways of 
thinking, and allow us to discover through logical analysis what objects there are, then 
can we afford to have propositions which allow of no truth/judgement distinction, at 
least by us? 
It may seem, at first sight, that abstract objects are going to pose these sorts of 
questions for us. When we come to analyse the patterns of use of our language, we 
come across singular tenns which certainly don't have, as their referents, physical 
objects, of which the paradigm examples are numbers or directions. But does the fact 
that there are no physical objects for these terms to refer to mean that we have no 
truth/judgement distinctions available to assess propositions concerning them? Are 
we to say that, because we identify such objects contextually, that is in terms of 
linguistic definitions, that the assessment of the truth of proposition containing them 
is a matter that is totally internal to language? And if so, does this leave us isolated in 
linguistic idealism? 
I think not, because that is to forget the picture of the interrelation of language and the 
world that we are working with. There are two points to be made here. Firstly, that 
language is not something separate from the world, something independent of it which 
provides a commentary on it. Language is something which arises from and is part of 
our interaction with as well as our conception of the world. To say something is 
internal to language is to picture it as locked up in language. and bearing no essential 
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relation to the world. But even this concept of the world, unspecified as such, is part 
of our conceptual interaction with it. If language itself is a part of our interaction with 
the world of which we are a part, then whatever is part of language is in some sense 
also a part of the world, not apart from it, and whatever the world is it is part of what 
makes our language the language it is. This leads to the second point, which is that 
the lack of physical objects as referents for abstract singular terms does not need to be 
a problem for holding a truth judgement distinction with respect to them. With this 
picture of the interaction of subject, world and language, what gives abstract objects a 
truth/judgement distinction is something rooted in our practices, and therefore in our 
interaction with the world. Even if the truth judgement distinction in a particular case 
were wholly linguistic, that is not to isolate it from the world and our interaction with 
it but just to locate it in a particular part of that interaction. 
Nevertheless there may still be a problem with evidence-transcendent truths. In the 
case of the people who detect objects undetectable to us, it seems possible that we can 
conceive that some such objects exist, since this seems to be the best explanation for 
their otherwise inexplicable behaviour; yet we appear to have no truth/judgement 
distinction that we can apply to statements about these objects. We seem to have to 
take these people's word for it as to whether there is an object of this sort present in 
any particular case. But is this really the case? This reduces the problem to one of 
verification. If we are working, however, on patterns of use of the language these 
people employ, then the enquiry we are engaged in is a conceptual one. We are 
looking, not at how we might verify the presence of these objects, but what users of 
this discourse are committed to in tenus of behaviour, including other linguistic 
behaviour. To talk about this in terms used by Wiggins which will be discussed 
further in chapter 2, if these people converge on some belief. and if we can find no 
other explanation for their convergence, then we will have to take it that the 
4.,1 
explanation for their convergence is the truth of that belief.1 3 We might only have to 
provisionally allow the existence of these objects, unless our shared understanding 
'-' 
with these people will eventually allow us to learn to detect these sorts of objects. 
Nonetheless it seems that we are not required to reject them, since they are not entirely 
irrelevant to our experience, even if it is only our experience of other's behaviour. So 
even for what are apparently evidence transcendent truths we have some way of 
deciding what will count as correct and incorrect linguistic usage, correct and 
incorrect ways of thinking; we know under which situations it would be rational to use 
such language, and under which it would not. 
The approach I want to take, therefore, to discovering what both the world and the 
subject are found to be like by a particular type of interaction between subject and the 
world, is to consider the language and concepts used by the subject in appropriate 
situations and how these present the subject's situation in the world. I have argued 
that this is possible because, although we might think that language can present both 
the subject and the world in ways totally other than the way they are, this is not really 
so. It must be possible, since the three elements of any interaction are not completely 
divorced from one another, to achieve some understanding of the nature of the 
interaction from looking at the concepts and language used both in the course of and 
in describing that type of interaction. To do this we will need an understanding of 
truth as what regulates our use of concepts, and not just truth relative to a particular 
type of some interaction, but truth that can deal with any interactions that might occur, 
to allow for development of interactions and communication between those with 
differing types of interaction. Yet to have this possibility of communication and 
comparison between interactions, we need to have an area of common understanding. 
and a common notion of rationality, as a basis for the assessment of the truth of a 
situation as opposed to any individual's judgement about it. I have proposed that our 
13See discussion of the marks of truth in D Wiggins. Needs. Falues. Truth. op.cit .. 
p.147-52. 
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everyday language of dealing with a world of material objects could provide such a 
basis. I would also like to suggest that by considering how we might analyse this sort 
of basic situation, we will have acquired a model that can be adapted for use with 
respect to other areas of language and other modes of interaction with the world. 
In the next chapter, therefore, I want to consider whether this approach can be applied 
to moral language and thought. One necessary pre-requisite for this approach is that 
the discourse or thought being considered must be the sort of discourse or thought to 
which truth as applicable. There is a history in ethics which claims that moral 
language is not making claims which can be true. They are either expressions of the 
feelings or beliefs of individuals or groups, or they are claims which are always in fact 
false because there are no moral properties or facts for them to be about. In the next 
chapter I want to examine the metaphysical positions one might hold with respect to 
ethics and whether these rule out moral discourse as one that is regulated by truth . 
.J:6 
Chapter 2: Truth and Objectivity 
If patterns of use regulated by truth and a grasp of the truth/judgement distinction are 
going to be the basis for discovering what sorts of things we must be to use moral 
language, then we must first discuss whether moral discourse is regulated by truth and 
whether the truth/judgement distinction holds in such a discourse or discourses. l This 
is not something we can decide in advance by declaring that there are no moral truths 
or facts because there are no objects of moral discourse for them to be about. This 
would be to beg the question at issue. What we can do is consider some metaethical 
views about truth and objectivity in moral discourse to see whether we have any 
grounds for ruling out truth as inapplicable to moral discourse. 
2.1 Metaphysical Possibilities 
I will begin, therefore, by discussing whether it is possible to maintain a metaphysical 
position which allows that moral language can be objective, that is be a candidate for 
truth, while still being relative to human ways of understanding and representing the 
world. These ways of understanding and representing the world do not have to be 
seen as not capturing something real merely because they are human ways of 
understanding and representing the world. I will start by looking at three possible 
classifications of metaethical positions as they are suggested by David Brink in his 
book 'Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics'2. From this initial categorisation 
he goes on to study two contrasting moral positions, that of the Moral Realist and the 
Moral Constructivist. I would like to try and describe a third position, that of 
1 It should be noted here that moral is used here in a very general manner. not in the 
specific sense of a language of obligations. principles etc. It is thus closer to -ethical' 
rather than -moral' as the tenns are used by Bernard Williams in his Ethics and the 
Limits oj Philosophy. (London: Fontana. 1985). 
2David Brink. Moral Realism and the Foundation oj Ethics. Cambridge Studies in 
Philosophy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989). 
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Sophisticated Moral Realist. I think there is room for this position, which allows for a 
realism linked to our sensibilities, because Brink's categorisation of moral positions 
conflates some distinctions that are articulated in Michael Luntley's paper 'On the 
Way the World is Independently of the Way we Take it to Be') By considering these 
distinctions, I hope to show how we can understand the Sophisticated Moral Realist 
position and what notion of truth might be applicable to it and the other positions. 
David Brink delineates his classes of metaethical view by contrasting them with what 
he calls the common-sense view about the objectivity of the sciences. This common-
sense view of the objectivity of the sciences he equates with realism and categorises as 
the view that 
"claims of the natural sciences ... [are] claims that purport to describe 
more or less accurately a world whose existence and nature are 
independent of our theorising about it ... and often succeed in describing 
such a world. Thus scientific terms refer to real features of the world, 
and the sciences provide us with successively more and more accurate 
knowledge of the world."4 
Here is how he describes the three views he identifies: 
1) Realism about science and antirealism about ethics: The common-
sense view about the objectivity of the sciences is roughly right; ethics 
is not (and cannot be) objective in this way. There is a special problem 
about realism or objectivity in ethics. Traditional nihilists. 
noncognitivists (e.g., emotivists and prescriptivists), moral skeptics. 
3Michael Luntley, 'On the Way the World is Independently of the Way we Take it to 
Be' in Inquiry, 32 (1989) 177-194. 
4Brink, p.7 
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and relativists can be viewed as holding this position on our 
comparative issue. 
2) Realism about science and ethics: The common-sense view about 
the objectivity of the sciences is roughly right; ethics is or can be 
objective in much the same way. Although many traditional 
cognitivists found important disanalogies and discontinuities between 
ethics and the sciences, most of them, including the intuitionists (e.g., 
Richard Price, Thomas Reid, Sidgwick, Moore, Ross, Broad, and 
H.A.Prichard), believed that ethics does or can possess these marks of 
objectivity. 
3) The third view is harder to label: Some will regard it as global 
subjectivism or antirealism, others as a sophisticated realism about 
both ethics and science. The idea is that, although ethics cannot fit the 
common-sense view of scientific objectivity, this establishes nothing 
interesting about the objectivity of ethics, since science itself does not 
satisfy the common-sense view of scientific objectivity. The common-
sense view of scientific objectivity is naive; once we understand the 
objectivity obtainable in the sciences, we can see that ethics is or can 
be every bit as objective as the sciences. Although it is natural for 
sympathizers with view (1) or (2) to regard (3) as global subjectivism 
or antirealism, proponents of (3) often regard their position as realist or 
objectivist. Presumably, they think it makes sense to call a position 
about the status of ethics or science antirealist only if there is some 
discipline whose status is more realistic or objective than that of ethics 
or science. Since they think that more realistic views are naive and 
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that nothing actually possesses that kind of objectivity, they regard 
their views about ethics and science as realistic."5 
The first thing I want to note about these categorisations is that for Brink realism and 
objectivity seem to be interchangeable terms. The essential elements of his realism 
are that the existence and nature of the world are independent of our theorising about 
them, and that our theorising does succeed in capturing and describing, with some 
degree of accuracy, the features of the world. The world is as it is independently of 
what or how we think about it, and yet we can obtain a true, or partially true picture of 
the world. The important notions here are independence and truth or accuracy. Both 
realism and objectivity seems to be equated both with the independence of the world 
from our theorising about it and the accuracy of that theorising. Thus he says on p.7 
that a moral realist claims that there are moral facts and true moral claims whose 
existence and nature are independent of our beliefs about what is right and wrong. 
Later, on p.20, he claims that ethics is objective because firstly it concerns matters of 
fact and holds that moral claims can be true or false, and secondly that these facts hold 
independently of anyone's beliefs about what is right or wrong. That seems to be 
why, although he uses the term sophisticated realist, he is dubious about using it for a 
position he would prefer to call antirealist, since it may not allow for the world to be 
independent of our theorising about it in quite the way he wants. I will look at the 
distinctions we might make with respect to 'real' and 'objective' later in this chapter 
and see how they might be applied to the realist and the constructivist, but for now I 
would like to clarify some of the points Brink is making and show how the position of 
the sophisticated realist can arise out of the methodology discussed in the previous 
chapter. Brink characterises the realist and the constructivist as holding two 
metaphysical theses: 
5Brink. p.6-7 
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Realist: (1) There are facts or truths of a kind x, and 
(2) These facts or truths are independent of the evidence for them 
Constructi vist (1) There are facts or truths of a kind x, and 
(2) These facts or truths are constituted by the evidence for them. 6 
50 both start with the thesis that there are facts or truths, and differ about their 
constitution. They are called truths because they are the sort of things about which 
true claims can be made. To see what it means for claims to be true in each case I 
want to adapt a formulation of Brink's [p.20] that will allow us to compare the realist 
and constructivist theses. 
Realist: For the realist a claim C states a fact x (C is true) just in case x is 
such a fact. 
Constructivist:For the constructivist a claim C states a fact for the subject 
(5), (C is true for 5) just in case 5 believes C, 5 would believe 
C upon reflection, 5 is part of a social group the majority of whom 
believe C, 5 would believe C in favourable or ideal epistemic 
conditions, or some such thing) 
The Constructivist thesis here is really a number of different constructivist positions. 
Thus for some constructivists C is true for 5 just in case 5 believes C, for others it is 
true just in case 5 would believe C upon reflection, for others again just in case 5 is 
part of a social group the majority of whom believe C, all classified by Brink as 
relativist positions. For the non relativists, Brink says, "there is a single set of facts 
6Brink .. p. 16 
7Brink. p.20 
51 
that are constituted by some function of our beliefs, often by our moral beliefs in some 
favorable or idealized epistemic conditions. ,,8 
In fact it is hard to see how the first of these positions makes any claim to truth at all. 
If a claim is true for a subject if the subject believes it, then that subject would have 
no false beliefs at all, there would be no distinctions to be made between considered 
and ill-considered opinions. Anything the subject believed at all, for whatever 
reasons, would, by definition, be true. I cannot see how such a position can be laying 
any claim at all to truth. The other positions have at least some hold on a distinction 
between the subject's beliefs and the truth of those beliefs. Some of his beliefs can be 
false because there are some constraints on the truth of the subjects beliefs. Since 
what Brink is claiming is ,that objectivity, and therefore truth, in ethics has some 
special problem, I think we can take it that the first position, having no objectivity at 
all, can be dropped from consideration. 
Thus, as Brink states them, both the Realist and the Constructivist say that the claims 
made by subjects state facts and are capable of being true, but when we look more 
closely we see that either they mean something different by what it is for claims to 
state facts or by what it is for claims to be true. For the realist a claim states a fact if it 
. 
has content, it is about something, and is a true claim if there is such a fact as that 
stated by the claim, that is the claim captures some actual state of affairs. Here the 
fact at issue cannot be just any fact which causes the truth of the claim, it must be the 
fact on which the truth of the claim rests. To borrow an example from David 
Wiooins9 what makes 'It is cold here' a true claim is that the content of the claim, that bb , 
is the coldness in the vicinity. captures the fact of coldness in the vicinity. The fact 
BBrink. p.20 
9David Wiggins. Needs. Values. Truth. Essays in the Philosophy oj \;alue. 2nd ed .. 
(Oxford: Blackwell. 1991). pp.142-3. 
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that the heating engineer failed to call last week may be a fact that is a cause of the 
truth of the claim, but it is not the fact on which the truth of the claim rests. 
For the constructivist there seem to be several possibilities. At first sight the 
constructivist seems to hold that the claim states a fact if it has content, is about 
something. So, for example, Brink suggests a moral claim might be something like 
'Abortion is wrong', which would seem to be about the wrongness of abortion. What 
makes it true, however, is not its capturing the wrongness of abortion but, in the case 
of the first type of constructivist, its matching with the subject's beliefs upon 
reflection. In the case of the second type it would be matching with the beliefs of the 
majority of his social group, or in the case of the third type, its matching with his 
beliefs in favourable or ideal epistemic conditions. This way of understanding the 
relation between the content of the claim and its truth makes it sound a little like the 
case of the heating engineer. Just as a claim about coldness is not a claim about 
heating engineers, despite the fact that the coldness is caused by the heating engineer's 
behaviour, similarly a claim about the wrongness of something is not obviously a 
claim about some people's beliefs even if they do believe it to be wrong. If the claim 
is about the wrongness of abortion, then the truth of the claim should rest in the 
wrongness of abortion, not on some other fact about the beliefs of an individual or 
group members under some conditions. Although the beliefs of the individual or 
group members may not be the cause of abortion's wrongness, as the absence of the 
heating engineer is the cause of the coldness, facts about beliefs do not, at first sight 
seem to be facts about the wrongness of abortion. The constructivist has to explain 
how the apparently straightforward content of his claim is linked to the fact about his 
or other's beliefs, such that it is these beliefs that make the claim true. This seems to 
require either a different account of truth from that of the realist, an account which 
explains how the truth of a claim rests not on a fact captured by the claim's content. 
but on some other fact, or a different account of the content of a claim. \vhich explains 
how a claim's content is other than what it appears to be at first sight. That is. either 
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the content of the claim is the wrongness of abortion, but what makes the claim true is 
its having captured something other than the content of the claim, or the content of the 
claim is a fact about beliefs and thus its truth does rely on its having captured the 
content of the claim. In the first case the account of truth differs from the realist's, and 
in the second the account of content differs from the realist's. 
The problem here is that Brink's formulation equates stating a fact (in my terms, 
having content) with being true. But in the two ways I have suggested looking at the 
Constructivist's position, stating a fact, having content, is attempting to capture 
something, and being true rests on what is captured matching with some fact. So 
there.is a putative fact that the claim captures with its content and there is a fact on 
which the truth of the claim rests. The problem for the constructivist is that, even in 
the case of true claims, either these facts are not the same fact, or if they are, then a 
different account of what it is to have content is required. In the first case we want to 
ask how the truth of a claim rests on some fact other than the one captured by the 
content, and in the second we want to ask how the content captures the fact on which 
the truth of the claim rests. Or to put things another way, we might think that in the 
first case the claim has no content because there is no fact about the wrongness of 
abortion to be captured, but only a fact about beliefs, and thus the first case collapses 
into the second case, in which the fact captured is the fact about beliefs, but we don't 
know how a claim that purportedly says something about the wrongness of abortion is 
actually saying something about beliefs. 
The constructivist might argue that these are both distortions of his position; that a 
claim does aim to express a fact, for example the wrongness of abortion, and that it is 
true if that fact is captured. It is just that the fact of the wrongness of abortion consists 
in or is constituted by the individual's or group's belief about abortion. This is, in 
effect, to take the second option, to provide an account which shows how saying 
something about the wrongness of abortion is saying something about beliefs. the 
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beliefs of the individual or the group he belongs to. The problem with this is that the 
individual's or group's beliefs cannot themselves be characterised as true or false in 
any terms other than their own, or even criticised as better or worse beliefs, since there 
seems to be no basis for argument or discussion about the merits of such beliefs. That 
is, when people belonging to different groups claim that abortion is right or wrong 
their claims do not have the same content. They neither agree nor disagree. If they 
both claim that abortion is wrong, the wrongness of abortion in each case refers to 
different sets of beliefs and so they are not making the same claim, and a similar 
problem arises if they apparently disagree. There is not just one fact about the 
wrongness of abortion, there are as many as there are different sets of beliefs, and they 
all seem to have equal status, and so cannot be the same sort of facts that Brink is 
talking about with respect to the realist. There is no single arena in which the 
apparently competing claims can be assessed as true or false. The claims of each 
group about abortion are tautologies. If what it means for abortion to be wrong is that 
the group has certain beliefs about abortion, then the group's claim that abortion is 
wrong is merely an affirmation of their beliefs and not an appeal to any other standard 
than theirs. The individual can make a true or false claim when assessed against the 
beliefs of his group, but the claim that the group makes cannot be false, there is no 
distinction for the group between their judgment of the claim and its truth. This is, I 
suppose, what Brink means to suggest when he says that in the constructivist picture a 
claim states a moral fact for the subject. There is not only one moral fact expressed by 
the claim that abortion is wrong, there are many deriving from the different 
individuals and social groups who have beliefs about abortion, and none of them are 
truths outside the beliefs of the individual or group. So again it may be argued that 
the content of the constructivist's claim does not state a fact in quite the same way that 
the realist's does. Further, if there are many of these 'facts' it is difficult to see what 
the content of the constructivist's claim is without explicit indexing to his community 
or particular epistemic conditions. That is, until we know what type of constructi vist 
he is we cannot say what it is he is claiming when he says 'Abortion is wrong'. It is 
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not just that we cannot compare his claim to the claims of others because their content 
is different, but that we cannot say what that content is without knowing what set of 
beliefs it was aiming to express. 
A possible exception here is the case of beliefs arrived at under ideal or favourable 
epistemic conditions. A lot will hang on what is included in the notion of such 
conditions. If the conditions are epistemic conditions, ones where knowledge is 
available, then favourable or ideal conditions should be ones which allow us to obtain 
knowledge, not merely opinions. The beliefs arrived at under such conditions should, 
surely, be beliefs about whatever it is the favourable or ideal conditions will give 
knowledge of. Either the constructivist is here claiming that ideal or favourable 
epistemic conditions will give knowledge of the wrongness of abortion, or they will 
give knowledge of individual or group beliefs. If in saying the former we are claiming 
that what such conditions give knowledge of is something beyond or other than the 
beliefs of individuals or groups, something that they have beliefs about, then the 
claims made do seem to be candidates for truth, they will be true in virtue of 
something other than beliefs, but this is not a constructivist position, it is a realist one. 
There are facts which are not facts about beliefs but about abortion and its wrongness, 
and this is what we have knowledge of under favourable conditions. If the latter is 
what is being claimed, that favourable or ideal epistemic conditions give knowledge 
of a group or individual's beliefs, then again we have a problem with what the content 
of the claim is without indexing it to the individual's community or upbringing or 
some such thing. Even if we can identify the content of the claim, it will tum out that 
different groups are not disagreeing or making claims against each other, because their 
claims will have different contents. What is wrong with this position is that it seems 
to claim that beliefs do not have to bear any relation to anything other than beliefs. 
The individual's beliefs about abortion can be true or false when checked against his 
group's beliefs. or against his own considered beliefs, but there are no criteria for 
assessing the group's beliefs or the individual's considered beliefs. The group or 
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individual may change their VIews, but it will not apparently be in response to 
anything, because those beliefs are not about anything other than themselves. If this is 
the case then they do not have any content, they are not about anything, since if we ask 
what belief X is about and the only answer is 'belief X' this can tell us nothing. 
Further, if we do not know, and cannot know what it is about, we cannot know 
whether it is true or false. If it has no content there is nothing to match up to or to be 
assessed against, there is nothing the truth of which it is trying to capture. Now, 
obviously beliefs may be wrong or mistaken on any individual occasion, but if they 
are not even aiming at capturing the truth about something, then it is questionable 
whether they count as beliefs rather than inventions or imagination. Of course the 
individual is aiming at capturing his own or his society's beliefs in any claim, but if 
those beliefs themselves are not aimed at capturing something other than themselves, 
why are they beliefs? Thus we have the possibility of an individual expressing a 
belief by the claim 'Abortion is wrong' which can be true or false, because the 
wrongness of abortion is constituted by his group's or community's belief, and yet the 
group or community is using the same form of words. 'Abortion is wrong' to fail to 
express a belief at all. The individual is aiming at capturing something by his claim 
but the community, by making apparently the same claim, is not. 
So far, then, I have suggested that for the realist a claim is true if its content captures 
the fact it aims to express. For the constructivist there are apparently several ways for 
a claim to be true. Either it is true if it captures the right one of a number of different 
facts about beliefs it could be understood as aiming to express, if that fact is 
constituted by the beliefs of individuals or groups. Or alternatively, the 
constructivist's claim is true either if its content captures a fact, which is not, at first 
sight, the one it aims to express, or if there is a fact about the beliefs of a subject or his 
social group, which is not the fact expressed by the content of the claim. In either of 
these cases there is a problem with the status of the beliefs held by the individual or 
group itself as to whether they can be assessed as true, that is. are themsel\'es facts or 
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truths, and if not whether they count as beliefs at all. Finally, if the constructivist 
holds that his facts are constituted by beliefs formed under ideal or favourable 
epistemic circumstances where these are not circumstance for gaining knowledge of 
the individual's or group's beliefs but of something those beliefs are about, the truth of 
an individual's claim will relate to these beliefs, but the beliefs themselves will have to 
relate to something else which the specification of ideal or favourable epistemic 
conditions allows knowledge of. This is more like what it is for the realists claim to 
be true, but then the fact the truth of the claim rests on does not seem to be constituted 
by the beliefs arrived at under favourable or ideal epistemic conditions, but is what 
those beliefs are about. 
Where does the sophisticated realist stand in this debate? Brink does not attempt to 
characterise the sophisticated realist's position, because he does not see this position 
as his main opposition. If we wanted to consider the sophisticated realist's position, 
however, I would argue that one way of doing so at least would not be comparable 
with Brink's characterisation of the realist and the constructivist, because it would not 
have the same starting point. Both the realist and the constructivist start from 
metaphysical claims about facts and their nature. I think the sophisticated realist's 
position is best captured by considering him as someone who uses the methodology 
outlined in the previous chapter; that is, someone who does not start from a particular 
metaphysical position but who finds his metaphysical position by analysing the 
patterns of his language use. 
The sophisticated realist, rather than starting with facts and seeing what the presumed 
nature of his facts tells him about truth, starts with truth and sees what the importance 
of contrasting factual judgements with the truth about those facts tells us about their 
nature. That is, he starts with truth and sees what the nature of the truth/judgement 
distinction in moral discourse forces him to say about facts. This is not to make any 
assumptions about the nature of truth either. but merely to recognise. and make use of. 
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our practice of distinguishing between a judgement and its truth. This practice 
imposes constraints not only on the claims the sophisticated realist makes but also on 
the way he thinks about the world and the way he understands the relationship 
between his thoughts and the world they are about. Thus the sophisticated realist, 
although he may well arrive at the position that there are moral truths, claims neither 
that these truths are wholly independent of the ways we have of knowing them, our 
evidence for them, nor that they are constituted by and thus solely dependent on that 
evidence. His claim would rather be that, because the way we conceptualise or 
understand the world is regulated by truth, the truths we aim for in making claims are 
truths accessible to particularly human ways of thinking. They are independent of the 
evidence for them in that any claim may fail to capture the truth, but not in that all that 
could count as the truth is something that could fail to be capturable by human ways 
of thinking. Nonetheless these truths are not constituted by human ways of thinking, 
since the truth may require us not just to modify a claim, but to modify our ways of 
thinking about something, as it does, for example, in the sciences. We once thought 
about heat in terms of an undetectable substance, caloric, which was contained in 
anything hot; but the truth about heat as a phenomenon we experience has forced us to 
revise our way of thinking in favour of understanding heat in terms of the motion of 
molecules, and may yet force us to revise it further. 
So for the sophisticated realist who claims that abortion is wrong, the content of his 
claim would be the wrongness of abortion, and its truth would rest in abortion's 
wrongness, as it does for the realist. The difference is that, for the realist, abortion's 
wrongness is a fact about the world that requires no reference to our ways of 
understanding it. This is not so for the sophisticated realist. It is not constituted by 
our ways of understanding moral facts, as it would be for the constructivist, but it is 
not wholly independent of them either. 
59 
2.2 Objective, absolute reality? 
To see how the sophisticated realist's position could be maintained I want to consider 
three sets of distinctions drawn by Michael LuntleylO: the objective/subjective 
distinction, the absolute/relative distinction and the reality/appearance distinction. 
Luntley claims that these are all distinctions with respect to the notion of mind-
(in)dependence, and so are often conflated, but that the concerns they express are 
separable and that it will be helpful if we focus on them more clearly. The 
objective/subjective distinction is a distinction with reference to truth. A proposition, 
statement or claim is objective if it is understood as being aimed at truth and capable 
of being true or false. Here if the claim is aimed at truth, then the independence of 
truth of our knowledge of it and thus of our minds is what makes a claim objective. 
That is, there is a potential difference between how things are and how they seem to a 
subject. If that difference is not available, if how things are just is how they seem to 
the subject, then the proposition or claim made by the subject is subjective. There is 
no possibility of the claim's being true despite the way it seems to the subject. A 
subjective claim is mind-dependent because there is nothing beyond the subject's 
mind that the claim is true in virtue of. An objective claim is mind-independent 
because there is something other than how things seem to the subject's mind, and it is 
in virtue of this that the claim is true. 
The absolute/relative distinction concerns mind-(in)dependence in a different way. It 
is concerned with concepts and refers to the type of mind required for the detection of 
a particular property. If that detection does not require any particular type of mind the 
concept used is absolute. If the property does require a particular type of mind to 
detect it then that concept is in this sense mind-dependent and relative. What is meant 
here by a particular type of mind can be illustrated by the idea of primary and 
lOOn the Way the \Vorld is Independently of the Way we Take it to Be. op.cil. 
60 
secondary qualities. Luntley argues that any creature which has some notion of 
investigating an environment it shares with others will be able to recognise and 
distinguish between the positions and shapes of various objects regardless of its type 
of perceptual system. That is, size, shape, position and motion are properties and 
relations that are detectable by a variety of sensory modalities (vision, touch, radar, 
sonar etc.), and any creature that lives and moves in the spatial world must be able to 
detect these properties and relations. Detection of properties such as colour and taste, 
however, require a particular type of perceptual system. There may be properties and 
relations that we cannot detect because we do not have the right type of perceptual 
system; for example bats may detect something akin to the texture of objects by sonar, 
which we do not, just as the bat does not see in colour. Thus, as Luntley puts it "We 
will converse with Martians about the mechanics of falling apples, but not their 
colour" 11. Or to put it more mundanely, both the bull and I may know the fastest 
route across the field but contrary to folklore the bull will not be sensitive to the 
redness of my shirt. 
There is however another sense of the mind-Cin)dependence of concepts which the 
reality/appearance distinction brings out. Here, again using colour as an example 
Luntley says that the idea that colour is only an apparent property does not 
immediately follow from the fact that it is relative. In order to get any hold on the 
idea that relative properties are not real we need to add into the absolute/relative 
distinction something like a representative theory of perception. Thus when we 
perceive a tomato, what happens is that the tomato produces an idea in us and the 
redness we perceive is "more properly a property of the Idea than the object".1 2 In 
this case the property is apparent because it is a property of the idea and not of the 
world; real properties are properties of the world. not of ideas. When the bat is able. if 
11 Luntley. p. 183. 
12Luntley. p.185 
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it is, to detect the texture of an object and I am able to detect it's colour, this does not 
require us to say that neither 'sonar texture' nor colour are real properties of the world, 
merely that they are ones not detectable unless you have the right sort of mind. In 
fact, when I say that the bat has the sort of mind that can detect 'sonar texture' and I 
have the sort of mind that can perceive colour, I am implying that 'sonar texture' and 
colour are properties that belong to the objects independently of whether the sorts of 
minds I and the bat use to detect them exist. So if we do not hold a representative 
theory of perception, then colour and sonar texture can be real relative properties and 
claims about them can be objective. If, on the other hand, we are committed to a 
representative theory of colour or sonar perception, then we hold that perceiving an 
object produces an idea, a mental item, and that the properties we attribute (wrongly) 
to the object, are in fact properties of that mental item or idea. They would then only 
apparently (not really) be properties of the object, and thus would be dependent on a 
mind in which the idea and its properties are produced. Claims about colour or sonar 
properties would then still be objective, provided that there are types of mind which 
have types of ideas produced in them by objects, and the properties themselves would 
now be relative to the type of mind that has them, but also they would only be 
apparent properties of the object, because they would really be properties of the idea 
or mental state produced in that type of mind by such objects. 
So, for example, the claim that there is a blackboard in this room is an objective 
claim, whereas the claim that I am having a black, rectangular sense datum might be 
seen as subjective; the shape of the blackboard is an absolute property of the 
blackboard, and its blackness is a relative property of it, because only a creature who 
perceived the world in terms of colour would see it as black. However, to make the 
move to the real/apparent distinction is to distinguish between the claim that the 
blackness is a property of the blackboard that is only detectable by creatures with 
colour perception, and the claim that it is a property of ideas. not of blackboards at all. 
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When we apply these distinctions to Brink's Moral Realist and Moral Constructivist 
what we get is that the Moral Realist is making objective claims using absolute 
concepts and real properties and relations. The claims made aim at truth and are about 
the properties and relations of things that exist independently of whether the subject is 
capable of conceptualising them. Actually it is not clear whether Brink thinks that 
these concepts are absolute in Luntley's sense. For example, 'sonar texture' might 
exist independently of our capability of conceptualising it, but that would not make it 
absolute. So perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the Moral Realist's claims 
are objective, because they aim at truth, and the properties and relations he recognises 
are real, but it is unclear whether they are relative or absolute. Brink says "The moral 
realist thinks that our moral claims not only purport to but often do state facts and 
refer to real properties, and that we can and do have at least some true moral beliefs 
and moral knowledge".1 3 
Since, according to Brink, the Moral Constructivist holds that there are facts or truths, 
he also holds that his claims are objective, although as I have shown this is open to 
dispute. The constructivist says nothing explicitly about the absolute/relative 
distinction, although if moral properties and facts are constituted by the evidence for 
them, which Brink construes as constituted by human beliefs it would seem that they 
must be mind-dependent in the third sense, that is apparent properties. Although I 
argued above that a property's being apparent does not follow from its being relative, 
it does look as if its being relative follows from its being apparent. If the wrongness 
of abortion is constituted by beliefs that 'Abortion is wrong' then that wrongness is 
surely not a property of abortion that anyone could detect, it can only be detected by 
the sort of mind that understands about wrongness and mistakenly attributes it to 
abortion, rather than beliefs about abortion. It is not a real property, nor is it a 
property of beliefs so much as one constituted by beliefs, but it is, perhaps on this 
13Brink. p.7 
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account, a property of the constructivist's idea of abortion rather than of abortion 
itself. The implication is that although for the constructivist there are moral truths, his 
moral claims do not refer to real properties and, although he might have moral 
knowledge this knowledge is of his beliefs, or his community's beliefs, or what his 
beliefs would be under ideal or favourable epistemic conditions. 
As we have seen above, however, there is a problem for the constructivist as to 
whether his facts are truths or not. That is, although there may be a fact of the matter 
as to what the individual or his group believe about abortion, whether these beliefs are 
themselves the sorts of things that can be true and are therefore truths is something 
that is still open to question. The moral knowledge he has is knowledge of his own or 
his groups beliefs, and these beliefs themselves do not contain knowledge and are not 
held to be capable of being true. Thus it seems that the constructivist's claims are not 
objective, because the facts he states, or seems to state, in them are not truths, the 
properties and relations they identify are apparent, not real, and therefore they are also 
relative to the type of mind that thinks that way about things. 
This does seem to leave a space for what I want to call a Sophisticated Moral Realist 
who would hold that there are moral properties of the world, but that these are only 
detectable by a creature with a certain sort of mind. The only evidence we may have 
for these properties will be in terms of our responses to and beliefs about them, but 
they will not, on that account have to be constituted wholly by those beliefs and 
responses. If there is a possibility that claims about them could be true or false, then 
they would be objective claims responding to properties that are real but relative to 
our way of perceiving the world. The Sophisticated Realist shares with the Realist 
that the properties he detects are properties of the world, not of our beliefs, but they 
are properties of a world that can only be conceptualised by creatures who are capable 
of relating to it in a particular way. 
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This would perhaps be more clearly seen if we consider the possible combinations of 
the three classes of mind-(in)dependence. Objectivity is compatible with the 
recognition of either absolute or relative properties or relations, that is claims about 
both absolute and relative properties and relations can be candidates for truth. There 
is a problem with whether objectivity is compatible with concepts being apparent or 
real. If, for example, colour is only an apparent property of objects, but nevertheless I 
make colour judgments about objects, then the judgments could be objective. It 
depends whether judgments about colour respond to something in the object. In the 
traditional understanding of colour as a secondary property, the colour of the idea I 
have is a response to some real property of the object; the real properties of the object 
produce a coloured idea in me. If this is so then it does not seem to affect the 
objectivity of judgments whether the colour is a real or an apparent property. If it is 
an apparent property then the objective judgment will be about what coloured idea the 
object will produce in me reliably under normal viewing conditions. The problem 
comes if we think, as we might be tempted to do in the case of moral properties, that 
the apparent property is not a response to some real property of objects. That is, if the 
wrongness of abortion is a property of my idea of abortion that does not reflect or 
respond to any of the real properties of abortion; if there is nothing about abortion that 
produces that sort of idea in me, then there is no being right or wrong about it. In this 
case the apparent property is not compatible with objective judgments, since there 
seems to be no reason why I should not have different ideas about abortion on 
different occasions. 
So judgments can be objective, independently of whether the concepts used are 
absolute or relative. If the properties and relations identified are real, the judgment 
will be objective, but if those properties and relations are thought of as apparent, then 
the judgments can only be objective if the apparent property is a response to some real 
property of the object. If it is not then the judgment must be subjective and the 
concept must be relative, which in fact it must be whenever the property or relation is 
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apparent. So we can have objective judgments usmg absolute or relative real 
concepts, objective judgements using relative apparent concepts provided they are a 
response to some real properties of the object the judgments are about, and subjective 
judgments about relative, apparent concepts where the apparent concept is not a 
response to any real properties or relations of the object. 
What the realist and the constructivist have in common is that they both start from the 
nature of moral facts and define objectivity or truth in terms of the nature of those 
facts. That is, for the realist, moral concepts are real and absolute, and this means that 
the truth/judgment distinction can place truth beyond the possibility of human 
knowledge, truth can be evidence-transcendent. For the constructivist, moral concepts 
are relative and apparent, in the sense of not responding to any real properties in the 
world. In Luntley's terms this makes the constructivist's moral claims subjective. The 
constructivist can at best claim that an individual's claims have some correctness (not 
truth) by referring them to some standard (his own beliefs upon reflection, his 
community's beliefs, or beliefs under some ideal conditions) which is not itself 
objective. The Sophisticated Moral Realist, however, starts not from the nature of 
facts, but from objectivity. He does not claim that his facts are a certain way and 
therefore that truth must be a certain way. He starts from the objectivity of his claims 
and sees what options this leaves for him in terms of the nature of his facts. That is, 
he takes at face value the objectivity of moral claims. Given that some of our claims 
are that not everything is apparently equipped to understand or respond to situations in 
moral terms, he has to take moral concepts as relative. He is then in a position to ask 
whether his concepts are real or apparent. So the Sophisticated Moral Realist has 
available to him the possibility that his claims are candidates for truth. even though 
the concepts used in those claims are only available to certain types of minds, and that 
the properties and relations identified in those claims are either reaL or if they are 
apparent they are a response to real properties of the situation the claim is about. 
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The question then anses, how does the Sophisticated Moral Realist deal with the 
objection that moral properties are apparent in the sense that would make moral 
judgments subjective; that is that they do not respond to anything real at all. The first 
response is to say that if moral claims are objective, are subject to a truth/judgment 
distinction, then they cannot be apparent in a way that would lead to such claims being 
subjective. Yet it might be argued that moral claims cannot be really objective 
because we have no way of checking them that is independent of our responses to 
moral situations. We have some independent hold on what true colour claims might 
be in terms of the knowledge of the physical mechanisms of colour perception and 
objective measurement of colours reflected by objects, none of which is available for 
moral claims. I would note, however, that we base our standards and definitions of 
correctly functioning colour vision on the ability of individuals to respond correctly to 
colour charts and tests, and the identification of particular wavelengths of light with 
particular colours is also based on these responses. That is, our understanding of the 
physical mechanisms of colour perception depends on what counts as truth in colour 
identification, which in tum depends on how we generally respond to colour 
properties. Objectivity in colour claims does not principally derive from our 
understanding of the mechanism of colour perception or the identification of its 
relation to wavelengths of light. The dependence is the other way around. It is only 
because of the objectivity of colour claims that we can understand the mechanisms 
involved. Although we may have difficulty in the moral case in saying what correctly 
functioning moral 'perception' would be, or an independent way of measuring moral 
properties, this does not force us to say that moral claims cannot be objective. Again 
the priority can be the other way around, the objectivity of moral claims would have to 
be the basis of any understanding of the mechanisms, if any, of moral 'perception'. 
Only if we can show that moral claims are not objective, that there is no truth in moral 
judgment, can we assert that moral properties are apparent in this way. I do not think 
the Sophisticated Moral Realist position can be ruled out unless we can show that 
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there is no distinction to be made in his case between true moral judgements and mere 
moral opinions. 14 
So, for the realist there are real moral properties and relations in the world that are 
conceptualisable in absolute terms and he has the possibility of making objective 
claims using these concepts: the moral aspects of the world are capturable by our 
concepts and claims provided we conceptualise the world the way it is independently 
of the moral way of relating to it. For the constructivist moral properties and relations 
are apparent because they are functions of the beliefs, or rather opinions, of moral 
subjects. Because of this they require no reference to anything other than the 
OpInIOnS, rather than beliefs, of moral subjects. Moral claims can, at best, be 
subjective, since they are not really aimed at expressing truths but only opinions; they 
do not capture the way the world is, they capture the way moral subjects are, and the 
facts they purport to be about would not exist if there were no moral subjects. The 
sophisticated realist also arrives at the position that there are real moral properties in 
the world, although they are conceptualisable in relative, rather than absolute terms. 
He accepts the possibility of making objective claims using these concepts, but these 
concepts are not concepts that are available independently of a particular way, the 
moral way, of relating to the world. To maintain this position, however, he needs to 
hold that there is a difference between moral judgments and their truth. To see how 
the Sophisticated Moral Realist might maintain a truth/judgement distinction, I want 
to consider truth from the point of view of the marks of plain truth, a concept 
14D McNaughton makes a related claim in his Moral Vision, (Oxford: Blackwell. 
1996), p.57, where he says that we do not need a special perceptual mechanism for 
moral observation. We take it in other cases that we can see more than just shapes 
or colour. the proper objects of perception. "If [ ... J we are prepared to allow that I 
can see that this cliff is dangerous. that Smith is worried or that one thing is further 
away than another. then there seems no reason to be squeamish about letting in 
moral observation. [ ... J Here as elsewhere. the realist sees no difference in kind 
between the moral case and others." 
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introduced by David Wiggins. 15 This is not a theory of truth but a characterisation of 
the marks by which our ordinary concept of truth bears. Something like this seems to 
be necessary if the Sophisticated Moral Realist is to be justified in claiming that his 
moral discourse distinguishes between truth and judgment. 
2.3 Truth and Moral Discourse 
Wiggins starts from a relationship between the meaning of a sentence and its truth 
value: 
"Sentence S has as its literal use to say declaratively that p (henceforth 
for short, S means that p) just if whether S is true or not depends upon 
whether p." 16 
This relationship is generally used to discover something about meaning, gIven a 
theory of truth; that is, we use our conception of truth to tell us something about 
meaning. Wiggins turns this round and tries to elucidate something about truth given 
that "we think we understand more than nothing about what declarative meaning 
is" 17. As was pointed out above, if the truth of a sentence (claim) rests on whether it 
has content which captures a fact, the content and the sentence have to have the right 
sort of relationship to get the meaning of the sentence from its truth. Thus the 
connection between p and S must be a semantic connection. To get this semantic 
connection, Wiggins uses the Tarskian conception of a truth theory for an object 
15Wiggins. in Needs. Values. Truth. Essays in the Philosophy oj Value. 2nd edn .. 
Oxford. Blackwell. 1991. I will draw principally on the account in Essay IV. Truth as 
Predicated of Moral Judgments. Slightly different accounts appear earlier in the book 
in Essay III. Truth. Invention and the Meaning oj Life. and in D Wiggins. -What would 
be a Substantial Theory of Truth?' in Philosophical Subjects: Essays presented to PF 
Strawson. ed. Z van Straaten. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1980). 
16Needs. Values. Truth. p. 141. 
17Wiggins. p. 141. 
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language. Unfortunately, to get true-in-L for L you need to be able to use the concept 
of translation; the object language sentence needs to be translatable into the meta-
language, and thus there is meaning on both sides of the bi-conditional. Wiggins 
therefore draws on Davidson's ideas to replace the concept of translation with that of 
the radical interpretation of an L-speaker in tenns of a theory of truth-in-L and a 
descriptive anthropology of L-speakers. That is: 
s means in L that p 
if and only if 
for any theory e of truth-in-L that combines with a descriptive anthropology 
to make sense of the shared life and conduct of L-speakers and that makes 
better sense than any rival combination consisting of a variant theory of truth 
and variant descriptive anthropology, it is derivable from e that s is true in L 
if and only if p.18 
What Wiggins means by a descriptive anthropology is one that "will seek to distribute 
predicates ... across features of reality, mental states and actions in such a way that 
the propositional attitudes it ascribes to speakers are intelligible in the light of the true 
descriptions it gives of features of reality, and the actions that it ascribes to speakers 
are intelligible in the light of propositional attitudes it ascribes to them." 19 That is, 
the interpreter tries to make sense of the speaker by relating his speech and actions to 
the environment they share in tenns of beliefs about that environment. Later in the 
same paper Wiggins says 
18Needs. Values. Truth. p. 145. 
19D Wiggins. Truth and Interpretation. in Language, Philosophy & Logic. Proceedings 
oj the 4th International \Fittgenstein Symposium (August 1979). eds. Leinfellner. 
Haller. Hubner. \Veingartner (Vienna: H6Ider-Pichler-Tempsky. 1980). pp. 38-9. 
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"insofar as the idea of a norm of rationality to be grasped by the interpreter 
requires the idea of information, and insofar as the discrimination of (Tood 
b 
from bad information has its rational culmination in belief, it is the idea of 
the communication of belief that I have had to see as organising the 
interpreter's search for what speakers say. For it is the idea of reciprocal 
governance between what beliefs speakers can discriminate and respond to 
in the particular environment impinging on them that provides us with a 
justification for using that environment itself as a partially independent clue 
to what it is that speakers believe and may, as they please, say or not say."20 
Thus the interpreter starts with the idea that he and the speaker share some common 
orientation towards the environment they find themselves in, in the light of which he 
ascribes beliefs about that environment to the speaker, and assumes that the speaker's 
utterances will be about that environment. From this starting point a theory of truth, a 
richer descriptive anthropology and an interpretation of speaker's utterances develop 
together. This is the position of the radical interpreter. 
What Wiggins wants to do is to tum this process around and argue that since we have 
some understanding of what people in our own language community mean, we can 
use the concept of radical interpretation to find out something about truth. Radical 
interpretation allows us to ask "What must sentences that are true in L be like (what 
properties must they have) if a sentence's being such as to mean in L that p is to 
consist in the best (or equal best) sense-making theory's delivering a Tarskian 
equivalence in the for "'s is true in L if and only if p'?"21 Since the procedure should 
still work, whatever particular language L is, since L is variable. this should give not 
2<Yrruth and Interpretation. p.4l. This is compatible with my second picture of the 
relation of the subject and his concepts to the world. Subject. concepts and world 
are part of one interaction in which we can take some part for granted and enquire 
into the nature of other elements. 
21Needs. Values. Truth. p.147. 
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just the marks of truth in L but marks of truth in general. So what marks of truth will 
this give us and how does it do it in detail. These are the marks of truth that Wiggins 
thinks we ought to expect. 
1) Truth is a primary dimension of assessment for beliefs and for 
sentences that can express or report beliefs. 
2) If x is true, then x will under favourable circumstances 
command convergence, and the best explanation of the 
existence of this convergence will either require the actual 
truth of x or be inconsistent with the denial of x. 
3) For any x, if x is true then x has content; and if x has content 
then x's truth cannot simply consist in x's being itself a belief, 
or in x's being something believed or willed or ... 
4) Every true belief (every truth) is true in virtue of something. 
5) If Xl is true and x2 is true, then their conjunction is true. ,,22 
The Tarskian equivalence relates beliefs, truth, and the meanmgs of utterances to 
content; that is to p in the formula. The sentences mean that p, their truth depends on 
whether or not p, and the descriptive anthropology ascribes beliefs about p to the 
speaker. Because the sentences have meaning we can relate the truth of those 
sentences to content by ascribing true beliefs about that content to speakers. For the 
content of a belief to be about something, the belief must be aimed at truth. There 
must be some way things would have to be that makes a difference to the truth of the 
belief. The belief must be sensitive to how things are in the environment of the 
speaker and interpreter, and must therefore be aimed at the truth of that environment. 
This gives the first mark of truth. 
:l2Needs. Values. Truth. pp. l-i 7 -8. 
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Since the content of a belief is something that is there in the environment of both 
speaker and interpreter, it is expected that there will be agreement about how things 
are, as expressed in the belief, and the best explanation of this agreement will be the 
truth of the belief. When there is a lack of agreement the initial reaction is to assume 
that there is misunderstanding, that the meaning component has broken down. Both 
interpreter and speaker depend on a common orientation towards the environment, 
they are working with similar conceptions of how things are, so disagreement will be 
taken as a sign that they have just assigned a wrong meaning to a particular sentence 
or class of sentences. The truth of how things are for subjects situated as they are will 
tend to ensure agreement about how things are. It is this common orientation towards 
the environment, its recognition of the way things are, that commands the 
convergence of true belief. This gives the second mark of truth. 
The third mark claims that if something is true then it has content and, if it has content 
then its truth cannot just consist in its being believed or willed or something similar. 
Since the first mark requires that in order to be able to ascribe content to the belief, the 
belief must be sensitive to how things are in the environment, its truth cannot just 
consist of what speaker and interpreter believe or wish or desire, independently of 
how things are in their environment. The truth of a belief must depend on the 
environment itself, on what the belief is about, as understood by the speaker's and 
interpreter's common orientation towards that environment. 
The fourth mark, that every truth is true in virtue of something, condenses the first 
three marks. That is, if it is a true belief, it has a content that is sensitive to something 
in the environment, both interpreter and speaker will tend to agree on that content 
because of its sensitivity to the environment, and it is in virtue of that content's 
sensitivity to the environment that the belief is true. 
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Finally, the fifth mark claims that if two beliefs are both true then their conjunction is 
true. If both beliefs are true, then they both have a content in which their truth 
consists. But if they individually have a content which is sensitive to particular 
elements in the environment, then their conjunction should also have a content which 
will be sensitive to those elements in the environment which support both of them 
individually. If the conjuncts are true then the environment which supports their 
individual truths, will be such as to support their joint truth and therefore the truth of 
the conjunction. There could not be circumstances which the content of two 
individual claims captured, and in virtue of which they were true, which were not also 
captured by the two claims taken together and thereby constituted the truth of their 
conjunction. Or, to put it another way, any claim rules out some circumstances. If 
both claims are true individually then neither rules out the circumstances in which the 
other is true, and therefore neither rules out those circumstances in which they are 
jointly true, therefore they are jointly true. 
So in general, truth is what is aimed at by beliefs, their content aims to capture the 
truth about how things are in the environment of a speaker and an interpreter (the first 
mark). Because the content of a belief is sensitive to the common orientation that 
both speaker and hearer have to the environment, there will be an expectation that 
they will converge on the same beliefs, and that the best explanation of that 
convergence will be the beliefs truth (the second mark). Since the truth of that 
situation is what the beliefs about it aim at, its truth will consist in something other 
than beliefs, something independent of the individuals concerned (the third mark), and 
will be true in virtue of its content, that is, true in virtue of whether it captures the 
situation it is about (the fourth mark). Finally because truths will assert some states of 
affairs and rule out others, because they have content sensitive to those states of 
affairs, those truths should be compatible with other truths since together they will 
assert a situation which encompasses both of them and rules out neither (the fifth 
mark). 
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Thus if I say to my son "There is a squirrel", I am aiming to convey a truth about the 
presence of a rodent in the vicinity (1st mark). Since we are sharing experience of this 
part of the world, I will expect him to be aware of the squirrel and agree with me, and 
the best explanation of this agreement will be that there actually is a squirrel here (2nd 
mark). "There is a squirrel" is true not just because we both believe it but because 
there is one here and the content of that sentence is about the presence of a squirrel 
(3rd & 4th marks). Given that "There is a squirrel" is true, then neither of us could 
accept as a truth any belief that ruled out the existence of squirrels here (5th mark). 
These marks do not define truth, but they do point out some conditions on the role that 
truth plays in any discourse. They are not a theory of truth, but they do highlight some 
minimum requirements on a theory. These are marks of the concept true, such that if 
some concept of truth fails to conform to them it would be fair to ask whether it is 
reasonably a concept of truth, or whether it distorts the concept of truth. They are also 
the marks, I would suggest, that the sophisticated moral realist will use to distinguish 
between judgments, or claims, and their truth. That is, the truth is something a 
judgment aims at, a judgment has content, not merely dependent on or derivative of 
the beliefs of those making the judgment, in virtue of which the judgment is true or 
not and which would be the basis of agreement about the judgment, and if a judgment 
is true we will expect it to be compatible with other true judgments. These marks say 
nothing about whether the concepts used in judgments are absolute or relative, real or 
apparent, they just delineate something of what it is for judgments to be objective. 
They characterise truth as something that can outstrip the evidence for it, but this does 
not entail that only what is beyond the evidence can be true. It might be that there are 
truths we cannot get hold of. 'sonar texture' might be one of these, but that does not 
surely mean that we have not got hold of some truth merely because we have not got 
hold of all the truth there is. We may have some truth, even if we do not have the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth. So let us see how Moral Realism (MR). ~'loral 
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Constructivism (MC) and Sophisticated Moral Realism (SMR) might display these 
marks of truth. 
Brink fonnulated the positions of the moral realist and the moral constructivist as 
follows: 
MR 1 )There are moral facts or truths 
2)These facts or truths are independent of the evidence for them 
MC l)There are moral facts or truths 
2)These facts or truths are constituted by the evidence for them23 
To be able to formulate the sophisticated moral realist's position we need to look more 
closely at what the second condition is saying. Brink's realist is meant to capture the 
idea that the moral facts are conceptually or metaphysically independent of our minds. 
That is, these are facts or truths which "are metaphysically or conceptually 
independent of the beliefs or propositions which are our evidence that those facts 
obtain"24. His constructivist, by contrast, thinks that there can be no such facts 
independently of our thinking about morality; moral facts are constituted by the 
beliefs that are our evidence that they obtain. As a result the realist thinks that the 
truth of those facts is evidence-independent (they are true independently not just of 
what we happen to believe about them but of the ways we have of thinking about 
them), and the constructivist that it is evidence-dependent (the only thing that could 
count as their being true depends on our having or being able to have evidence). 
Perhaps the best way to highlight the difference between the realist and the 
sophisticated realist is to say that for the sophisticated realist, while the facts we 
discover are metaphysically independent of our beliefs (they are not brought into 
23BIink. p. 16. 
24Brink. p. 15. 
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being by our beliefs or constructed out of them) they are not required to be 
conceptually independent (they do not need to be thinkable without using the concepts 
we use to think about them).25 This means that for the sophisticated realist the truth 
of a fact is independent of the beliefs which are our evidence for it, but not true 
independent of our ways of thinking about such facts. This is something which 
follows from the use of the marks of truth; truth is something that constrains the 
beliefs we may attribute to others in an attempt to make sense of them in the light of a 
common orientation to a common environment, it arises in the context of the ways we 
think about things, not independently of that context. 
This distinction will perhaps be clearer if we consider an example. For the moral 
realist it is possible that releasing information held on computer about someone to 
anyone who asks would have been wrong even for the Ancient Greeks who had no 
concepts of computers because they had no computers. There could be, and probably 
are on the realist account, moral facts for which we have no concepts and will never 
have concepts, but those facts exist nonetheless. The sophisticated moral realist starts 
from a different position. He does not start by making claims about what exists, he 
starts by seeing if his ways of thinking about things are constrained by truth. If they 
are he will conclude that there are moral facts, but because he starts with his ways of 
thinking about things, he will not be able, or want, to make claims about the existence 
or nature of anything that is independent of those ways of thinking about things, not 
even that there could or could not be such things. The facts he discovers will be tied 
to our ways of thinking about things and he will not want to make any metaphysical 
claims about what is independent of those ways of thinking, because he will not be in 
any position to do so. There may turn out to be facts that we discover because our 
25A similar point is made by D McNaughton in his Moral Vision, op.cit., at p. 96. "If 
we reject the account of reality given by the absolute conception then we might say 
that reality is to be thought of as perception-independent but not as conception-
independent. That is, what is real is thought of as there in the world, whether or not 
we are experiencing it, waiting to be encountered. But we need not think of what is 
real as being independent of our particular way of conceiving of the world." 
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ways of thinking change and develop in response to our situation, but the 
sophisticated realist should not feel compelled to claim that, because there is now a 
fact, if there is, about the morality of passing on computerised information, there 
always has been and always will be. I will say more about the relation between moral 
claims and what they are about later on in the chapter, but for now I would like to 
characterise the three moral positions as follows and consider their response to the 
marks of truth. 
MR' 1 )There are moral facts or truths 
2)These facts or truths are constituted by how things are independent 
of human beliefs 
MC' l)There are moral facts or truths 
2)These facts or truths are constituted by human beliefs independent 
of how things are 
SMR 1 )There are moral facts or truths 
2)These facts or truths are constituted by how things are as 
understood by human beliefs 
All these positions claim that there are moral facts or truths, so they would all seem 
display the first mark of truth. Certainly the realist and sophisticated realist would 
both aim at conveying truth, and accept truth as the primary dimension of assessment 
for beliefs. At first sight this is also the case with the constructivist, but since beliefs 
aim at truth because their content, what they are about, is the basis of their truth, then 
problems arise for the constructivist. If, as the constructivist claims. all that moral 
beliefs are about is other beliefs, then there would seem to be nothing beyond beliefs 
that those beliefs aim at. There is nothing that makes any difference to the beliefs of a 
social group, or of the individual subject: nothing to have a common orientation 
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towards which would be the basis of meaning of sentences and of ascribing beliefs to 
speakers. That is, there would be no truth for the constructivist, beyond any claim's 
relation to his considered beliefs or the beliefs of his community. His considered 
beliefs or the beliefs of his community would not be aiming at truth, they would have 
no content in Wiggins' tenn and, therefore, would not be beliefs, merely inventions, 
imagination or even noises, because they would not be saying anything. 
Also, since the content of a claim, if it is detenninate, by which I mean that there is 
some one thing it is claiming or some one situation it is sensitive to, is both what is 
expressed by the belief and what its truth rests on, the constructivist's claims would 
seem to have no such content. Either what it expresses and what its truth rests on are 
two different things, or even if they are the same thing, the content is still 
indetenninate since there is no one thing, no one set of beliefs, which the 
constructivist is capturing and on which the truth of his claim rests. That is, any 
individual constructivist may be said to be aiming at one thing, the beliefs of his 
community, or his own considered beliefs, but those considered beliefs, or the 
community's beliefs are not aiming at anything. Moreover, any two constructivists 
making apparently the same claims may be aiming at different sets of beliefs Now the 
constructivist might be quite happy to say that there was no truth as the basis of his 
beliefs, or inventions, but then he could not, as Brink thinks, be said to be claiming 
that there are facts or truths which he has access to or knowledge of. If they are truths, 
they must be based on more than just opinions, but if they are not or cannot be true, 
then they are not truths or facts. 
There are differences as well, when we consider the second mark of truth. If a moral 
claim is true it is expected to command convergence. where the best explanation of 
that convergence will require the truth of the claim or the inconsistency of denial of it. 
This at first seems all right for the realist, since truth depends on fit with the \\'orld. 
and therefore one would expect that all those who are conceptualising the \\'orld 
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correctly will agree on the way things are because of the way things are. The realist, 
however, is someone who believes in the possibility of evidence-transcendent truths. 
There may be truths to which we may never have access, we may perhaps miss out on 
whole areas of the way things are because we never develop the conceptual apparatus 
to capture them. There would be a problem with claiming this, however, since such 
truths could not display the marks of truth. As we cannot conceptualise these truths 
we cannot give them any content or agree about them. The most the realist can be 
claiming here is that there could be some facts which some concepts, were we to 
develop them, could express. Whatever it means to call these truths, it is not anything 
that fits with the marks of truth. There is, however, also the possibility that we have 
developed conceptual apparatus to describe features of the world for which we do not 
or even could not have sufficient evidence. In the case of these truths presumably the 
realist would not expect that convergence would be commanded by the truth of the 
claim but by the evidence, and the best explanation of convergence would be to do 
with the sorts of evidence we are equipped to detect not the truth of the claim. If a 
claim is beyond human detecting, if the evidence cannot decide the truth of the claim, 
then someone making that claim is basing their claim on the evidence, and if two 
people agree on a claim it will be because of the evidence rather than the truth of the 
claim, because that can have no effect on their judgments. 26 In this case it is dubious 
that the content of the claim is the truth or fact that it is purportedly about. The 
content here is surely some function of the evidence rather than the truth. For 
example, a realist who believes that the pain of others is an evidence-transcendent fact 
may say that the content of a claim "X is in pain" is X's pain. It is not X's pain, 
however, that he responds to when he rushes over to ask if X is alright, since he has 
no access to that. It must be X's groaning or rolling around or the fact that he has 
261n fact an anti-realist who believes in defeasible criteria for some truths has 
similar problems. For an example of this position see Crispin Wright's discussions 
of criteria in his Realism. Meaning and Truth, 2nd ed .. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). If 
these criteria are defeasible. then there may be convergence. but there seems no 
reason to claim that convergence is best explained by truth rather than the criteria. 
since the criteria may apply in cases where the claim is not true. 
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bullet wounds or some such thing. In which case it cannot be X's pain that he and 
others have beliefs about which causes their agreement, they must in fact have beliefs 
about and agree about his behaviour and other evidence. So in the case of evidence-
transcendent truths the realist has no right to expect either that convergence will be 
commanded by the truth of a claim, or that the best explanation of convergence will 
be is truth. 
The sophisticated realist would certainly hold that, since his truths are true of the 
world, truth would command convergence. In fact he holds the second mark to be 
partly definitive of truth, such that if something fails to confonn to it, it will not be a 
truth. Thus the sophisticated realist does not have the problem of the realist, since the 
second mark excludes the possibility of evidence-transcendent truths. If there were no 
possible evidence for a claim, what could it be about it that would command 
convergence, and how could the best explanation of that convergence be the truth? If 
whether a claim is true or false makes no difference to people, then there can be no 
reasons to assent to that claim, and assenting to it cannot be best explained by its truth. 
If, on the other hand, the claim does, under some circumstances command 
convergence the best explanation of which is the truth of the claim, then there is 
something which makes a difference to its truth or falsity and it is not, therefore, 
evidence-transcendent. The sophisticated realist's problem comes at the best 
explanation level. If his truths can only be discovered via the beliefs of moral subjects 
about the world and their responses to it, can he tell whether his beliefs and responses 
are appropriate to the true state of the world seen from a truly moral point of view or 
are influenced by some other circumstances and conditions? This may equally, of 
course, be a problem for the moral realist, since he may not be able to tell when he. 
and the people he agrees with are conceiving of the world correctly, the only test he 
has for the justification of his beliefs may be a test for coherence. So, although both 
the realist and the sophisticated realist would expect the truth to command 
convergence, at least in the case of non-evidence-transcendent truths, they both have 
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problems on whether, on any occasion, the best explanation for convergence achieved 
is the truth or something else. The sophisticated realist has an advantage in that he 
holds that the truth is within reach, is available to our ways of understanding it, and 
therefore has a guarantee that it can be the best explanation of convergence, at least 
sometimes. If the realist holds that truth is or can be evidence-transcendent, then he 
has a problem in those cases with the truth of a situation being the best explanation for 
convergence. Since the truth may be beyond our grasping or conceiving, any 
convergence in these cases will have to be explained on other grounds. 
The constructivist seems to have no problems with convergence on a particular claim 
made from within a particular ethical community since the convergence expected will 
be on the ethical views of that community. He does however have problems both 
about the reasons for this convergence, and with ethical communities making 
incompatible moral claims. The second mark claims not just that there will be 
agreement about a true claim, but that the best explanation of this agreement will be 
the truth of the claim or will be inconsistent with its denial. This cannot be the case 
for any form of constructivism, however, since all versions of constructivism hold that 
there is no truth, beyond what happen to be the beliefs of a community, for opinion to 
converge on. Within a community there will be convergence, but it will be 
convergence on a set of beliefs which are not themselves held because they are true, 
and therefore it is not the truth of those beliefs that is commanding convergence The 
explanation of convergence within a community will be something to do with cultural 
conditioning, education and upbringing. Even if the constructivist holds a coherence 
theory of truth, and holds that the community's claims are true because coherent, their 
coherence does not seem to be the explanation of the convergence of those claims so 
much as that is what the community trains its members to believe. In the case of 
incompatible claims from different communities convergence will not even be 
expected precisely because there is no truth independent of a community's beliefs to 
be had. There is no coherent set of beliefs that would encompass both communities 
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claims and therefore no standard for what would be a true claim. So the constructivist 
does not conform to the second mark of truth at all. 
When it comes to the third mark, again the realist and the sophisticated realist have a 
hold on it, but the constructivist denies this one altogether. For the realist, the truth of 
a claim again consists in how well its content captures the facts about the world, so 
cannot simply consist in being a belief. Again, however, he has a problem with 
evidence-transcendent truths. The content of a claim in Wiggins' understanding, is 
meant to be something which impinges on the common orientation to an environment 
in which moral language is used, in terms of which moral language users can make 
sense of one another. If moral truths are evidence-transcendent, or may be, then they 
may not impinge on moral language users at all, moral language users cannot be 
sensitive to the content of their beliefs, and therefore those beliefs cannot be the sorts 
of things that are candidates for truth, because they do not have content in Wiggins 
terms. The sophisticated realist will also hold that the truth of a claim cannot simply 
be a belief, since the content of a claim is something that is as it is independently of 
whether we believe it or not. However, he maintains that there may be no means of 
assessing its truth independently of our beliefs about and responses to the world. That 
is not to say that the truth is constituted by those beliefs and responses but that our 
beliefs and responses may be the only ways we have of assessing truth claims. There 
can be no getting outside our interaction with the world to assess it. Again these 
truths cannot be evidence-transcendent because their content is the sort of thing that 
impinges on moral language users, the sort of thing they are sensitive to, which affects 
their beliefs and allows them to make sense of one another. For the constructivist, 
although a claim mostly cannot be just the individual's belief without any constraints 
on it, its truth does consist in its being a belief or a function of beliefs. The problem 
comes in at the level of content. The third mark says that if a belief is true then it has 
content and if it has content then its truth cannot consist in its being a belief. The 
constructivist's claims. however, either do not have a content. or have content in a 
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special sense yet to be defined, or perhaps the same belief has different content under 
different conditions. For example, the constructivist could claim that the content of an 
individual community member's belief that 'Abortion is wrong' could be his 
community's beliefs about abortion, but the community's belief that abortion is wrong 
could not have that same content. That is the individual could be sensitive to his 
community's beliefs, but the community has nothing to be sensitive to. Either way 
they do not have the straightforward sort of content that the realist's and sophisticated 
realist's beliefs do. This ensures that what the constructivist claims cannot be a truth , 
since it does not have content, or at least does not have content of the sort that is a 
candidate for truth, and is therefore not content in the terms of the third mark. So, 
although the realist and the sophisticated realist lay claim to the third mark, the 
constructivist cannot and would not want to, since he thinks that the truth of his 
claims consist in beliefs. 
For the realist and the sophisticated realist truths are true in virtue of something, 
although the nature of the something would be different in each case; the way the 
world is independent of us, or the way the world is seen by a particular type of mind, 
one that sees it in moral tenns. For the realist this mark does not, however, condense 
the first three marks. Since the realist may allow for evidence-transcendent truths, 
there are problems for him with how the content of his beliefs relates to what he can 
be sensitive to, and whether the truth of his beliefs is what commands convergence on 
them. So although he would hold that true beliefs are true in virtue of something this 
something does not play the same role in the first three marks. For the constructivist 
truths would seem to be true in virtue of something, that is their coherence with the 
other beliefs the constructivist holds, either as an individual or as a member of his 
community. This mark does not, for the constructivist however, follow out of the first 
three marks. It is not because a belief has content, commands convergence and its 
truth consists in something other than beliefs, that it is true in virtue of its coherence 
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with other beliefs. A claim's coherence with other beliefs as a test of its truth is taken 
as primary, and ensures that the constructivist fails the first three marks. 
The fifth mark claims that the conjunction of any two truths will be true. The realist 
will hold it because if they are true, a true description of the world will contain them 
separately and a rearrangement of that description could contain their conjunction. 
Should the constructivist accept the fifth mark? If he requires coherence or 
consistency to be a constraint on his ethical beliefs, then his beliefs will fit with each 
other, so that the conjunction of any true beliefs will be true If he did not require 
consistency or coherence of ethical beliefs then two beliefs could be contradictory and 
their conjunction could be an inconsistency, and therefore not true. However, if 
ethical beliefs are supposed to guide our ethical behaviour, contradictory beliefs 
would fail to provide a guide. The constructivist, therefore, has to hold coherence or 
consistency as a constraint on his ethical beliefs and so must adhere to the fifth mark. 
The sophisticated realist will hold that the world as experienced from a particular 
perspective will be such that a true description of it will contain both truths and the 
various conjunctions of those truths, and so will also accept the fifth mark. 
So by using the marks of truth to assess the objectivity of moral discourse we have 
problems with both the realist and the constructivist. There are difficulties with the 
constructivist position, since if his claims are to be regarded as candidates for truth 
they cannot be making the same prima facie claims as the realist or sophisticated 
realist would be making using the same language, and even so he has only a limited 
method of distinguishing between belief systems with respect to their truth. The 
realist in general has problems with evidence-transcendent truths, particularly with the 
notion of their content, and moral language users ability to be sensitive to it with 
respect to the second and third marks. If the truth of moral claims is, or can be. 
evidence-transcendent then the realist could not expect convergence as a mark of truth 
and their content could not be of the sort to impinge on the common orientation to the 
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environment of moral language users. The sophisticated realist may, as we remarked 
above, have problems telling whether, when convergence on a claim is achieved, the 
best explanation for it is the truth of the claim or something else, or when claims are 
incompatible, which is true. He does not, however, have any difficulty with using the 
marks of truth to assess the objectivity of his claims, whereas both the realist and the 
constructivist will hold, because of their metaphysical position, that there are truths 
which are not recognisable by the marks of truth. 
Another way of understanding their different responses to the marks of truth would be 
to bear in mind that the sophisticated realist starts from a different point of view than 
both the realist and the constructivist. As we saw earlier, they both start from a 
position about what facts are that forces a particular view of truth on them. As a result 
both fail to comply with the marks of truth in at least some cases. In fact both the 
realist and the constructivist have to reject Wiggins' whole approach. The realist must 
reject it because some of his truths are not recognisable by this approach. For him 
truths do not always make a difference to people's behaviour, they do not always 
explain us to one another. He holds that there are truths which do not, or even cannot 
impinge upon us, and therefore cannot hold that those truths would play any role in 
making sense of one another. The constructivist rejects it because, although it is a 
viable process within any community, or between an individual and his considered 
beliefs, it cannot work between communities or individuals. There are only truths 
within a community or for the individual, and so the claims they make are only truths 
in a limited sense. By starting from the nature of their moral facts the realist and the 
constructivist have ruled out the marks of truth as applying to all their truths or 
applying to them in all circumstances. The sophisticated realist, however, starts 
neither with a metaphysical view of facts or a theory of truth. He starts from the 
possibility of his claims being candidates for truth, uses the marks of truth to assess 
whether they are true, and arrives at facts from there. without having to specify the 
nature of his facts or a precise theory about how truth relates claims to facts. The 
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question is whether this is good enough or whether we have to reject the sophisticated 
realist point of view because it does not match up to the realists demands. I want to 
argue that this is not the case, and in fact that the realist position makes demands on 
us that cannot be met. I do not think we have to go as far as the realist would have us 
go to meet the demands of truth. 
2.4 Is realism too demanding? 
I quoted David Brink at the start as saying that scientific realism talks about "a world 
whose existence and nature are independent of our theorising about it." and that 
"scientific tenns refer to real features of the world". 27 He also thinks that for the 
realist truth is evidence-transcendent. That is, the realist claims that the world is as it 
is independent of us and our beliefs about it, that facts about the world are true 
independently of our evidence for them, and that nonetheless our concepts manage to 
capture some of the features of the world. The motivation for these claims is surely 
that we can be mistaken about things. Past experience shows us that not only can 
individuals be mistaken about how things are in tenns of the current understanding we 
have of the world, but also that our understanding in general may be mistaken. We 
have had ways of understanding things that we no longer believe reflect how things 
are; for example, beliefs about witches and magic, or that the world is flat, or that the 
universe revolves around the earth. This leads the realist to say that there must be a 
right way of describing and understanding things which we either succeed or fail in 
getting hold of with our ways of understanding. He may also hold that some of our 
ways of thinking about things say more about us and our peculiarities than they do 
about how things really are. 
27Brink. p. 7. 
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This all seems to fit with the first picture of us and our relationship to the world that I 
suggested in Chapter 1. There is a world out there, and we observe and attempt to 
understand it using our concepts, but our concepts may seriously distort things for us, 
and may even invent features of the world that do not exist. The picture of what it is 
to get things right here is a picture of an observer or understanding which uses 
concepts which do not distort or invent. That is there is a right way of understanding 
the world, which has all the facts right. The facts are fixed, according to this right 
understanding of things, and we will only be getting things right, our claims will only 
be true, if we conceptualise things the way the correct understanding does. That is, 
the correct story about the world is the world's story, it is not our story or anyone else's 
story, or at least it is ours only if we can tell the world's story, if our language and 
concepts can fortuitously match the world's language or concepts. There is a right 
way to describe the world that is independent of our theorising, which our theorising 
just happens to capture in some circumstances. This success in telling the world's 
story has or may have nothing to do with the sorts of evidence we have for the claims 
we make. We may succeed in capturing the facts but without having the evidence to 
support our claims, for example, when we make claims about other's pain or facts 
about the past. All that counts as truth then is conformity to the right way of 
understanding things, or being able to tell the world's story. 
This concept of truth makes far stronger demands on us than the marks of truth 
require. In terms of Wiggins' depiction of truth, it is something that relates meaning 
to understanding others and the world in terms of a common orientation towards the 
world. Quite what it would be for the world to have its own story is something that 
the marks of truth cannot give any content to precisely because the notion of sharing 
an orientation to the world with the world and sharing its sensitivity to how things are 
from that orientation. to attribute beliefs to the world about itself and to explain the 
world's behaviour in the light of those beliefs, fail to make sense. The whole picture 
of approaching any area of discourse by the marks of truth cannot lead us to what the 
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world thinks about itself, or allow us to make any sense of the world's thinking about 
itself at all. So if, for the realist, conformity with the world's story is the important 
mark of truth, it is not clear what role this could play in our ways of thinking about 
things and or understanding others. This is not just an epistemological point that we 
could not know whether any particular claim was true or not, that can also be the case 
for the sophisticated realist. It is more the point that this mark of truth is not one 
which fits with our pre-theoretic notion of truth, with our everyday practice of 
understanding others and the world. The concept of truth surely arises within the 
context of our orientation towards, and understanding of things. We understand the 
idea of claims being true in terms of how things are understood by us in general, not 
in terms of how things might be from some inhumanly distant point of view, or rather 
some non-point of view. The point of the world's story is either that it is told from 
some all encompassing point of view, or from no point of view at all. An all 
encompassing point of view does not seem to be a point of view at all in that its aim is 
to leave all points of view behind, to remove all their distortions and come to a clear, 
undistorted view. But either that is a view of some sort, in which case it risks having 
some distortion due to its perspective, or it is no view at all, in which case it is 
difficult to see how to tell a story from there. To have no point of view is not to be in 
a position to make any claims. It sounds rather like some Buddhist notions of 
immersion in the unity of the world rather than having a point of view from which the 
world can be understood. But while Buddhists would claim that this immersion gives 
understanding of the world, and therefore truth, it is not an understanding that can be 
communicated, and its truth cannot be the concept of truth we use in making sense of 
others and the world in terms if what is meant by claims about them. That is, the 
realist's concept of a world fixed and describable in terms which we mayor may not 
have access to, which mayor may not bear any relation to the ways we have of 
understanding it, leads him to a concept of truth which threatens to bear no 
relationship at all to our ordinary understanding of what it is for claims to be true or 
false. 
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The sophisticated realist, by contrast, thinks the only story we are in a position to 
make any claims about and assess the truth of is our own story. That is not to say, 
however, that the world plays no part in our story of how things are, that our concepts 
do not grasp the truth because they are ours. This is not a story we have made up in 
isolation, it is an understanding in which the world plays a significant part in that it is 
what constrains what we can say in the story. This holds, for the sophisticated realist, 
of all our ways of conceptualising the world, not just in moral terms, and this is why 
he would claim that scientific claims are no more realist than moral claims. That is 
not to say that there are no differences between claims about, for example, primary 
qualities, secondary qualities and moral qualities for the sophisticated realist, but that 
the difference is not that some are real and claims about them are objective, whereas 
others are not. For the sophisticated realist the qualities are all real, as opposed to 
apparent, and claims about them are all objective, as opposed to subjective, they are 
just relative to different ways we have of understanding ourselves and our 
environment. 
In primary quality terms the sophisticated realist would hold that primary qualities are 
real, but although we develop the concepts we do because of the sorts of creatures we 
are (oriented towards the world in visual and tactile terms), there are other ways of 
being oriented to a spatial environment, in sonar or radar terms for example, which 
will identify the same properties and relations. That is primary qualities are described 
by us in terms of the concepts we have developed from using particular sensory 
modalities, but other points of view, using other sensory modalities may develop and 
use the same concepts to describe the same primary qualities. What constrains the 
concepts we develop are primary qualities of the world (shape, position, motion etc.), 
and the sorts of creatures we are. The interesting thing about the primary qualities is 
that these are the qualities we would expect anything that we recognised as sensitive 
to its environment and capable of thinking about it to recognise. This is perhaps \\"hy 
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there is still much debate about whether and how complexly animals think about their 
environment, because we do recognise that they are sensitive to it in ways that are 
both similar to and different from ours. It is debatable, however, whether we would 
even consider or recognise as candidates for cognitive ability things that did not 
respond to the primary qualities of the world. If there were such things we might fail 
to recognise them at all! 
In secondary quality terms, the qualities we identify are still real, although relative to a 
particular sensory modality, a sort of orientation, that has developed in response to an 
environment that is conceptualisable in those terms if the subject has the relevant 
sensory modality. The constraints on our concept development are secondary 
properties of the world (colour, taste, smell etc.), and the sorts of creatures we are. 
What primary and secondary qualities have in common is that they are generally 
speaking stable properties, by which I mean that what it is to have those properties, 
and what sorts of things have them is something that does not change very much if at 
all. For example, what it is to be circular may be a little more precise for a 
mathematician than for the general public, but our concept of 'circularity' has not 
changed over time; Euclid would probably recognise the same things as circular as a 
modern mathematician. Similarly, in general, our colour judgments do not change 
much through time, although I understand that colours such as yellow and orange are 
comparati ve latecomers to the spectrum. 
The difference between primary and secondary qualities and moral qualities lies in the 
fact that here our concepts develop in response to a changing environment; that is an 
environment in which what it is to have a particular moral property may change. 
When we think about primary and secondary qualities we think of ourselves 
developing concepts to cope with a world which it is beyond our power to change. 
That is, our concepts develop largely because of the way the world is capable of being 
conceived of by creatures like us, and if we develop new concepts it is not that the 
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world has changed but that we have developed an ability to make discriminations that 
we could not make previously, not because the relevant properties did not exist, but 
because we could not, and perhaps had no need to, discriminate them. The moral 
environment, however, is not just one we find ourselves in, it is one we create. The 
moral qualities we find in our environment are there because of the way that 
environment has developed in response to social, political, physical and biological 
constraints, and in response to the ways we have of conceptualising it in moral tenns. 
Our moral environment develops out of the way it already is and in response to the 
way we think of it, and this developing moral environment then causes us to revise 
our ways of thinking of it. Just as, no doubt, our conception of heat changed when we 
thought of it as produced by molecular motion rather than caloric, so our moral 
understanding and conception of slavery changed when we thought of it as the 
possession of fellow human beings rather than of some sub-species, and so, 
presumably, did our concept of what it was to be a human being. So the constraints 
on our concept development are the moral properties of a world that is changing and 
developing, at least in part, because we are moral subjects with a particular way of 
conceptualising that world. 
In all three cases, with respect to the three types of properties, what matters for the 
sophisticated realist is that there is a difference between the truth of something and 
judgements made about it. Our environment is as we find it or even as we make it, 
but there is a way that it is and our judgements are aimed at the truth of the way it is. 
That is our judgments have content which is about the way things are, understood 
from our perspective (as having sensitivity to spatial, colour and moral properties), 
and are true or not in virtue of that content Nonetheless, the way things are cannot be 
inaccessible to the sorts of ways we have of thinking and talking about them. and 
adherence to the marks of truth does not require or even allow that truth be 
inaccessible to our ways of theorising about it. They allow that \ve may make 
mistaken claims, but gi\'en that the content of our claims is what determines their 
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truth, then the claim must be able to conceptualise that content. It cannot be the case 
that the content might be totally beyond the reach of our concepts, even though they 
might on occasion only capture it very loosely. 
This is something that becomes apparent III consideration of the favourable 
circumstances mentioned in the second mark. These seem to be taken generally as 
being something to do with the individual's location relative to what he is makincr 
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claims about and some description of the conditions of the environment. Thus we 
might say that favourable circumstances for making claims about the shape of a 
material object involve being close enough to see or feel it, the object being in a good 
light, the individual having good eyesight, not having lost his sense of touch, not 
being dizzy or intoxicated, and any other of a number of conditions. All these 
conditions seem independent of the actual beliefs about and responses to shapes of 
objects. Yet are they really? We might say that being close enough is a measure 
based on people's ability to recognise shapes of that sort, that having good eyesight or 
a sense of touch ultimately relies on people's responses to tests of, amongst other 
things, shape identification. If I am right about this, then it would seem that the 
favourable circumstances even for primary qualities are not describable independently 
of the responses to and beliefs about objects of the claimant. It seems reasonable to 
make the same claim about secondary qualities and moral qualities as well. However, 
in the case of primary qualities there does seem to be a difference. For the truth of a 
claim to command convergence there will be a requirement that the conditions be 
favourable for the sensory modalities by which the claimants can be sensitive to the 
claim made. In the case of primary qualities, qualities which are detectable by several 
modalities there may not be just one set of favourable conditions for detecting primary 
qualities. Foggy conditions may not be favourable for humans to make long-distance 
spatial judgments, but may not impede bats at all. What may be favourable conditions 
for a blind man to assess shape by touch, may not be for someone who has lost tactile 
sensitivity but assesses shape by sight. This does not mean that bats and humans. 
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blind or seeing, are distinguishing different properties however. 28 It may be that the 
truth of a claim about primary qualities will command convergence only amongst 
those who detect it by a particular sensory modality, under circumstances favourable 
for the use of that sensory modality, while still holding that the best explanation of the 
convergence is the truth of the claim. It is difficult to see, however, how a claim 
could command convergence if there was a requirement that the favourable 
circumstances for such convergence be described in terms independent of the type of 
sensory modality used to detect the properties claimed, and this seems to be the sort of 
requirement that the realist may be making. Primary qualities are qualities that are, 
we assume, recognised by other sensory modalities such as sonar and radar, but then it 
is not inconceivable that secondary qualities are also capable of being recognised by 
other sensory modalities. For example, it might be argued that Evelyn Glennie, the 
deaf percussionist, recognises sounds by the way she senses vibrations in different 
parts of her body. Thus sounds, as well as primary qualities, might be describable in 
different ways, but these are all relative to particular ways of conceiving the world, to 
responses to and beliefs about objects, and all constrained by the distinction between a 
claim and its truth. Is it reasonable, then, or even possible to require that the world be 
describable morally without reference to moral beliefs and responses. If the way the 
world is morally cannot be described without reference to human moral sensibilities, 
then moral discourse is no worse, and of course no better, off than any other 
discourse, and the only reasonable position to hold, with respect to any discourse, is 
that of the sophisticated realist! 
2&rhis is not to say that something that conceptualised shape. position and motion. 
for example. in sonar tenus. might not use different language to deSCribe a belief 
about an object. The claims that were made however. would be describable in tenus 
of human responses to and beliefs about the primary qualities of objects. That is. 
whatever tenninology a bat used to deSCribe a round object would be deSCribable in 
human language appropriate to round objects. because the properties both the bat 
and we are describing are the same properties. 
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The argument so far has shown that the realist, if he is understood to require that the 
nature of the world is describable independently of any reference to human ways of 
conceiving of it, makes unnecessarily strong requirements on truth, and that the 
constructivist might, at best, have hold of a moral system which his moral claims are 
endorsements or descriptions of, but no overall truth against which to test them 
because he is not making moral claims in the same way as the realist and the 
sophisticated realist.. The sophisticated realist holds that there is a distinctively moral 
way of understanding the world and that moral discourse is accordingly regulated by 
truth. 
Of course it might be possible, particularly since we do not have an account of any 
mechanism on which to base the moral way of understanding the world, to maintain 
that there are many different types of moral understanding, in much the same way as it 
might be possible to say that a person who is colour-blind does not have a defective 
visual system but merely a different one. This would allow us to say that, although 
there was only one truth against which to assess moral claims, there could 
nevertheless be incompatible moral claims because the people disagreeing would have 
different ways of understanding things in moral terms. It might therefore be that if 
someone seemed genuinely unable to distinguish between two moral properties we 
would have to think about whether they were morally blind in this respect, whether 
their moral understanding was defective or genuinely different. However, as in the 
colour case, I think the temptation is to say that if they are sensitive to the same moral 
properties that we are in general, then a minor deviation is a defect rather than a 
difference. Thus there would be no need to postulate different moral understandings 
as long as there was a background of general agreement with a few exceptions. 
So it seems at least possible that the position of the Sophisticated Moral Realist is a 
coherent one. That is, it is possible that moral discourse can maintain a 
truth/judgement distinction for its claims even though the truth of those claims \\"ould 
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have to make reference to distinctively human ways of understanding the world, that 
is in moral terms. If this is the case then moral discourse will have patterns of use that 
can be analysed in order to give us information about ourselves and the moral 
environment we find ourselves embedded in. 
Having established, therefore, that moral discourse is one that can be regulated by 
truth, we now need to consider whether it is so regulated, and whether there can be 
different truths relative to different discourses, or whether we have to maintain that 
there is really only one truth against which different discourses, not just different 
moral discourses, must be measured. There are two important questions here, whether 
each discourse can be regulated merely by its own standards, and if not whether the 
standard that regulates all discourses is truth. These will both be addressed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Discipline, norms and truth 
We have discovered that there is room for a metaphysical position where moral 
discourse can be regulated by truth. The question now is whether it is so regulated -
whether it has what Crispin Wright, in his 'Truth and Objectivity'1 calls discipline, 
and whether that discipline is a discipline of truth or of something less than truth, such 
as, for example, warranted assertibility. I want to consider Wright's position because 
he argues that the applicability of truth to a discourse does not support a realist, or 
presumably even a sophisticated realist, metaphysical position. Wright claims that 
there will be a discipline with respect to truth in any assertoric discourse, but that the 
truth predicate associated with any such discourse is particular to that discourse and 
arises out of the norms of warranted assertibility of that discourse. Furthermore, there 
is no need to invoke a realist picture of a world independent of us and our thoughts 
about it, to maintain a concept of truth or even to have some idea of our thoughts 
corresponding to the way things are. The realism that Wright is denying the need for 
here is what he calls modest realism, that is, the view that holds that 
"the external world exists independently of us, that it is as it is 
independently of the conceptual vocabulary in terms of which we think 
about it, and that it is as it is independently of the beliefs about it which 
we do, will or ever would form."[pp.1-2] 
His thought is that any discourse that makes assertions has a truth predicate associated 
with it, merely by virtue of its assertoric form and its firmly acknowledged standards 
of what may and may not be asserted within the discourse. The truth predicate is one 
that for Wright arises out of these standards of proper and improper use, what Wright 
calls the discourse's discipline. Since this requires no grounding in anything external 
lAB page references in this chapter are to Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity. 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1994). 
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to the discourse, no realist notion of a world the discourse is about, the standards of 
proper and improper use regulate assertions with respect to their relations to previous 
assertions. The standards are about words and their patterns of use without any need 
for recourse to anything else.2 Wright talks about discipline as internal, as that to 
which "any genuine range of assertoric contents will be intrinsically subject"[p.73, 
footnote, emphasis added] and about "assertoric "language games", each governed by 
its own internal standards of acceptability"[p.76, emphasis added]. This discipline 
takes as input strings of world or symbols that have already been uttered, and 
constrains what strings of words or symbols can be output according to a set of rules. 
Of course use of the terms 'word' and 'symbol' suggests that they stand for something, 
but the discipline ignores this aspect and manipulates them in virtue of their intrinsic, 
internal properties. Thus they can be seen as syntactic relations between assertions 
(what can be said now is constrained purely by what has been said before) and I shall 
label this internal discipline. It is internal since it operates in terms of a system of 
rules about the terms of the discourse and their patterns of use which needs no 
reference to anything external to the discourse (such as facts or a world) to generate or 
constrain them. A consequence of this possibility of truth being purely a matter 
internal to the discourse is that the realist, or sophisticated realist, would have to 
provide a further argument to show a need for any reliance on the idea of an external 
world to give a concept of truth. What I want to argue is that Wright's picture of a 
truth predicate arising from wholly internal standards about what may be said in the 
discourse is not enough to give us anything that might be called semantic evaluation. 
21t should be noted that the concept of the patterns of word use that are talked 
about here are different in one important respect from the way this phrase is used in 
Chapter 1. There I was talking about analysing our language and its patterns of use 
to tell us something about both ourselves and the world we interact with. In that 
case. however. language and concepts were a part of our interaction with the world: 
the world. in Wright's modest sense of realism. was part of the picture and part of 
what regulates our patterns of use of language and concepts. The idea of words and 
their patterns of use that I am equating with Wright's discipline does not have the 
world in the picture at all. They are patterns of use in Wright's understanding of a 
discourse which arises solely out of standards of proper and improper use which are 
purely internal to the discourse. 
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I will consider whether Wright's concept of minimal truth is applicable in the way he 
thinks it is to any discourse, and whether he can maintain, as he does, that the nonns 
of warranted assertibility are the primary nonns of a discourse. If it can be shown, as I 
think it can be, that truth is the primary nonnative constraint on all but a very few 
discourses, and that this does not arise from the nonns of warranted assertibility, then 
I think this will suffice to show that truth, as it applies to and constrains moral 
discourse cannot be a truth particular to moral discourse or different from the concept 
of truth as used for other discourses. That is, while warrant to assert is, on Wright's 
account, particular to a discourse since it arises out of that discourse's discipline, 
which need depend on nothing external to the discourse, the concept of a substantial 
truth predicate, even in a minimally true discourse, depends on some idea of how 
things are that is external to the discourse, and cannot therefore be something that 
arises out of the discourse and is applicable solely to that discourse. 
3.1 Wright's Minimal Truth 
What Wright claims is that any assertoric discourse will have a truth predicate 
associated with it. For a discourse to be assertoric it must have two features: firstly its 
sentences must have the grammatical fonn of assertions, and secondly there must be 
"finnly acknowledged standards of proper and improper use of the discourses 
ingredient sentences" [p.29] - what Wright calls discipline. The first condition is 
important because Wright wants to rule out from the start the idea that some 
discourses might not be properly assertoric, despite a particular type of surface 
crrammar because there is no reality for them to be about. Like the Sophisticated 
b ' 
Realist Wricrht does not want to start with a metaphysical position that makes any 
, b 
realist assumptions and deduce something about truth from it. He wants to start with 
truth as minimal a notion of truth as possible, and see what, if any, metaphysics is 
, 
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required to sustain a substantial truth predicate in a discourse.3 To do this he needs to 
take claims or judgements made in the discourse at face value; thus if their surface 
grammar is assertoric, then they are to be taken as assertions and not disguised 
commendations or some such thing. Moral discourse also contains inferences where 
assertions are embedded in negations, conditionals and propositional attitudes, and 
Wright feels there cannot be any satisfactory account of such inferences and 
embedded claims if the discourse is seen as not properly assertoric. Another reason 
for the grammatical constraint is that his first approach to the truth of the sentences of 
the discourse is via the Disquotational Schema and therefore the discourse's sentences 
need to be the sorts of thing that can form the antecedent of conditional sentences, and 
can therefore be negated, combined with other sentences or embedded within 
propositional attitudes. So if "P" is a sentence of a discourse which is what Wright 
calls truth-apt, he takes it for granted that "it is not the case that P", "P or Q", and "S 
believes that P" must also be truth-apt sentences of the discourse. 
The second condition, the one about discipline, is to do with the content of the 
sentence. It is what ensures that the sentences have bona fide content, and it does this 
by regulating what sorts of things may be said in the discourse.4 That is, a sentence 
3'Substantial' for Wright is opposed to the deflationary view that to attribute truth to 
an assertion is to claim nothing more than is claimed by the assertion itself. For the 
deflationist 'true' is a predicate applied at the meta-language level that has the same 
effect as warranted assertibility at the object-language level. For Wright. truth is a 
substantial property because it differs in extension from warranted as sertibility , that 
is, something that is warrantedly assertible may not be true and we may lack a 
warrant to assert something that is true. This is different from Wiggins' 
understanding of truth as substantial, because Wiggins makes a methodological 
assumption that truth is substantial. That is, he wishes to start from the 
assumption that there is only one relevant sense of the predicate 'true'. truth tout 
court, and to enquire what this property is like. See for example the third postscript 
in his Needs. Values. Truth. 2nd. ed., (Oxford: Blackwell. 1991). 
4Again we may note that this differs from Wiggins' notion of content. For Wiggins a 
true claim's content is part of the common environment in which claimant and 
interpreter find themselves. The content of a true sentence is something in that 
common environment which both can be sensitive to. This already has some 
reference to something external to the discourse in question, to something that that 
discourse is about. For \Vright the content of a claim will be something to do with 
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has bona fide content if it confonns to the rules of the discourse as applied with 
respect to previously used sentences. Wright claims that this disciplining can be done 
wholly within the tenns of the discourse itself, by which he means that there are rules 
which regulate what may be said given the state of infonnation we find ourselves in. 
Thus all that constrains the proper and improper use of the discourse's sentences is 
words and their patterns of use, that is, their patterns with respect to allowable 
syntactic relations between them. I want to talk more about infonnation states later, 
but for now I will just say that if the disciplining is purely linguistic and internal, 
purely a matter of syntactic relations, then it seems that our state of infonnation, the 
situation we find ourselves in and on the basis of which we apply the rules, is also 
linguistic, a matter of what sentences have already been said limiting what other 
sentences may be said. 
Wright's conclusion, as we shall see, is that it is unnecessary to postulate a realist 
metaphysics, that is any external world independent of our conceptualisation and 
beliefs, in order to assign a truth predicate to a discourse. Unlike the Sophisticated 
Realist he does not think that the truth of a judgement or claim requires recourse to 
anything more than the discourse's standards of proper and improper use. This 
internal discipline is, he thinks, adequate for truth with no need for constraints 
external to the discourse, where external means constraints other than those imposed 
by words and their patterns of use. He claims, therefore, that as long as moral 
discourse has a grammatically assertoric fonn and discipline, then its judgements can 
be true or false, and although he acknowledges that this minimal sort of truth might 
not be one that many of those who argue about morals would like, nonetheless it 
accords with the sorts of things we say about truth and true judgements. 
what the standards of the discourse constrain us to say, which does not necessarily 
have any reference beyond the internal regulation of the discourse. 
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Given that our discourse satisfies these two conditions, surface assertoric fonn and 
discipline, Wright claims it has a truth predicate, and one that arises from their 
satisfaction. He says: 
"To the extent that generally acknowledged standards of appropriateness 
inform our appraisal of, for example, moral judgement and argument, the 
claim that moral discourse is not genuinely assertoric will seem 
unmotivated in contradistinction to the idea that the truth predicate 
which applies within it is some sort of construct from the relevant notion 
of appropriateness." [p.IO] 
This claims that the surface assertoric form and the discipline of the content together 
suggest that the discourse is making genuine assertions that can be true or false, and 
the truth predicate applicable in the discourse is one that arises out of the notion of 
discipline in particular: it is a construct out of what it is appropriate or inappropriate to 
say within the discourse. Appropriate here refers to correct syntactic relations 
between claims as regulated by the internal discipline of the discourse. This 
understanding of propriety as being about syntactic relations is important because, 
although Wright considers that sentences must be capable of semantic evaluation, 
must be truth-apt, his concept of semantic evaluation is one that arises out of internal, 
syntactic discipline. The above is said in the course of criticising the expressivist 
approach to discourses like the moral, but it seems clear that this is the idea that 
Wright has of a minimal truth predicate 
Wright then goes on to consider what is the nature of the truth predicate the 
minimalist is committed to. and in particular what is its relation to the concept of 
warranted assertion. He starts with the idea of the Disquotational Schema and the 
deflationary approach to truth: that to predicate truth of something in the meta-
language is to accomplish no more than does assertion in the object language. and that 
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the concept of truth is only needed to allow us to say something about sentences 
whose content is unspecified or generalised sentences - such uses as "Goldbach's 
conjecture is true" or "Everything he says is true". Wright thinks the Disquotational 
schema captures something about truth but actually says more about truth than the 
deflationist thinks it does. It makes the link between warranted assertibility and truth, 
but it also enforces a split between them. Both the link and the split are in tenns of 
the normative force of truth and warranted assertibility. What he claims is that truth is 
positively nonnatively coincident with warranted assertibility but that it diverges from 
it in extension. 
Wright takes the norms of the discourse to be those generated by the discipline and the 
concept of warranted assertibility, that is, they are to do with what we are justified (or 
not) in asserting within the discourse, which is how he understands the "finnly 
acknowledged standards of proper and improper use". There are rules which constrain 
what we may say within the discourse. These are not just descriptions about under 
what conditions we do in fact say something, they are prescriptive rules about what 
we should or should not say under these conditions; they provide reasons for making 
assertions. So the definition of the positive, normative coincidence of truth with 
warranted assertibility that Wright provides is that if truth and warranted assertibility 
are normative within the discourse (i.e. they both provide constraints on the discourse) 
then "reason to suppose that either characterises a move is reason to suppose that the 
other characterises it too." [p.l8] If we have reason to think it warrantedly assertible, 
we have reason to think it true, and if we have reason to think it true we have reason 
to think it warrantedly assertible. The positive part of positive, normative coincidence 
is important because this leads to the split he also identifies. So, if P is true we have a 
reason to assert P, and if P is warrantedly assertible we similarly have a reason to 
assert it. It is also the case that if P is either not true or not warrantedly assertible we 
have reason not to assert it. The problem arises when we do not have a reason one 
way or another. Wright says we can see how it arises through consideration of how 
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the Disquotational Schema CDS) is affected with respect to negation. The 
Disquotational Schema is how the deflationist understands truth and can be 
formulated as follows. 
(1) "P" is T if and only if P (DS) 
T here is any truth predicate As Wright has said earlier one of the elements of 
assertoric discourse is that the truth-apt sentences of the discourse are such as to have 
a truth-apt negation. If this is the case we can substitute -P for Pin (DS) to get: 
(2) "-P" is T if and only if -P 
But because (DS) is a biconditional we can negate both sides of (1) thus obtaining: 
(3) -("P" is T) if and only if -P 
and using the transitivity of the biconditional, from (2) and (3) we get what Wright 
calls the Negation Equivalence: 
(4) "-P" is T if and only if -("P" is true) (NE) 
This means that if it is not the case that "P" is T then it must be the case that the 
negation of "P" is T and vice versa. While this is right if T is read as true, it does not 
hold for T read as warrantedly assertible. If it is not the case that "P" is warrantedly 
assertible, that does not imply that its negation should be warrantedly assertible. For 
example, if I am in no position to assert that my husband is in his office now, since I 
have no evidence one way or the other, this does not give me a warrant to assert that it 
is not the case that he is in his office. Whereas if it is not true that he is in his office. 
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this does imply that it is true that it is not the case that he is in his office. I may not 
know one way or another, but that has no implications for the truth of the matter. 
So we now have a picture of an assertoric discourse whose sentences have the 
grammatical form of assertions and a content which is governed by firmly 
acknowledged standards of proper and improper use, i.e. discipline. This discourse 
will have a truth predicate associated with it which is a normative constraint on the 
discourse, coincident with and arising out of the norms of warranted assertibility, 
which are themselves a result of the discipline, and yet a substantial property because 
it may diverge in extension from warranted assertibility. 
There are, I think, several things wrong with this picture. Firstly the concept of truth 
that Wright has does not fit with the sort of information state he ought to be using if 
his discipline is to be internal to the discourse. Internal discipline only requires 
information about words and their patterns of use, not about the world, but this does 
not give us a rich enough concept of truth to diverge in extension from warranted 
assertibility. It also seems to cause problems for the idea of the coincidence of 
normativity between truth and warranted assertion. The norms of both may coincide, 
at least up to a point, but because Wright thinks that truth arises out of warranted 
assertibility he has the priority of the norms the wrong way round. If the priority were 
the way he thinks it is then warranted assertibility would not generate the sort of truth 
that can diverge in extension from it. And finally, the concept of truth that is used in 
generating the Negation Equivalence goes beyond and is richer than that arising out of 
the discipline.5 These three points show that if Wright were to stick strictly to the 
5rhis is similar to a point made by Neil Tennant in his 'On Negation, Truth and 
Warranted Assertability' in Analysis. 55 (1995) 98-104. Tennant approaches the 
point from concerns about the proper construal of negation from within a 
constructivist position. but nevertheless concludes. as I do. that Wright is using a 
realist concept of truth to generate his idea that truth diverges in extension from 
warranted assertibility. Tennant thinks that the Negation Equivalence also holds for 
warranted assertibility. which is not a point I am concerned to make. since if it does 
then truth and warranted assertibility still do not diverge in extension. 
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idea that truth arises out of warranted assertibility, he would not have a rich enough 
concept of truth to differ in extension from warranted assertibility, that is his truth 
would not be as substantial as he thinks it is. If he wants to retain substantial truth, it 
turns out that it must be something richer than can be generated by the concept of 
warranted assertibility. Wright's minimal truth may be found in some limited 
discourses, but it is not substantial enough to sustain the divergence in extension 
between it and warranted assertibility, and therefore does not actually differ from 
warranted assertibility; it collapses into it. If, however, we find that a discourse uses 
and needs a divergence in extension between warranted assertibility and truth, if its 
claims can be assertible while failing to be true, or true while failing to be assertible, 
then the concept of truth does not and cannot arise out of warranted assertibility. In 
these discourses the priority is the other way around, warrant to assert arises from 
truth and claims are true because of something other than purely internal discipline. 
3.2 Discipline and Information States 
As we saw earlier, a basic element in Wright's concept of minimal truth is the 
discipline of the discourse. Discipline is what "ensures that we have bona fide 
contents"[p.140] and consists in "firmly acknowledged standards of proper and 
improper use of its [the discourses] ingredient sentences"[p.29]. Wright thinks that 
this discipline is something that relies on the resources of the discourse alone, it is 
something wholly internal to the discourse, since if it were not there would be a 
constraint on the discourse from the outside, and this would be to go beyond what the 
concept of minimal truth requires. This suggests that what we mayor may not say 
within the discourse depends both on the rules of the discourse and the situation we 
find ourselves in. That situation, on the basis of which we apply the rules. must be 
purely linguistic, that is. it must consist of things that have been said before in the 
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discourse.6 Since internal discipline is purely in terms of syntactic relations between 
the discourses sentences, words and their patterns of use, all someone who uses the 
discourse's sentences properly will need to know is what the rules are and what has 
been said before. This situation, which I take it is what Wright means by an 
information state, will therefore consist in an accumulation of previous assertions of 
relevance to the assertion being contemplated and in the light of which the rules 
governing what assertions can be made are applied. 
This understanding of what an information state consists in is important because of 
the role information plays for Wright in distinguishing between truth and warranted 
assertibility. In commenting on the Negation Equivalence he claims it will not hold 
for warranted assertibility because in a neutral information state we would not be 
warranted either to assert P or -P, whereas we would still hold that either P or -P was 
true. So a state where we have insufficient information is one that makes a difference 
to the extension of the concepts "true" and "warrantedly assertible". Information also 
plays an important role in the concept of superassertibility, which is Wright's 
candidate for a minimal truth predicate. What distinguishes assertibility from 
superassertibility is that the superassertibility of a claim does not change under the 
impact of new information, and this is something that is also expected of truth. So we 
have a further use for information in that it can change the warrant to assert a claim 
but not the truth or superassertibility of that claim. Information then has these two 
roles distinguishing between truth and warranted assertibility; it can be insufficient to 
warrant assertion without affecting truth, and new information can affect the warrant 
to assert but not truth. How then does information function in a discourse with a 
minimal truth predicate, one whose discipline and information states are part of the 
discourse and do not arise from outside it? 
tYrhis is the view of language as it appears in my first picture of the relation between 
subject and world. Here language is understood by Wright as separate from the 
subjects relation to an e:\."ternal world. 
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The process of language use in a discourse with a minimal truth predicate sounds 
rather like the playing of a game such as chess, and I would like to try and take this 
analogy a little further. In the case of chess, as in a discourse with a minimal truth 
predicate, we have a closed discourse, that is it need not, and does not, have any 
reference to anything outside itself, its discipline is internal to the discourse or the 
game. Whether you are playing chess, or talking about it, once you know the rules, 
what sorts of moves are allowed, what counts as winning, and what the state of play 
is, there is nothing more that is relevant to what you may do. A consequence of this is 
that chess is a perfect information game: if you know the rules and the state of play 
there will be no possible improvement in information. To be a perfect information 
game does not imply that the players have grasped all the information available, but 
simply that the information is in principle available to them. So any move, or any 
assertion about moves will be made from the point of view of full information. Thus 
if any move, or assertion about moves, is warranted, that warrant will not change. 
That is, in chess discourse we could have superassertibility; but this is because if a 
claim were warranted, no new information could come to light that would change the 
warrant, not that the warrant remains unchanged even in the light of new information. 
It also seems, however, that if a move or a claim is not warranted through lack of 
information, there is no truth beyond a warrant given by the rules to legislate one way 
or another. That is, if there is a gap or a contradiction in the rules, nothing beyond our 
desire to have a playable game will necessitate filling the gap or resolving the 
contradiction. 
We have to be careful about the use of the term information here, because as I have 
presented it, it sounds as if chess players or commentators could never get things 
wrong: as it once you know the rules and have the board in front of you, you should 
always make the right moves. As we know, however, even Grand masters can 
sometimes make the wrong moves. There would be no point in playing at all if no-
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one ever did or could make mistakes. Nonetheless, although there are ways of making 
mistakes in chess, such that some of our reasons for making moves are defeasible, 
these reasons are not defeated by new information coming to light. One way of 
making mistakes arises from ignorance of the rules, or from relying on someone else's 
mistaken opinion. In both these cases, however, the standards being used are not 
those of chess, and therefore it is not the discipline of chess that warrants, or provides 
reasons for the moves. Or again, mistakes could be made through not appreciating the 
state of the game, having overlooked a piece en prise, or through an inability to 
calculate far enough ahead to realise the consequences of a move. These cases are 
not, however, cases of new information coming to light so much as of the implications 
of the information we have not having been realised. If a move is made because of 
these reasons, again it is not warranted by the internal discipline of chess, but by 
something less than this, or some incorrect understanding of it. Thus, either the 
internal discipline of chess warrants a move, or a judgement about moves, or it does 
not. If the reasons we had for making a move or a judgement turn out to be defeated it 
is because they were not, after all, in accord with the norms of chess, not that they 
were in accord with the norms of chess but new information has come to light that 
cause the norms to be reapplied in a different way. Thus in this sort of situation there 
does not seem to be anything that is normatively coincident with warranted 
assertibility but divergent in extension. There is nothing that is one way or another if 
the rules and information do not determine the situation. 
If this is the sort of picture that Wright has of a disciplined discourse, then there is no 
room for the notion of truth that Wright also maintains. If there were a state of 
information that did not warrant one move, or assertion, over another, then there 
would not be any truth beyond that, no fact of the matter to be true, nothing that would 
be the case. Wright might want to say that a novice, or someone ignorant of chess 
would be warranted in making assertions on the basis of some authority, say a chess 
book by Bo.tvinnik, and that although the assertions were warranted. there would still 
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be the question of whether they were true or not. That is, they would have a reason to 
make a move or an assertion, but this would be a defeasible reason, because beyond 
this reason there is a question of whether this move is the right move, or this assertion 
is correct. This is right, but it should be noted that the novice here is not warranted by 
the norms of chess discourse, his reasons and his warrant come from relying on 
Botvinnik who is not, if he is mistaken, operating with the norms of chess discourse, 
but perhaps with the norms of Botvinnik discourse. Or, alternatively, the novice may 
be operating with a poor understanding of the consequences of applying the rules of 
chess to his particular situation, in which case we will say that he played in a way that 
the rules allow, but does not lead to the result he thought it did, and his reasons for 
making that move are not warranted by chess discipline. So when we say that there is 
still a question about the truth of assertions about chess moves or games, we are really 
asking if the assertions are in accord with the norms of chess discourse, are they really 
assertions about chess, or about something else, such as Botvinnik's or our own 
inadequate opinions. Or again, if the reasons people have for making moves or 
assertions are reasons provided by the norms of chess or by something else. In the 
case of chess, it seems that if the norms of warranted assertibility are to be the norms 
of the discourse itself, then there can be no difference between warranted assertibility 
and truth, and if these norms are regulated by something other than the norms of 
chess, then the assertions made according to them are not warranted assertions of 
chess discourse. This distinction between people having reasons to make assertions, 
and the norms of the discourse providing reasons to assert is something I want to 
come back to later, when I discuss the relation between the normativity of truth and of 
warranted assertibility. 
Of course chess is a game with strict rules laid down and a well understood way of 
playing it. There may be variations of chess. with slightly different rules. but 
nonetheless, even if we want to say that some of the norms of chess are based on past 
play and recognised good patterns, these in the end come down to being consequences 
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of the rules and aims of the game. What are we to say about a discourse which does 
not have fixed rules like this, whose discipline is a rather looser agreed pattern of use, 
firmly acknowledged standards of proper and improper use? There are no rules as 
such but there are patterns of good practice established on the basis of past usage. It is 
harder to think of an analogy here, perhaps it is like children playing a chasing game. 
Such constraints as it has are generally internal, there is no reason why there should be 
one set of rules rather than another, no reference is required to anything other than 
how they play the game. In fact there could be external constraints if some of the 
children were much younger than the others, rules about giving them a head start or 
special concessions might develop, or perhaps if one area of the playing ground was 
dangerous they might decide on a rule not to chase players who were too near that 
area. These sorts of cases apart, however, there is nothing beyond how they play the 
game that constrains them to have some set of playing practices rather than another. 
But then if this looser idea is what a minimal discourse is like, there is again no truth 
beyond warranted assertibility. If a situation arises where a player does not know 
what to do because this situation is not covered by the patterns of play then there is no 
right or wrong move. If the infonnation she has is purely in tenns of what other 
players have done in the course of the game, and this gives no guidance, there is 
nothing further that is the right answer, there is no truth beyond the warrant of past 
practice. Wright would of course claim that he is not talking about a one-off game but 
about a long-standing practice. Yet even in a long-standing practice, if he maintains 
that we need not see the practice as responding to anything external to it, the length of 
time the practice has existed should not make any difference. Its practice generates 
warrant, and information about what to do is just about past practice, so there is no 
concept of the right thing to do (the truth) that can make sense when the practice does 
not determine what to do. 
This collapse of truth into warranted assertibility arises because all the constraints are 
internal - there is no game reality for the discourse to be about. In these games the 
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internal nature of the infonnation state, the fact that any infonnation had to be about 
the rules or the state of play, all of which is infonnation about past practices and the 
allowable relations between them, is what rules out the possibility of any fact of the 
matter above and beyond that infonnation state. If all discourses which sustain a 
concept of minimal truth are like this, then it does not seem to be the case that they 
sustain a truth predicate at all. In these discourses the infonnation is about past 
assertions and the allowable syntactic relations between them and there cannot be 
more infonnation available from elsewhere; what is allowable is exhausted by the 
internal discipline. If either of the sorts of distinction made above between truth and 
warranted assertion - that of truth applying in cases where there is insufficient 
infonnation to warrant assertion, and of truth, unlike warrant, being something that 
does not change under the impact of new infonnation - is applicable however, then it 
seems that the improvement in infonnation we require is something beyond the 
present resources of the discourse. If the improved information state, the one that 
would cause us to revise our judgement, or that would support the truth rather than the 
warranted assertibility of the statement, is of something that was not available to us 
before, then it seems it cannot be something that was part of, or implicit in the 
knowledge of the rules and the state of play, that is, in the allowable internal relations 
between sentences. 
The result of the above section is that we have two types of discourse. The first, call it 
a Minimal Discourse, is a fairly limited discourse. It is closed since it needs no 
reference to anything beyond itself, and if we are operating within this discourse then 
all the information we need is in principle available to us at once - there can be no 
concept of improvement of information. Since there is no reference to anything 
beyond the internal syntactic relations of sentences of the discourse. the internal 
discipline, the content of those sentences must be in some sense restatements or 
consequences of those rules. Of course it may be that we do not know all the rules of 
chess, for example, or that they are inconsistent, so that sometimes we are not sure 
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what we are warranted to assert. In the fonner case, however, any assertions we make 
are not operating with respect to the nonns of chess discourse and any mistakes we 
make are not because anything about chess reality has changed but because we were 
mistaken about the norms of the discourse. And in the latter case, since warrant arises 
out of the internal discipline, there cannot be any truth of the matter to adjudicate one 
way or the other. The norms of a Minimal Discourse are fixed, they are not something 
that responds to anything else. We can change them if we like but this would only be 
because we choose to play a slightly different game, not because they do not fit as 
well as we thought they did, or because we have come to recognise finer 
discriminations in chess, or have recognised that we had previously been 
misidentifying some element of chess. There is nothing above and beyond the nonns 
of chess that we have invented that would allow us to make a distinction between the 
warrantedness of any assertion and its truth. Note that in this sort of discourse the 
distinction between truth and warrant that Wright sees as inherent in the 
Disquotational Schema does not apply - there is nothing that is the case that assertions 
can be about - if we are not warranted to make an assertion because we are in a neutral 
information state, then there is nothing that is the truth of the matter. 
The second type of discourse, a Non-Minimal Discourse, is one where there can be 
improvements in our information state. An improvement is additional infonnation, 
not available before. This cannot, however, be information about the internal 
syntactic relations, since that was all previously available. It must, therefore, be due 
to something external to the discourse. It might be that the nonns of the discourse 
need to be refined or modified, but if they do, this will be because they were found to 
be inadequate in some respect. They did not match up somehow with what the 
discourse is talking about, and therefore the discourse must be talking about 
something other than its own discipline; its discipline must be seen as a response to 
the discourse's content, to what it is about, and its content must be something richer 
than merely a restatement of the rules. This sort of discipline is an external discipline: 
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although it constrains what may be said it does so because it is responsive to 
something outside the discourse, the discourse's subject matter, what it is about. If 
this is so then there can be a distinction between truth and warranted assertion, since 
there will now be something that is the case, the truth of which is generating the 
norms of the Non-Minimal Discourse. Assertions will still be warranted or not 
dependent on the information state of the speaker, but there will be possible 
improvements in information which arise, not from within the limits of the discourse 
but from what is beyond the rules of the discourse, namely its content. This is what 
gives rise to the distinctions that Wright finds in the Disquotational Schema and 
therefore to the Negation Equivalence as Wright derives it. 
3.3 The Negation Equivalence 
Wright derives the Negation Equivalence, as I showed in section 1, from the 
Disquotational Schema. The Disquotational Schema is used as the prime example of 
a link between truth and warranted assertibility, that should allow us to move from the 
concept of warranted assertibility as it exists in an internally disciplined discourse, to 
the concept of truth. That is, it maintains that truth is a predicate applied in the meta-
language that achieves no more than does simple assertion in the object-language. 
Yet Wright claims that, while the Disquotational Schema "gives an all but complete 
explanation of the truth predicate"[p.14], truth must be more substantial than this, 
even in a minimally true discourse, because the Disquotational Schema can be used to 
create the Negation Equivalence, which says something about truth which we cannot 
say about warranted assertibility. 
I do not want to claim that substantial truth cannot be found in the Negation 
Equivalence, but that when Wright does so he is using a concept of truth which goes 
beyond the limits of either the object- or the meta-language, that is he finds it there 
because he has already assumed it. This is because the Disquotational Schema can be 
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read as relating the truth of a sentence either to what can be or is asserted in the object 
language, as the deflationists do, or to what is the case, as Wright sometimes wants to. 
What is relevant to the concept of warranted assertibility is not what is the case. but 
what evidence the speaker has. 
If we consider the four steps of the derivation: 
(1) "P" is T ~ P (DS) 
(2) "_p" is T ~-p (negating P in (1)) 
(3) _("P" is T) ~ -P (negating both sides of (1)) 
(4) "_p" is T ~ _("P" is T) (NE) (equating (2) and (3)) 
This derivation works because .p in (2) and (3) is taken to be the same. That is, it is 
taken to be something of which we can say that it is or is not the case. The content of 
a truth-apt sentence, as Wright has insisted, is something that has a truth-apt negation, 
but the very fact that both are truth-apt rather than just warranted already involves a 
more substantial notion than warrant. If the Disquotational Schema really just related 
truth in the meta-language to warranted assertibility in the object-language, as the 
deflationist wants, and as Wright is claiming to use it, then its form should be 
something like 
(DS*) "P" is T m ~ "P" is W Ao 
Where T m means true in the meta-language and W Ao means warrantedly assertible in 
the object-language. Of course the Negation Equivalence cannot be derived from 
(DS*) because it would require us to equate {"-P" is W Ao} with {-("P" is \VAo)} and 
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this is the very point Wright is denying to show the difference between truth and 
warranted assertibility. But surely if the Disquotational Schema is just what the 
deflationist says it is, if it shows that to predicate truth in the meta-language is to do 
no more that is accomplished by assertion in the object-language, then truth can only 
be predicated in the meta-language under those conditions where assertion in the 
object language is warranted and is therefore, by definition, no different from 
warranted assertibility. That is, where assertion in the object-language is not 
warranted, there is nothing that is the case or is not the case which can be negated to 
allow the Negation Equivalence to go through. There is nothing that could count as 
the truth of the content of the sentence; that content could not be truth-apt. So the 
deflationist would have to be committed to holding that if a sentence were not 
assertible, for example, owing to insufficient information, then it could not be true or 
false. Wright's derivation of the Negation Equivalence works, then, because he is 
already willing to allow that P, the content of a sentence, is truth-apt, where truth is 
understood as potentially larger than warranted assertibility. It is not that the Negation 
Equivalence demonstrates this, it is that it could not be derived if the assumption was 
not already present. 
To put things another way, in a Minimal Discourse, the content of an assertion is a 
restatement or consequence of the internal discipline, since it is this discipline that 
ensures we have a bona fide content. So whatever P is, it is something that derives 
from the internal discipline of the discourse. If this is so then the only way of having 
a neutral information state is if the rules are inconsistent or have a gap in them. In this 
case there is nothing about the content or contained in the content that can settle 
anything not covered by the warrant given by this internal discipline; in fact there is 
no content since the content is a restatement of the rules and the rules say nothing 
here. There is nothing to be the case, nothing to be true, if neither an assertion with 
content P nor an assertion with content .p turns out to be warranted. If an account of 
the content P requires something more than a restatement or consequence of the rules. 
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if something in addition to an internal discipline, an external discipline, ensures the 
bona fide nature of the contents, then there is something contained in the content that 
could settle the truth of assertions not covered by the warrant given by an internal 
discipline. This, however, would be a Non-Minimal Discourse where neutral 
information states and improved information are possible, because the content is 
richer than anything that could be captured by internal discipline. It is about 
something wider than the rules and past practice, and therefore its discipline is an 
external discipline, it reflects what the discourse is about. In this case the discipline 
still tells us what to do with sentences with a particular content, or fails to do so if we 
have inadequate information, but the discipline cannot be purely syntactic, purely 
about relations between sentences, it also has to take into account what those 
sentences are about, and that involves the semantic regulation of those sentences, not 
merely a syntactic regulation. 
So both the idea of truth as in any way differing from warranted assertibility and the 
derivation of the Negation Equivalence depend on the concept of a Non-Minimal 
Discourse where the discipline we have is a discipline with respect to something more 
than the rules and assertions of the discourse, it requires the discourse to be about 
something, to have a content which the rules respond to. An external discipline is the 
discipline it is because of the sort of content the sentences of the discourse have, 
whereas in a Minimal Discourse this priority is reversed and the content is the content 
it is because of the internal discipline the discourse has. The content here is no more 
than the rules and assertions that can be derived from them, so the internal discipline 
can be purely syntactic and there will be nothing to the content that sustains a concept 
of truth different from warranted assertibility. Whereas in a Non-Minimal Discourse 
the possibility of an assertion being true, even where neutral information imposes a 
lack of warrant, and the possibility of improved information affecting warrant but not 
truth, both require that the content of assertions is richer than a restatement of the 
discipline, and that the external discipline therefore is semantic not syntactic. 
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The Minimal Discourse seems to be what Wright wants a discourse sustaining a 
minimal truth predicate to be, but in fact it does not sustain anything over and above 
the concept of warranted assertibility. There are firmly acknowledged standards of 
proper and improper assertion, but there is no substantial truth predicate which shares 
the norms of the discourse with warranted assertibility but is divergent in extension. 
Thus, if moral discourse is held to sustain a substantial truth predicate, if we hold that 
our information with respect to a particular claim can change and bring us closer to 
the truth of the claim, it must be a Non-Minimal Discourse which has reference to 
something beyond itself. It cannot be a discourse where all that is referred to are the 
rules of the discourse. If its patterns of use respond to truth as opposed to merely 
warrant, then it must have content, it must be about something beyond the discipline 
of the discourse and it must require access to information about that content. 
In these first two sections I have argued that a substantial concept of truth is not one 
that arises out of the norms of warranted assertibility. In a Minimal Discourse it is 
possible to have warrant, because of the relation between internal discipline and 
content, without there being any possibility of truth. In a Non-Minimal Discourse 
there can be a substantial truth predicate, but this possibility arises because the content 
and the discipline of the discourse are both constrained by the discourse's subject 
matter, something beyond the syntactic relations between the discourses sentences, 
and this is what makes its discipline external. In the next section I want to go further 
and show how, rather than truth arising from warranted assertibility, in a Non-
Minimal Discourse warranted assertibility arises from truth. That is, if truth and 
warranted assertibility are normatively coincident yet extensionally divergent, as 
Wright claims they are, this is because the normativity of warrant derives from the 
normativity of truth and not vice versa. By looking at how Wright conceives of norms 
and the normative coincidence of truth and warranted assertibility, I hope to show that 
in a discourse to which a substantial truth predicate can be applied. it is truth that is 
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the primary norm of the discourse and warranted assertibility is normative, if it is, 
only because truth is. 
3.4 Norms 
What are norms for Wright, and what is normative coincidence? He distinguishes 
between descriptive and prescriptive norms and positive and negative norms and 
looks at what characteristics make a move a descriptive or a prescriptive norm. He 
says of positive norms: 
"A characteristic of moves in a particular practice is a descriptive norm 
if, as a matter of fact, participants in the practice are positively guided in 
their selection of moves by whether a proposed move possesses that 
characteristic." and "By contrast, a characteristic of moves supplies a 
prescriptive nonn just in case the reflection that a move has that 
characteristic provides a (defeasible) reason for making, or endorsing, or 
permitting it, even if such reasons tend, for the most part, to go 
unacknow ledged by actual participants." [p.15] 
And of negative norms: 
"negative descriptive norms would be, correspondingly, characteristics 
such that participants in a practice treat a move's having such a 
characteristic as a reason for avoiding, condemning, discouraging or 
prohibiting it. And negative prescriptive norms would be characteristics 
recognition of which ought to provide reason for such negative responses 
to actual or proposed moves."[p.15] 
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The first paIr of quotes suggests that the difference between descriptive and 
prescriptive norms is whether the characteristic provides a reason for making the 
move, and the second that the difference is between whether the move ought to be 
made or not. I take it then that descriptive nonns are characteristics which moves 
made by participants in the practice actually have, and prescriptive norms are 
characteristics which provide reasons why participants in the practice ought to make 
those moves. This is borne out by a later quote: 
"[the norm's] being observed (if it is a descriptive norm) or its supplying 
a defeasible reason for the making, refusal and so on of moves (if it is a 
prescriptive nonn) ... "[p.16] 
Both truth and warranted assertibility are understood as prescriptively normative of a 
discourse that sustains a minimal truth predicate, so both must be characteristics of 
moves made by participants in the discourse which provide reasons why speakers 
ought to make assertions. This is confusing since Wright is here talking about the 
nonns as characteristics of moves, and truth does not seem to be the sort of thing that 
characterises the act of asserting so much as the assertion made. Later he says that a 
complex of norms of warranted assertibility operate in the discourse because "to have 
reason to think that a sentence is warrantedly assertible is, trivially, to have 
(defeasible) reason to assert it, or endorse its assertion"[p.17]. It follows from this 
that nonns of truth apply because "any reason to think that a sentence is T may be 
transferred across the biconditional, into reason to make or allow the assertoric move 
which it expresses"[p.17J The first quotation suggests that it is the status of the 
sentence which warrants its assertion, rather than the status of the act of assertion 
itself. It is the warranted assertibility of the sentence (or its truth) that endorses its 
assertion. Yet on Wright's account the warranted assertibility of a sentence is surely 
only a property the sentence has because the act of asserting is warranted: that is why 
the two are triyially equated. The second must surely be \\Tong since it is not the 
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reasons we have for thinking something is true that may be transferred across the 
biconditional, especially as Wright insists that they are defeasible reasons, but only the 
characteristic of being true. 
If the normativity depends on the characteristics of the sentences rather than the 
moves, then we can say that the truth of a sentence, or the warranted assertibility of 
the sentence is what endorses its assertion. So prescriptive norms of a discourse 
should, on this account, be characteristics of the sentences of the discourse which 
provide reasons why participants in the discourse ought to utter those sentences. Now 
truth, as a characteristic of sentences, is what Wright calls a stable characteristic, it 
does not change under the impact of new information, and therefore the reasons it 
provides must surely be non-defeasible reasons. Warranted assertibility may be a 
characteristic of a sentence, but it is a characteristic that the sentence has only 
derivatively because the act of asserting is warranted. It is not stable, because it may 
change under the impact of new information, at least in a Non-Minimal Discourse, so 
it will provide defeasible reasons, and what defeats them is new information which 
arises from the situation the sentence is about. Or, to put it another way, what defeats 
the warranted assertibility of a sentence is its truth. So if normativity of a discourse 
depends on characteristics of the sentences of the discourse, then truth is the 
normative constraint that matters. 
If, on the other hand, what the norms operate on in the discourse are moves, then truth 
cannot be a norm of the discourse, because truth cannot be predicated of the act of 
asserting. An assertion can be true but asserting is not the sort of thing that can be a 
truth bearer. Someone may be right in asserting something because what he asserts is 
true, but his asserting it is not true. If what is regulated therefore is the move of 
asserting, then only warrant can act as a norm, and if warrant provides defeasible 
reasons for asserting it is hard to see what defeats them. If it is only further warrants, 
then presuDlably the reasons are not always defeasible, if they are then the truth of 
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what the assertions are about has come back into the picture as what defeats the 
reasons. Then, however, we are back to a Non-Minimal discourse where the 
discipline is external, it responds to the content of the discourse and arises out of truth. 
Thus although warrant and discipline applied to the moves or acts of asserting may be 
the only way we could approach the truth of assertions, nonetheless, the truth of 
assertions is what is constraining the discipline of warrant and the discipline is an 
external discipline. The discipline is the discipline it is because of the truth of the 
subject matter of the discourse. So whether we take the normative constraints of the 
discourse to be characteristics of the discourses sentences or of its moves, the bottom 
line is truth. Either truth is the characteristic of sentences that provides reasons why 
those sentences ought to be uttered, or truth is what constrains the discipline which is 
normative of the moves or acts of asserting. 
Normative coincidence also concerns reasons. Here Wright says that a definition of 
the normative coincidence of truth and warranted assertibility is that "reason to 
suppose that either predicate characterises a move is reason to suppose that the other 
characterises it too" [p.IS]. Here again the predicate is seen as characterising a move, 
which is something truth cannot do while warranted assertibility can. I think that 
there are problems here because there is confusion over both what is meant by 
assertion and by how truth and warranted assertibility can be predicated of assertions. 
The first problem is that assertion is being taken to mean both the sentence, which is 
an assertion because of its grammatical form, and to mean the act of asserting. The 
second is that the two properties, truth and warranted assertibility, do not both apply 
to assertions in the same sense. Truth is predicable of assertions in the first sense, a 
property of sentences which they do not lose, and which has nothing to do with the 
information state of the speaker; it can be true whether they know it or not. Warrant is 
a property of assertions in the second sense. a property of the act of asserting. It is a 
relational property between the sentence and the speaker in a particular information 
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state and therefore something that can change in applicability to sentences of a 
discourse as the information state changes. A sentence will be true because of what it 
says is the case, but an act of asserting will be warranted both because of what the 
sentence asserted says is the case and because of the information the speaker has 
relating to that state of affairs. If the act of asserting is warranted then the sentence is 
warrantedly assertible and not vice versa, the sentence has that characteristic because 
the act of asserting is warranted. 
So in both cases, that of defining norms and of normative coincidence, Wright is 
laying emphasis on the act of asserting and the warrantedness or otherwise of that, and 
saying that since truth is linked to warranted assertibility via the Disquotational 
Schema, that truth must be normative in the same way. Yet truth cannot act 
normatively in this way since truth cannot be predicated of the act of asserting but 
only of assertions in the sense of sentences. Here again the arguments used above will 
apply. If we understand the normativity of the discourse as based on characteristics, 
not of the moves of the discourse, but of the ingredient sentences then the normative 
force of both truth and warranted assertion will be that if either is a characteristic of a 
sentence, that will provide a reason why a speaker ought to assert that sentence; and 
warrant will be only derivatively normatively coincident with truth. Truth will be the 
normative constraint on the discourse and warrant will coincide with it since sentences 
are warranted ultimately because they are true. If, however, we understand the 
normativity of the discourse to be based on characteristics of the acts of assertion, then 
in the case of Minimal Discourses truth and warrant coincide both in normative force 
and in extension, or in the case of Non-Minimal Discourses they coincide in 
normative force and differ in extension because it is truth that constrains the discipline 
that provides warrant. 
There is also a problem concerning reasons as they are used in talking about norms 
and normative coincidence. I think that Wright is equating two notions of reason 
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here: the notion of norms providing a reason to assert sentences (justifying the 
assertion), and the notion of having reasons to suppose them true or warrantedly 
assertible (the requirement of evidence).? Thus normativity is the provision of 
reasons to assert (if a sentence is true or warrantedly assertible then we are justified in 
asserting the sentence) but says nothing about how we know the sentence is true or the 
move warranted, it is just that if either is the case then we have a reason to assert it. 
Or to put it another way, the truth or warranted assertibility of a sentence just is a 
reason to assert it, it does not provide any other reason, and this, at least in the case of 
truth, is not a defeasible reason. On the other hand, when Wright talks about a reason 
to suppose a sentence true or warrantedly assertible, he is talking about whether we 
have evidence in favour of it. And, of course, a sentence can only be warrantedly 
assertible if asserting the sentence is warranted by having the right sort of information. 
The truth and the warranted assertibility of a sentence are both a reason to assert the 
sentence, they both act as positive prescriptive norms, but this is not a defeasible 
reason. It just is the case that if the sentence is true we may assert it, and if it is 
warrantedly assertible we may assert it. The further question of how we may know 
that the sentence is true or warrantedly assertible is a different one and clearly here we 
can have defeasible reasons. We may have a reason to assert a sentence, but if we 
acquire more information we will then say that while we were warranted to assert the 
7These two types of reason can be equated with the concept of external and internal 
reasons as it is used by Bernard Williams in his Internal and External Reasons in R. 
Harrison ed., Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979). There is a difference, however, in that what 
makes a reason an internal or external one is an epistemic difference. That is, for 
someone making an assertion, his internal reason to do so depends on the 
information he has, whereas saying that the truth of an assertion provides an 
external reason to assert is something that may be beyond the information available. 
at least at that time. to that person. This distinction between internal and external 
reasons would not then be subject to Williams' criticism because it requires no 
change of motivation for someone to see that the external reason is a reason, but 
only a change of information. If. as Wright's platitudes about truth claim. to assert is 
to present as true. then truth must be the motivation for assertion. and thus the 
truth of a (' laim will be an external reason for asserting which requires no change in 
motivation. 
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sentence earlier, it was not true. The reason was a defeasible reason for thinking the 
sentence true, though not for thinking it warrantedly assertible. 
This distinction between having a reason to assert and the discipline providing a 
reason to assert was something I noted earlier in my account of a Minimal Discourse. 
Here the internal discipline does provide a reason to assert (a justifying reason) 
because it is the only constraint on sentences. If a sentence is warranted at all it is 
warranted by the internal discipline. If we have a reason to assert it (the evidence 
requirement) which is not in accord with the discipline, either because we have an 
incomplete knowledge of the discipline, or because we have failed to notice some of 
its consequences, this is not in fact a defeasible reason provided by the discipline of 
the discourse but a reason provided by something else, and our assertion is not 
warranted by the discourse's internal discipline at all. 
Whereas in a Non-Minimal Discourse, because we have a notion of substantial truth, 
truth which may differ in extension from warrant, the discipline of the discourse, here 
an external discipline, may warrant us in an assertion which fails to capture the truth 
either because the information state we are in, or the discipline itself, is not 
sufficiently sensitive to the truth of the situation that the assertion is about. Reasons 
for asserting may be defeasible because either our information or the discipline itself 
does not match up to the situation the assertion is about. That is the truth of the 
sentence is a reason to assert it Uustifies assertion), while the discipline of the 
discourse together with our information state warrants the act of asserting (we have 
reason to assert). It may be that the discipline is the only way we have to approach 
true assertions, but the point here is that the distinction between truth and warrant 
requires an information state that includes more than just the rules and a discipline 
that is constrained by the discourse's subject matter. it includes a recognition of the 
situation the assertion is about. The external discipline we apply to the act of 
asserting is, in a Non-Minimal Discourse, based on the recognition of the situation: in 
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particular cases we apply the discipline differently. Thus the discipline in a Non-
Minimal Discourse is something that needs to respond to something, to the types of 
situation that the discourse is about, as opposed to a Minimal Discourse where the 
discipline need respond to nothing. 
So, when we are considering the normative force of truth and warranted assertibility 
we have two different sorts of norms. The truth of an assertion is a norm that justifies 
assertion, it is a property of the sentence that does not change and is therefore a non-
defeasible reason to assert the sentence. Whereas warranted assertibility is something 
that acts as a constraint on the act of asserting. Warrant is a property of the act which 
changes as the information changes. If the act of asserting is warranted, then the 
sentence would be warrantedly assertible, but the sentence only acquires this property 
as a result of the act being warranted, and the sentence can lose the property if the act 
is no longer warranted. So warranted assertibility is not a stable property of sentences, 
but only of acts of assertion given particular information states. An act is warranted 
given the reasons we have for asserting it, but these are defeasible reasons, and what 
defeats them in the end, if anything does, is truth. In a Non-Minimal Discourse both 
these norms operate, but truth is the normative force of the discourse, it is truth as a 
stable property of sentences that justifies their assertion, whereas warrant is normative 
of the act of asserting based on evidence and reasons which are defeasible. Truth is 
what makes the discipline the discipline it is, and so warrant is secondary to truth. In 
a Minimal Discourse truth disappears as a norm, or perhaps warrant and truth are 
indistinguishable both in normative force and extension. Here substantial truth is not 
a possible property of sentences, warranted assertibility is the most they can have and 
they have it as a result of the warrantedness of the act of asserting. Warrant here 
makes the discipline the discipline it is, but the reasons provided by the warrant are no 
longer defeasible if they are in accord with the discipline. Here defeasible reasons are 
ones that do not arise out of the discipline. but from some other source. 
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Wright's understanding of the links between warrant and truth are illustrated in the 
following quote: 
"Suppose F and G are so related that, while the only kind of reason we 
can have for supposing that something is G is that it be F, the reason 
supplied is a defeasible reason. Then having reason to think that an item 
is G will involve having reason to think that it is F; and having reason to 
think it is F will amount, when so far undefeated, to reason to think it is 
G. Hence if either predicate is normative with respect to some practice. 
the two predicates will be normatively coincident with respect to 
it." [p.19] 
Thus, having reason to think an assertion is true will involve having reason to think 
that it is warrantedly assertible, and having reason to think it is warrantedly assertible 
will amount, when so far undefeated, to reason to think it is true. The warranted 
assertibility of a sentence is, by definition, something we must have evidence for, and 
is all the evidence we can get for the truth of the sentence. 
The last sentence of the quotation concludes that the two predicates are normatively 
coincident on the basis that there is only one set of reasons we can have, although they 
do duty for both predicates, therefore "reason to suppose that either predicate 
characterises a move is reason to suppose that the other characterises it too" [p.18] 
This is Wright's definition of normative coincidence, but it seems a peculiar way of 
defining it. It sounds as if we must have a reason, or that there must be reason. to 
suppose that the norms coincide if they are to coincide. But shouldn't it be the case 
that if the norms coincide, they don't do so just because we have reason to think that 
they do. Would it not be more correct, if talking from the point of view of the 
discourse to say that the norms coincide if whenever a sentence's being true endorses 
its assertion its being warrantedlv assertible also endorses its assertion. and "'ice 
127 
versa? It may be that we cannot know in any given case whether a sentence is true, 
but only whether it is warrantedly assertible, but does this affect the coincidence of 
normativity? 
This leads to a way of looking at things which makes truth the primary normative 
force on the discourse and warranted assertibility only a secondary norm. That is, 
truth is a property of a sentence of the discourse which provides a reason to assert it, 
whereas warrant is a property of a sentence and a speaker which gives that speaker a 
reason to assert it. Warranted assertibility is only predicated of a sentence because 
warrant can be predicated of the act of asserting. Warrant is a norm of the use of the 
discourse and warranted assertibility only derivatively a norm of the discourse, 
whereas truth is a primary norm of the discourse. If, however, Wright would argue 
that normative constraints on the use of the discourse are the only ones we could have, 
there is still a case to be made for truth as the primary constraint on the discourse. If 
truth is a substantial property and can differ from warranted assertibility in extension, 
then it is truth that in the end constrains the discipline the discourse has. As a Non-
Minimal Discourse its discipline is external and constrained by truth. 
This view is supported by considerations from the previous sections where we saw 
that in a discourse which sustains a truth predicate, a Non-Minimal Discourse, there 
must be the possibility of imperfect information. In an imperfect information state 
acts of assertion mayor may not be warranted although the assertion concerned is held 
to be true or untrue. Since the information may be imperfect there can be 
improvements in our information state, and as long as they are improvements the 
information acquired will be information about the truth of an assertion, about what is 
the case. Of course we may mistakenly regard some information as relevant to the 
truth of an assertion even when it is not so and thus be lead away from the truth. 
Having only come across pasta near the vegetable section of Sainsbury's I may assert 
that it is a vegetable and regard David Dimbleby's April 1 st report on the spaghetti 
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harvest as supporting my assertion to this effect. I am, however, still wrong in my 
assertion, although perhaps warranted, and an improved infonnation state, perhaps 
based on the ingredients list on the packet of spaghetti, will be infonnation relevant to 
the truth of my assertion. Thus it seems that the normative force of truth has priority 
over the normative force of warranted assertibility. The warranted assertibility of a 
sentence is not really a reason for justifying an assertion, it is a result of already 
having that justification, which is itself based on a defeasible reason, whereas the truth 
of the sentence is a reason, and an indefeasible reason, for justifying the assertion. I 
therefore find it difficult to maintain that truth and warranted assertibility coincide 
even in positive normative force, since reason to suppose that warranted assertibility 
characterises a move is not necessarily reason to suppose that truth characterises it, 
even if truth could characterise moves. The very fact that an assertion, not an act of 
asserting, may be warranted although untrue, or may not be warranted although either 
true or untrue, suggests that its truth-characteristic mandates different moves, even 
though we may not know that it does, from its warrant or lack of warrant. 
The difference between a Minimal Discourse and a Non-Minimal Discourse is in the 
normative basis of the discourse. I would argue that in a Non-Minimal Discourse 
discipline, the concept of standards of proper and improper use of sentences, is an 
external discipline, a discipline with respect to truth not to warrant; it provides 
warrant not responds to it. In Minimal Discourse warrant is nonnative and thus, if the 
wrong information is used we are not operating with the norms of the discourse and 
there is nothing beyond being warranted that the internal discipline of the discourse 
has recourse to. In a Non-Minimal Discourse truth is the nonn and therefore if the 
wrong information is used we may be warranted, but the nonns of warranted 
assertibility may not coincide with the nonns of truth because the discourse's external 
discipline is not sufficiently sensitive to the demands of truth, or the information state 
is not sufficiently sensitive to the truth of the particular situation concerned. 
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So, in a discourse where truth applies, it is truth that is the primary normative force. 
Truth here is not something relative to the discourse, or even the type of discourse, but 
something that is stronger than any warrant to assert mandated by the rules of the 
discourse. Truth is what constrains the discourse and any rules about warrant to assert 
arise because of the response of the discourse to truth. As truth is independent in this 
way of the rules of a discourse, the rules are the rules they are because of what the 
truth is not vice versa, there seem to be no grounds for suggesting that truth is 
different in different discourses and every reason to hold that the same truth is what 
constrains any discourse that makes claims to truth as distinct from warrant. 
I have shown, therefore, that truth cannot be ruled out as inapplicable to moral 
discourse from the start. It is possible to hold a meta-ethical position, that of 
Sophisticated Moral Realist, which claims that moral discourse is an objective 
discourse, its claims are candidates for truth, a discourse about real properties of the 
world which are nonetheless relative to a particular human way of understanding the 
world, that is in moral terms. The fact that we have no account of the mechanism of 
moral sensibility and cannot measure moral properties is no grounds for denying 
objectivity to moral discourse. That is not to claim that there might not be accounts 
that would be problematic, but just that the fact that we do not at present understand 
how moral sensibility works, or even if there is any such thing as moral sensibility as 
opposed to an ability to recognise moral properties and relations as we recognise any 
other types of properties and relations in everyday perception, should not be a 
problem. In fact, if someone were to come up with an account of how moral 
sensibility worked, it would surely, to count as an explanation at all, have to take into 
account and explain our moral practices, so it seems unlikely that such an account 
would pose a problem for the objectivity of moral discourse, if this is something that 
constrains our moral claims and so forms a part of our moral practices. Further, if we 
maintain. as we seem to, a distinction between truth and mere opinion or judgement, if 
we hold that people can be wrong or mistaken in their moral claims. then it seems that 
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truth is applicable to moral discourse, and that it therefore ought to operate as the 
discourse's primary normative force. This gives us grounds for looking at the patterns 
of use, governed by truth, not patterns of word play but patterns governed by external 
discipline, that we find in moral discourse and using them to discover things about 
ourselves and our embedding in our moral environment, which will be the work of the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Moral situations and the nature of actions 
We have seen that moral discourse cannot be ruled out a priori on the grounds that it 
is a discourse to which truth does not apply. That is, it is not subjective merely 
because it understands the world from a particular point of view, and the way the 
world is from that point of view cannot be described without reference to the beliefs 
about and responses to the world that that way of understanding it gives rise to. 
Considerations of truth and objectivity with respect to a particular discourse have 
shown us that, if a discourse has a substantial truth predicate, that is, it is an objective, 
Non-Minimal discourse, then the discipline of that discourse must be external. That 
is, it requires access to information from beyond the resources of the discourse itself 
and, as a discipline, responds to the sorts of situations the discourse is about. So for 
there to be a distinction between judgments or claims made within the discourse and 
the truth of those judgments or claims, the content of the discourse, what it is about, 
must be taken into account. The restrictions on our use of the discourse, the standards 
of proper and improper use of the discourse, arise not just from internal rules we have 
developed for that discourse, but from the discourse's subject matter. In fact, if the 
discourse is objective, then the rules that develop for that discourse will be ones that 
are sensitive to the truth of the discourse's subject matter, and the content of sentences 
expressing beliefs about that subject matter will also be sensitive to truth. 
So is moral discourse the sort of discourse that is minimally true, whose only norms 
are those of warranted assertion, a Minimal discourse, or is it one where we make 
distinctions between judgments and their truth, a Non-Minimal discourse? If it is the 
latter then we must maintain, in making moral judgments, that there is a difference 
between truth and warranted assertibility. And here we must bear in mind a 
distinction between the two elements involved in making, either a judgment or a 
decision to act in some way; that is, between the situation on the basis of which we 
judge or act, and the discipline of a discourse or practice, which tell us what to judge 
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or how to act in this situation. The difference between a judgment and its truth can 
have its roots in either of these two different elements. We can be wrong about the 
situation on the basis of which we make our judgment, the situation which the concept 
of substantial truth requires our judgments to respond to. Or we can be wrong about 
what to do or to judge in the situation in one of two ways. The first is by a failure on 
the part of the individual to discern what the discipline says we should do in such 
situations (something akin to an incomplete or incorrect knowledge of the rules of a 
game), and the second is in the discourse's having developed a discipline for situations 
that is not sufficiently sensitive to the truth of those sorts of situation. That is we can 
be mistaken by misidentifying an A-type situation as a B-type situation, and thus 
making the wrong decisions or judgments based on what the discipline says we should 
do in B-type situations; or we can be mistaken in that when we do correctly identify 
A-type situations we do not apply the correct discipline either because we are ignorant 
of it or because the discourse has not developed it. For example, I may take as my 
moral discipline the Ten Commandments. Now I could mistakenly condemn someone 
for committing adultery when they were in fact married, I could mistakenly condemn 
them for adultery because my copy of the Bible had missed a 'not' out of the relevant 
verse, or it could be that the Ten Commandments assumes that the only options are 
monogamy or adultery and therefore is insufficiently sensitive to situations, such as 
this one, that allow legitimate polygamous relations, for example. Thus in a Minimal 
discourse, since there is nothing other than the discourse for claims to be about, there 
is no substantial truth and warrant, as a norm, has no need to be sensitive to anything 
apart from the discourse's discipline, which has nothing it is required to be sensitive 
to, except perhaps tradition. If the discourse is objective and Non-MinimaL the 
difference between truth and warranted assertibility requires two things. Firstly that 
the objectivity of the judgment or decision rests on information about and available 
from the situation we are judging or acting on, that there is a possibility that our 
information state will change and our judgments and actions will respond to this 
change. and that. even if we do not have sufficient information to judge or act at 
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present, there may be a fact of the matter which is the correct basis of our decisions or 
judgments. Secondly objectivity of the discourse requires that the rules of the 
discourse have developed in response to the sorts of situation the discourse is about , 
and are sensitive to changes in those types of situation. I now propose to look at 
moral discourse and our common moral practices to see which of these models, a 
Minimal or a Non-Minimal discourse, gives a better picture of what we do. 
When we consider the making of moral judgments we certainly appear to think that 
the situation we are in is important, and that improvement of information about that 
situation is possible. 1 We do not think that all we need to do in the case of moral 
judgments is to look more closely at moral rules and at what we or others have said 
about morality, we also need to know as much as we can about the situation being 
judged. The details of how things are in a particular case affect the judgments and 
decisions we make: we try to recognize similarities and differences between situations 
as a basis for judgments. Both the similarities and difference are in what the discourse 
is about, the particular situations under consideration, and not merely different 
systems of rules. In fact, if morality consisted in the application of rules then 
knowledge of the situation is the only basis on which we can decide which rules to 
apply in this case. Whereas if a more general notion of discipline, one perhaps not 
capturable in rules, is what is needed then knowing how the discipline applies will 
depend on the nature of the situation; if the situation is of one sort then there is one 
sort of answer to the question about what to do, and in another situation a different 
IThis is not just the case in considering our general moral practice. Nearly all 
normative ethical theories think this is important. Aristotle says that attaining the 
mean is doing the right thing to the right person at the right time in the right way 
etc.. suggesting that recognition of the situation the agent is in is vital. 
Consequentialist theories would surely require that recognition of the situation is 
essential to calculating the consequences of acting in that situation. Deontological 
theories will need to recognise the situation to know which rules to apply. and in 
Kant we arrive at a decision based on the situation we are in which then needs 
formulating as a rule and testing for conformity with the Categorical Imperative. 
Situation ethics and particularist theories will. by their very nature require us to 
recognise the situation to know what will be a reason for action in it. 
'-
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sort of answer will be appropriate. So, for example, if we see someone attacked in the 
street then what we should do according to the discipline of moral discourse is 
different from what would be the case if we were watching street theatre simulating an 
attack; we would help in the former case, and not in the latter. So in distinguishing in 
moral discourse between a judgment and its truth we are required to take into account 
the situation in the context of which the judgment is being made. We need to use 
information from the situations moral discourse talks about to make moral judgments 
or decisions, and this is information that can change, thus changing our judgments or 
decisions; we can discover that this is street theatre, not a real attack. Moreover, if we 
have only just walked onto the scene and do not have enough information about the 
situation to know whether it is a genuine attack or not, the situation is not on that 
account indeterminate. It either is or is not a genuine attack, and improved 
information can change our judgments about it. Of course some situations may not be 
determinate. It could be that two actors are at odds with each other and use the street 
theatre to work off their aggression. Here it may not be clear whether what is going 
on is street theatre or a fight. Nevertheless, what is going on depends on the situation 
and not on what observers think about it. Even if the information cannot be improved, 
the situation may be determinate. Think of whether a defendant in a criminal case is 
considered to be neither guilty nor innocent because a piece of vital evidence has been 
lost and the information can no longer be recovered. The law may require that he be 
found innocent, but we still consider that there is a fact of the matter as to whether he 
committed the crime or not, even if it can no longer be demonstrated one way or 
another. So in all cases of moral judgment or decision-making, what is important is 
the situation we are judging or making a decision about, not just how things look to us 
or what a set of rules developed independently of such situations say we should do. 
So our moral practices do require the making of judgments and decisions that are 
sensitive to information. which is capable of improvement. from the situation the 
judgment or decision is about. That situation may be a determinate one whether or 
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not we have decisive information about it, but whether it is or not, it is what gives rise 
to the information on which the objectivity of our judgments and decisions rests, and 
that information is what determines decisions and judgments we make about the 
situation and helps determine the discipline of moral discourse. The discipline we 
develop in the case of moral discourse is an external discipline that is sensitive to the 
situations that moral discourse is concerned with. The objectivity of the discourse 
requires that the norms of that discourse are the norms of truth. That is, that the 
discipline we develop, the constraints within the discourse on the proper and improper 
use of the discourse's sentences, will be ones that are sensitive to the truth of the sorts 
of situation that the discourse talks about, that they too will change to respond to 
changes in the sorts of situation the discourse is about. 
In the criminal case it is clear that if and when the situation is known, the rules to be 
applied will depend on the criminal's guilt or innocence. If he was in the bank 
threatening people with a shotgun when it was robbed, then he was guilty and should 
receive the appropriate punishment. In other cases, however, for example a custody 
case in a divorce, our practices suggest that even if we could know all there is to be 
known about the situation, the rules we have may be inadequate or may conflict with 
one another. We may not have adequately worked out what to do in such situations, 
we may need to develop new and more responsive rules for new or changing 
situations. Still this does not necessitate claiming that there is no right decision in this 
case, merely that we have not found it. It may be that we give up before finding the 
right decision, because of a lack of time, or money, or interest, but that is not to say 
there is not an objective judgment to be made, but merely that we do not know or have 
not found out what it is. I will postpone discussion of the normativity of the rules and 
their sensitivity to the types of moral situation we discover for the moment and 
concentrate on discussing the situations with which moral discourse is concerned. 
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4.1 Moral Situations 
In maintaining this objectivity of moral discourse and that it rests on the recognition 
of underlying situations, we need to be clear about what counts as a situation, about 
what it is that we need to be able to identify or recognise. Both the practical side of 
deciding what to do in any situation, and the theoretical side of making moral 
judgments require identification of the situation, and I want to consider moral 
situations from the point of view of both activities to see if they can throw any light on 
the nature of moral situations. 
The first point I want to make is that in both types of activity, the making of moral 
decisions and judgments, what we consider and pass judgment on is actions. Moral 
decisions concern actions, they are about what the agent should or should not do in a 
particular situation. However, we do not need to, and I think cannot, think of actions 
as something independent of agents. As we shall see below, part of what it is to 
identify an action takes into account the agent. Moral judgments may cover a wider 
field than just judgments about actions; we make moral judgments about people, 
institutions, laws, constitutions or theories as well as actions. I would argue, however, 
that such things are judged the way they are because of the actions the people or 
institutions perform and the actions the laws, constitutions or theories allow. Thus 
what moral discourse talks about is actions, and the judgments or decisions it makes 
depends on the situations in which those actions could or do take place. If moral 
judgments and decisions are to be objective then we need to be able to think and talk 
about actions, and I want to argue that in order to do this we also need to be able to 
identify objectively the situations in which these actions mayor do occur. This may 
be only a part of what we need to identify, the judgment or decision will also require 
that we know what to do in such situations, but that is a matter of the objectivity of the 
discipline of moral discourse, which I said would be postponed until later. To help us 
think about those situations and what we consider important about them in decision-
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making and judgment, I would like to look at a few examples. Then I want to 
consider some restrictions on thinking about material objects that Gareth Evans 
produces in his 'The Varieties of Reference'2, and their possible applicability to 
thoughts about actions. 
My first example is the story of the Good Samaritan. Here we have someone, a Jew, 
who has been attacked and robbed and is in need of help. The Samaritan, in deciding 
what to do, understands the problem in terms of two factors: his relationship to the 
victim, and what he ought to do as a result of that relationship. He could have judged 
that as the victim was a Jew, and Jews and Samaritans were mutually antagonistic, 
there was nothing he need do as a result of that relationship. Or he could, as he 
presumably did, judge that here was a fellow human in need of help, and that as a 
human he should help the victim. In both judgments there are two elements; there is 
recognising one's situation in a moral environment, one's relations to others in that 
environment, and there is deciding what to do in that situation. That is, the situation 
that we need to recognise as a basis for moral decision-making or judgments is a 
situation structured by the relationships between the participants. I will try to show in 
the second half of this chapter how the structure of relationships in moral situations is 
analogous to the structure of causal relations in the physical situations that are the 
basis for judgments about material objects. But for now it should suffice to show that 
this structure of relationships is part of what we need to know, and that we also need 
to know how to respond to that structure of relationships in action. These two 
elements need to be kept distinct since, I believe, that it is here that many apparent 
problems with relativism in moral discourse arise. 
It might, for example, be tempting to say that what I am calling the situation is not 
independent in the way I suggest from what we might do about it. Perhaps, in the case 
2G E The Varieties 0>1 ReFerence. ed. J McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
. vans. :J' 
1991). 
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of the Good Samaritan, we do not have two people who find themselves in the same 
vicinity, one of whom has been attacked and needs help, perhaps what we have is a 
situation perceived as one where the Good Samaritan ought, or ought not, to help the 
Jew, and someone who does not see it like that will see a different situation. There 
are two reasons why I want to resist this temptation. The first is that if what ought to 
be done is part of the situation in this way, as opposed to distinct from it, then there 
seems to be no basis for moral debate. Any two people who attempted to debate the 
question would seem to be in danger of having no common ground from which to 
approach this debate.3 The second reason is that this view appears to allow no room 
for development or change of moral views. We would appear to have no way of 
saying that some approach was a better or worse approach to a particular type of 
situation, because the approach itself would be part of the situation. I think, therefore, 
that it is more helpful to think of the situation in which we decide what to do as 
something distinct from that decision; that we can recognise certain relationships 
between the elements of a situation and that we decide what to do on the basis of 
those relationships. 
The next important point is whether different people recognise the same relationships 
and therefore the same situation as a basis for decision-making. Is there just one 
structure of relationships in a situation, or can different structures be recognised? If it 
is possible that different structures can be recognised by different people, then there 
may be problems with claiming that moral claims and decisions can be objective. If 
the participants in a situation, and perhaps those judging it, can each be correct to see 
the situation and its structure of relationships differently, then the decisions they will 
make, based on those relationships, may all be different and equally correct. In the 
3It should be noted that this point differs from the view about common 
considerations being necessary for judgment that B Williams criticises in his Ethics 
and the Limits oj Philosophy (London: Fontana. 1985). p.17-8. The point here is 
about the situation we are considertng not what sorts of reasons or considerations 
we bring to bear on it. 
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case of the Good Samaritan there are several relationships that the protagonists have 
to one another; of Jew to Samaritan, of common humanity, of being travellers on the 
same road. I want to suggest that these are all relationships that both parties would 
probably agree to, although different races have differed on the issue of whether other 
races are truly human. Generally speaking, however, these relationships are all 
recognised from within the same understanding of relationships, although from 
different perspectives within that framework; that is both protagonists have a roughly 
similar understanding of the relationships between them, such that the relative 
priorities of those relationships to the question at issue can be debated. We might say 
that their situation is analogous to one of being in the same physical space and being 
able to compare and contrast various physical relationships. In the same way that two 
people could claim to be respectively to the left or to the right of the other, so the 
Samaritan can claim to be related to the Jew as traveller to victim whereas the Jew 
sees the relationship from the point of view of victim to traveller. Their 
understanding of their moral relationships can be reconciled to one another. But what 
of cases where this seems not to be the case? 
For example, consider parents arranging a marriage for their daughter. From their 
point of view they are acting in their daughter's best interests by providing for her 
future in the way their tradition has found best. From the daughter's point of view, 
however, they are not acting in her best interests by forcing an outmoded social 
structure onto her life. The question here is whether the protagonists see the situation 
so differently that their ways of understanding it cannot be compared. I want to argue 
here that what they differ over is not the moral situation and the relationships involved 
in it, but what to do about that situation and what those relationships require. What I 
think both parties would agree on is the parent/child relationship and possibly the 
responsibility of parents to provide for their children's future. What they disagree 
about is how far those responsibilities go, at what point the child also takes 
responsibility for her future. and how best to discharge those responsibilities: that is. 
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they disagree about what to do in the situation that both parties recognise. Someone 
who argues that what it is to be a parent is to see that your child marries well, and 
what it is to be a child is to be obedient to your parents wishes has no basis for 
argument against, and no common ground, with someone who argues that to be a 
parent is to allow your child increasingly to determine their own future, and to be a 
child is to learn to do this by growing out from within the confines of a family. In 
fact, of course, they can have common ground, since the parent child relationship can 
be recognised either in biological terms, legal terms (in the case of adoption), or in 
terms of a much looser set of commitments, responsibilities and expectations (perhaps 
in the case of people living together in a family unit where the children are not 
necessarily the biological children of at least one of those caring for them). This not 
only allows them to debate what should be done in this particular case, but it also 
allows both parties to the discussion to develop their views as to what is appropriate to 
the parent/child relationship. 
The above problem arises from a difference between cultures in the way they tackle a 
problem situation. It might also be the case that different cultures recognise different 
relationships. There are probably relationships in polygamous societies that our 
monogamous society has never developed a need for and does not recognise, although 
in these times new forms of extended family due to divorce and remarriage may 
require us to extend our notions of family relationships. It can seem tempting to say 
that polygamous societies have a different moral arena from ours because they 
recognise different relationships from the ones that we do, and that their morality is 
therefore incommensurable with ours. This recognition of different sorts of 
relationships does not, however, have to lead to incommensurability or to the 
conclusion that each moral system has its own truth and cannot be criticised from 
outside. Each society has found a solution to the stability of small social units, 
families, and has something to say about the various relationships and responsibilities 
involved in that solution. That is not to say that one solution may not be better than 
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another, that is that they cannot be compared, or that either is not capable of 
development or improvement. As long as the different societies have no connections 
with one another, all they respond to is their own environment, and their moral system 
may develop in isolation from any other. One thing, however, as we noticed in 
chapter two, that leads to changes in moral systems is changes in societies through 
contact with other societies. Thus, when societies are in contact with one another , 
their moralities have to start to take into account the sorts of situation recognised by 
each other, to recognise the sorts of structures of relationships the other recognises, 
and if they are merging they will need to develop a joint understanding of, and 
possibly modification of, the sorts of relationships and structures that form a part of 
the new society. 
Considerations such as these suggest that, although societies may develop different 
understandings of the ways their members can relate to one another, and different 
responsibilities associated with those relationships, this does not require us to say that 
the truth that their moral discourse is sensitive to is a different truth for each society, 
and that they are beyond criticism from other societies. Neither does it require us to 
claim that the moral situations each recognises are in a different moral arena from 
each other, that there are different moral spaces. There may be very many different 
areas in moral space, and some may be so far away from others that it is difficult to 
understand how things look from there, but the very fact that we do try to understand 
other societies' moralities and sometimes criticise them, I think suggests that they are 
accessible to us, at least as long as we have some common ground with them. We 
generally recognise some similarities in moral relationships, some common feelings as 
to what creneral behaviour is desirable in societies. This is largely, perhaps, because 
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the sorts of problems that humans living in social groups have to face are very similar: 
access to food and shelter, the care of children, how to survive in old age, what to do 
about those who are ilL or disruptive or non-conformist. Certainlv. in the 
consideration of any particular judgment or decision. the protagonists must have some 
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things in common, SInce they have arrived somehow at this common situation. 
Although they may, as I noted earlier, have differing moral systems that deal with 
such situations differently, this does not seem to require that they see the situation 
differently. 
Thus at the basis of the sorts of moral decisions and judgments we make, our 
examples suggest there is a common situation that the protagonists recognise, and that 
the importance of this situation is the structure of the relationships the protagonists are 
part of in moral terms. There are two questions we might consider at this point. The 
first is, if the protagonists may be related to one another in several different ways, is it 
only one or some of these relationships that are relevant to the decision or judgment 
being made, and if so should we consider how we might decide which? The second is 
whether these relationships I have been talking about as the important elements of the 
situation are moral relationships, as I have claimed, or merely social ones, and if they 
are merely social whence comes the moral imperative to act? I want to defer 
discussion of this latter question until I explore the nature of the moral environment 
and moral relationships in more detail in Chapter 5. For the moment I will simply 
note that, whether these relationships are moral or social they have this link with 
morality, that it is on the basis of these relationships that we decide what to do in 
moral terms, what the discipline of moral discourse requires of us in this situation. 
4.2 Priority in relationships 
The first question may be addressed initially by considering some more examples, and 
then by looking more closely at how we think about actions. If we are to maintain the 
objectivity of moral discourse we will need to be able to assert not only that the 
various relationships an agent is part of in any given situation are objectively 
identifiable, but also that which of the various relationships form the correct basis of 
decision making or judgment in that situation is objectively identifiable. In the Good 
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Samaritan's situation we need to be able to say not only that he was related to the 
robber's victim as traveller to traveller, as Samaritan to Jew and as human to human, 
but also that the relationship that he should use to decide what to do is that of 
common humanity. 
If we look at how we make decisions in a variety of situations we will see that, 
although there may be a variety of relationships between the protagonists, some are 
considered relevant and some not, and we may also get an indication of the basis on 
which we decide which are relevant. In the case of the Good Samaritan, for example, 
the point of the story as it is told, is to show that the relationship of Jew to Samaritan 
is not the important one, that despite this relationship, what counts is the relationship 
of 'neighbourliness', that of common humanity. 
Why is this the relevant relationship? At first sight it might be tempting to say that 
since the relationship of common humanity has a wider scope, this justifies its being 
the relevant relationship. This surely will not be a universal basis for correct 
identification of the relevant relationship, however. Jonathan Sacks, in the third 
chapter of his Reith lectures, provides an example that suggests the reverse.4 If you 
were in the National Gallery with your child and a fire broke out and you could only 
rescue one of your child, an MP or one of the works of art, if width of scope were the 
overriding factor in deciding what to do you would surely be obliged to give the work 
of art priority, since it belongs to all mankind. Or if people count over works of art, 
then the MP should be rescued since the societal relationship is wider than the family 
one. Most people, however, would surely decide, and rightly so, to rescue their child. 
A further consideration is that in some cases the width of scope decision would go 
different ways depending on what action is being considered. For example, suppose a 
state of affairs where a couple are director and secretary in the same finn. It might be 
4J.Sacks. The Persistence oj Faith: Religion. Morality and Society in a Secular Age, The 
1990 Reith Lectures (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1991). 
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considered that the work relationship had a wider scope than the family one, since at 
work both are part of a larger organisation. Supposing, however, that it was normally 
acceptable for a director to ask her secretary to order theatre tickets for her partner's 
birthday, it would surely not be acceptable if the secretary were her partner. Here the 
familial relationship would take priority. But if what was being considered was the 
promotion of the secretary, then the familial relationship should take second place. 
What is surely the basis of our intuitions about these different cases is that what helps 
to determine the relevant relationship is the type of action being contemplated and the 
relevance of the various relationships to this action. In the case of the Good 
Samaritan we have someone who is injured and we feel that considerations such as his 
race, or the urgency of other appointments should be irrelevant to considerations of 
whether to help or not. In the two cases with the partner/secretary what makes the 
difference between them is that in the first case the action being contemplated, 
ordering a birthday present, is one that occurs within the scope of the family 
relationship, whereas the promotion question occurs within the scope of the work 
relationship. The National Gallery case is trickier, since saving a life occurs both 
within the scope of family and human relationships. It might be here that different 
cultures would prioritise those relationships differently. There may be cultures (China 
perhaps) which would think that the politician was of more value than the family 
member. This would not necessarily be a problem for the sophisticated realist, since 
he holds that cultures can dispute about such questions, but that until the dispute is 
settled, if it is, there is no saying which of the competing claims is true. That is not 
necessarily to say that they are equally true, but just that the matter is as yet 
unresolved. 
Consideration of cases so far supports the idea that the basis of any moral decision or 
judgment is a situation which is understood in terms of the various ways the 
protagonists in the situation are morally related to one another. There may be many 
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different ways of being related to one another morally, but some will be irrelevant in 
the case under consideration, and what decides their status in this respect is the nature 
of the action being contemplated. This confirms what I suggested at the start of this 
section, that what we judge and make decisions about in moral discourse are actions , 
and so I want now to tum to considering how we think about actions in more detail. 
To do this I want to draw some parallels with work done by Gareth Evans in his ~ The 
Varieties of Reference'. 5 Here he considers the conditions under which we can have 
singular thoughts about material objects. Singular thoughts are here opposed to 
descriptive thoughts; that is, a singular thought is one which succeeds in capturing a 
specific object, distinguishable from all others, as opposed to capturing any object that 
might fit a particular description. In order to do this he discusses the nature of thought 
and the sorts of conceptual abilities needed to have such thoughts. 
4.3 Thinking about Material objects 
In Evan's model of thought, thoughts are not just something private to the individual 
and assessable solely on the individual's own terms. In order to be singular thoughts, 
or thoughts at all, they must have a particular structure, and the characterisation and 
individuation of particular thoughts is not something the thinking subject can do in 
abstraction from the situation that thinker is in. The structure of the thought is 
important because, to be thinking about an object, we must somehow have captured 
the object, and be thinking something about it. That the characterisation and 
individuation of thoughts be, to some extent, independent of the thinking subject is 
important, since it is the subject's situation which determines whether a particular 
object has been captured by the thought, and therefore whether anything true or false 
has been thought. 
5-fhe idea of the Generality Constraint and the Fundamental Ground of Difference 
are introduced in Chapter 4. sections 3 & 4 
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This leads to two important concepts identified by Evans; the Generality Constraint on 
thoughts, and the Fundamental Ground of Difference of the objects thought about. 
The Generality Constraint is concerned with the structure of the thought and claims 
that, if we are thinking of some object that it has a particular property, e.g. of this pen 
that it is blue, then, in order to have a coherent concept of the object and of what we 
attribute to it, both parts of the thought must be able to play the same or a similar role 
in other thoughts. So, to have a coherent concept of "this pen", I must also be able to 
think of it as being transparent, as having been bought in the Union shop, as being in 
different places at different times, and as capable of having any of a number of 
suitable predicates attributed to it. Similarly, to have a coherent concept of "blue", I 
must be able to think of it as attributable to cups, jeans, walls and perhaps people and 
music as well. There will, of course, be some constraints on the appropriateness of 
both objects and attributes to one another. Thus "blue" would not have to be 
applicable to numbers, or "this pen" be capable of being thought of as prime. Evans' 
primary concern is with the coherence of the concept of the object the thought 
captures, or fails to capture, since whether a type of object is captured at all will 
depend on whether it can play the subject role in appropriate types of thought. 
Whether however, we succeed in thinking of a particular object, that is in thinking a 
singular thought, depends on the other concept I mentioned earlier, the Fundamental 
Ground of Difference of the object. This is what allows us to distinguish a particular 
object from all others of its type. In the case of material objects, the Fundamental 
Ground of Difference is spatio-temporal location. Material objects can share all sorts 
of properties with objects of their type, but they cannot be in the same place at the 
same time as any other material object of that type. That is, the lump of marble can be 
in the same spatio-temporal location as the statue which it is, but two statues cannot 
be in the same spatio-temporal location without being the same statue. We ensure we 
have captured a particular object by being able to say that it is the one at this or that 
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spatio-temporal location. We do not necessarily have to be thinking of the object in 
terms of its spatio-temporal location, but we have to be thinking of it as the sort of 
thing that has a unique spatio-temporallocation. 
Further, to be able to think of the same object on another occasion, we must be able to 
track it through space and time. Thus a material object not only has a unique spatial 
location at any time, but its history is a continuous track of such locations through 
space-time. Thus the paradigm of singular thoughts for Evans is the demonstrative 
thought. In demonstrative thought we locate things in our immediate spatio-temporal 
neighbourhood, and we can keep track of them perceptually. That does not mean that 
we cannot have singular thought about objects not in our immediate vicinity, but to do 
so we must be thinking of them as occupying a spatio-temporal location that is on the 
continuous track of such locations that is the history of that object. So I can think 
singular thoughts about my next-door neighbour because I think of her as someone 
who has a continuous history through space and time, and because she does, in fact, 
have such a track. If it happened that the man next-door had bigamously married a 
pair of identical twins, both of whom I had taken to be the same person, then any 
thought about "her" would not be a singular thought since I would not have succeeded 
in capturing a particular individual with my thought. Thus an object is the particular 
object it is because it is continuously spatio-temporally located. This is what 
distinguishes it from other objects of its type, that it follows this particular space-time 
track. 
This necessity to think of objects as located in and travelling through space and time 
leads to the requirement that we have an ability to locate objects and ourselves in 
space-time. This ability is, according to Evans, actually two abilities: the ability to 
conceive of ourselves as occupying space and interacting with objects in our vicinity 
(what Evans calls egocentric location), and the ability to have a concept of objecti ve 
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space and to locate ourselves in it (objective location).6 Thus I need a concept of 
myself as a spatio-temporal being interacting with objects in my vicinity, and I need to 
be able to understand location in places other than where I am, by understanding what 
it would be like for me to be there. 
4.4 Action Identification 
Having sketched some of the ideas that Evans uses, I want to suggest how they might 
be of use in classifying and individuating moral thoughts or judgments. In making 
moral judgments and decisions, as in thinking about material objects, it seems there is 
something which we identify and attribute certain qualities to. In the case of moral 
judgments it is not, however, objects that we identify but actions. As I argued above 
(section 4.1), both in judgments and in decision-making, it is actions we consider. We 
either judge a particular action as good/cruel/unjustifiable, or we judge a situation, 
person or theory because of the actions they do or allow, or the actions that lead up to 
or constitute them. In deciding what to do, or what sort of a person to be, how to lead 
our lives, we consider a variety of actions available to us, or the actions that sort of 
person will do or that sort of life encompasses. Some of these actions will be types of 
action, rather than specific actions, and therefore thoughts about them will be 
descriptive thoughts. At least some, however, will be singular thoughts about specific 
actions, and therefore to engage in moral discourse we need to be able to pick out 
specific actions and attribute moral properties to them. 
If we were to follow Evans' position with regard to singular thoughts, it would seem 
that there must be two conceptual abilities here: the ability to identify particular 
actions, and the ability to employ concepts appropriately applicable to these sorts of 
action. In the case of material objects Evans looked for a Fundamental Ground of 
61 will consider these concepts in further detail with respect to location in a space of 
personal relations in Chapter 5. 
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Difference, that is something that would ensure that we were thinking about a specific 
material object rather than a type of material object, and concluded that, for material 
objects, this would be spatio-temporallocation. The Generality Constraint claims that 
the type of object we are considering will affect the Fundamental Ground of 
Difference. If it is just a piece of matter we are considering with respect to various 
material properties (size, shape, weight, location etc.) then spatio-temporallocation is 
an adequate Fundamental Ground of Difference. If, however, we are considering 
aesthetic properties, for example, the Generality Constraint will force us to take some 
account of what sorts of things aesthetic properties are applicable to, and this in tum 
will affect the Fundamental Ground of Difference of those objects. At some level the 
sort of judgments we can make of things will be determined by the sort of things they 
are, which will be indicated by their Fundamental Ground of Difference. Thus we 
judge material objects as having a certain shape, colour, position, weight etc., and that 
they are suitable to be so judged is indicated by their being the sort of things that have 
unique spatio-temporal locations. Similarly numbers can be judged as even, prime, 
square, irrational, transcendental etc., and that they are suitable to be so judged is 
indicated by their being the sorts of things that have a unique place in a numeric 
sequence. 
Is there a parallel we can draw with actions, and will actions suitable for moral 
assessment require a different Fundamental Ground of Difference from other types of 
action? What might be unique about an action, which would allow us to identify it? I 
want to consider two possibilities. Firstly that it has a particular spatio-temporal 
location, that it is performed by a particular person in a particular place over a 
particular period of time. And secondly, that it has a location within a network of 
relationships involving obligations and responsibilities, which is at least one thing that 
seems to make it susceptible to moral judgment. 
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4.5 Location in physical space or moral space? 
Any action can, I think, be seen as having two components: a movement component 
and an intentional component. The movement component I take to be that element of 
the action that could be described in physical terms, that a hand was raised and 
pressed a switch, for example. By the intentional component I mean that element of 
the action that involves some purpose of the agent, for example turning the light on. 
By this I do not mean to suggest either that the action is separable into these 
components in any ontological sense, or that one is really the action and the other 
either a means by which it is achieved or the purpose behind it. Thus the concerns 
that Ryle has with intentions as separate entities should not be a problem here.7 I just 
take it that for anything to count as an action it must possess both components, with 
the proviso that failing to move may be part of the movement component of an action. 
Anything that would count as an action must be intentional and be doing something in 
some sense. There are some movements that we may not count as actions, ducking to 
avoid a cricket ball may fall into this class, because we do not see it as deliberate; 
even if we could ascribe a purpose to it we do not necessarily class it as voluntary, and 
this, I think, is an important part of the intentional component. However if we do 
regard the movement as an instinctive reaction to some state of affairs and do not, 
therefore, class it as an action, then we may run into problems with habits. These also 
seem to be done without any intention or purpose in mind, yet we may categorise 
them as good or bad habits and praise or condemn an individual for having acquired 
them. Perhaps though, we could consider the moral action here to be the acquisition 
of the habits. There could also be a problem in that some things that we might think 
of as actions may not seem to be associated with any movements at all. For example 
we may condemn someone for refusing to do something, where his refusal is not 
expressed verbally but just consists in not doing whatever we think he should do. I 
7Gilbert Ryle. The Concept of Mind (London: PengUin Books. 1988). 
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intend to treat these cases, however, as actions, although habits are perhaps actions in 
some secondary or derivative sense depending on how automatic they are. I will 
concentrate, however on actions that have both components in a straightforward 
manner. 
Consider an action such as handing over £50 to someone. That is a transaction that 
occurs at a particular time and place and can be described in tenns of objects and 
physical movements, for example, Joe taking five coloured pieces of paper out of his 
trouser pocket and passing them to Jim; this is its movement component. It can also 
be described in different ways, depending on what sort of an act it is: paying a debt, 
bribery, placing a bet, making a gift etc. Is either of these descriptions sufficient to 
distinguish it from all other actions of its kind? 
In the case of material objects, no attention was paid to what sort of object we were 
talking about; it was considered just as being something, perhaps not even identifiable 
as a particular sort of object, except in so far as it could be the bearer of physical 
properties. We could say "That thing is round" for example, without having any idea 
of what sort of thing it was, except that it was in a particular position and we could 
conceive of it as the sort of thing to which other material properties were applicable. 
Does this suggest that in the case of an action its spatio-temporal location, its 
perfonnance by a particular person at a particular place and time will suffice to 
identify it? At first sight this seems sufficient, after all it is the act we see that we 
judge as right or wrong. Nonetheless there seem to be two distinct problems with 
using this as the basis of identification. 
Firstly. if we are following Evans' model of thought, then the Generality Constraint 
indicates that if we are to be counted as making a moral judgment. the object of that 
judgment must be thought of as the sort of thing that is capable of having moral 
predicates attributed to it. The bare physical act, of handing over £50 for example, 
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does not on its own seem capable of moral assessment. In fact without the intentional 
component, handing over £50 on its own might not even seem to count as an act. It is 
only because we assume that there is some intent behind the movement that we count 
it as an act. Until we know what sort of an act it is, however, whether a bribe or a o-ift 
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for example, we cannot make a moral judgment about it. So the movement 
component on its own does not count as an act, and until we are considering an act we 
are not considering the sort of thing we can make moral judgments about. 
The second point is that when we are judging an action, we may neither know nor care 
what physical movements were involved in the act. What we are assessing is whether 
that debt, for example, ought to have been paid, and we don't much care where it 
happened (although when might be a factor) or what form the payment took (cash, 
cheque, credit card?). Although it had to happen somewhere and in some particular 
form of payment, this doesn't seem essential to identifying the payment of the debt as 
this debt payment rather than another. What does seem important are the agents 
involved. What makes it this debt payment that is being thought about is surely that it 
is a debt between these particular people that has been cancelled. Further, there might 
be difficulty in deciding the exact spatio-temporal location of the payment; is it when 
the cheque is put in the post, or received by the creditor, or cleared through his bank 
account? Is it even a single action rather than a sequence of actions that counts as 
paying the debt?8 Or is an act identifiable with any physical movement at all, as in 
the case of refusal to act mentioned above? All these seem to pose problems with 
citing the movement as the sole, or even primary grounds for identification of actions. 
On the other hand, if we try to use what I have called the intentional component of the 
action to identify it we seem to run into a different set of problems. How can we 
8See, for example, the discussion of the definition of an act in P J Fitzgerald, 
'Voluntary and Involuntary Acts', in The Philosophy of Action, ed. A R White, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1968), and A C Danto's discussion in 'BasiC Actions' in the 
same volume. 
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possibly identify someone's intentions in perfonning an act? How do we, in fact, tell 
actions from movements? The first important thing to note, I think, is that we seem to 
have little difficulty in deciding whether something is a deliberate act or a random 
movement and I think an important factor in deciding this is the context within which 
the act or movement occurs. Nonnally, for example, we would regard breathing more 
as an automatic or reflex movement than as an act, it is not something we think of as 
being done deliberately. Yet if we are at the opera, watching a singer breathe in, 
preparatory to singing an aria, then we would tend to think of this as a deliberate act. 
Other movements seem indisputably to be acts of some sort, the example of handing 
over £50 is one. They are not the sort of things we do without some purpose in mind. 
When we identify something as an action, therefore, rather than a movement, we 
attribute a purpose of some sort to the agent, and we do so on the basis of the context 
within which the act occurs. We see the act as a response to that context. When we 
identify the act as one susceptible to moral jUdgment, however, I think we do more 
than this; we see it as a response to a context which contains commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations. We see the participants in the actions as situated in, 
what for want of a better phrase I will call a network of relationships involving these 
commitments, responsibilities and expectations. Handing over £50 is only identified 
as payment of a debt if it is an action that takes place in response to a situation where 
payments are made and liabilities incurred. Further, it is only the debt that it is, 
because it is incurred between two particular individuals who are located within that 
network. So, in order to identify something as an action about which we can make a 
moral judgment it seems that we have to see the agent as located in a network of 
relationships with commitments, responsibilities and expectations, as perhaps being 
so placed in that network as to have a variety of different relations to others in that 
network, and to see the act as a response to one of those relationships. 
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So here we might have another way of thinking about actions. An act will be the type 
of act it is because it is a response to a particular type of relationship between the 
agent and some other element(s) in a network of commitments, responsibilities and 
expectations, and it will be the particular act it is because it is a response to a 
particular relationship between the agent and others. Thus I may have incurred a 
variety of debts, but my payment of £50 will be the resolution of a particular debt 
owed to a particular individual at a particular time. 
This way of thinking of things suggests then a different sort of location, analogous to 
location in physical space. Just as in physical space we locate ourselves by our spatial 
and causal relations to the objects around us, in order to think about acts in moral 
terms we also need to locate the agent in a different sort of space where he is related 
to other elements in that space, not by spatial relations but by moral relationships and 
the commitments, responsibilities and expectations that belong with these. I say 
'elements', since it I want to keep an open mind about what we may have 
responsibilities towards and vice versa. These may be other persons, but equally they 
may be groups, institutions, animals, inanimate objects, or anything else we might 
think we have commitments to, responsibilities for or which can reasonably expect 
something of us. Furthermore, some of these elements may be easier to identify in 
this moral space than in physical space. For example, we may consider a university as 
having responsibilities towards its students, and vice versa, and thus see both 'the 
university' and its 'students' as elements of a moral space, and yet have distinct 
difficulties in identifying either element in physical terms. 
Will this location in moral space work as a Fundamental Ground of Difference for 
actions? Again we seem to have problems using it on its own. Firstly, I am not sure 
that the action can be seen as taking place in this moral space, although I ha\'e called it 
a response to relationships in this space. The payment of a debt is a response to a 
relationship between two elements in moral space, but the payment itself does not 
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seem to be an element in moral space. And secondly, the nature of the relationship 
between the agent and others in this moral space may be just what is disputed in moral 
assessment of the action. Are they really related as giver and recipient of a gift, or are 
there expectations attached to the gift that means the relationship is really one of 
bribery? What type of action this is, not just what particular action this is will depend 
on the identification of the relationship. If, however, in considering a moral action, 
we are able to think of it while disputing the nature of the relationship between the 
people involved, then which action it is cannot be identified solely by the relationship 
it is a response to. 
It appears, therefore, that we have two distinct elements in identifying an act, neither 
of which can on its own be regarded as the basis of a Fundamental Ground of 
Difference of an action. It can be seen as a movement or sequence of movements, but 
this is too narrow an identification to allow us to pass moral judgment on it, and may 
not even be known or identified by someone who is passing a moral judgment on the 
act. It can also be seen as an act by an agent who has a location in what I am calling a 
moral network or space, and an act which is a response to some relationship between 
the agent and other elements of that moral situation. Because the nature of the 
relationship may be in dispute without making it impossible to identify or think about 
the act, we cannot hold that the relationship is the sole determinant of the act. So 
neither the spatio-temporal location of the act, nor its being a response to the 
relationship between the agent and others will uniquely identify the act. Of course we 
cannot say that neither of these is relevant, since if there are no movements to the act 
and it is not a response to any relationship then there is nothing that we are talking 
about. That is we could identify a set of movements and question what relationship 
they were relative to and therefore what sort of act it was, or we could identify a 
particular act relative to a relationship without knowing which actual set of 
movements it was, but if there is neither of these components, then there is no act. 
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Before I tum to the possibility that what individuates an act is a combination of these 
two I briefly want to consider the idea that it is performed by the agent with some 
intention, and this is what makes it the act it is.9 While I would not deny this, and 
after all I started off by claiming that to be an act some movement or set of 
movements had to have an intentional component, I think that this way of 
individuating the act is derivative. If some act is performed with some intention. then 
in order to identify the intention we still have to see the act as a response to some 
relationship. If the Good Samaritan acts with the intention of helping a fellow human 
being, then that intention is dependent on there being such a relationship between him 
and the Jew. If my intention in rushing heroically into a burning house is to save my 
son, that intention derives from our relationship. Even if we would say that paying a 
debt in general is handing over money with an intention to reimburse a lender, this 
presupposes a general type of relation between lenders and debtors out of which that 
type of intention arises. This is not just an argument about the order in which we 
think of things. The important point is that I do not see how we could form an 
intention to repay a debt if there was not already a relationship between lender and 
debtor. It is because I have borrowed money that a debt repayment is handing over 
money with an intention to repay. If I attribute such an intention to someone, I 
presuppose that such a relationship exists. 1 0 So although it is true to say that an act is 
performed with some intention, I do not think it is possible to say what the intention is 
independently of some relationship to which it is a response. I tum now to the 
possibility of identifying the action in terms of both ideas, spatio-temporal location. 
and location in a network of relationships with commitments, responsibilities and 
expectations. 
9]ne sense of intention here is that used. for example. by GEM Anscombe in her 
'Intention'. Proceedings oj the Aristotelian SOCiety. 57 (1956-7). 321-32. 
IDA Similar argument is used in chapter 5 to show that desires derive from 
relationships and cannot be individuated independently of them. 
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4.6 Location in physical and moral space 
If we cannot identify an action completely in either physical or moral tenns, will a 
combination of the two do? Perhaps the case can be seen as analogous to making an 
aesthetic judgment about a material object. There, for example, for it to be the Mona 
Lisa that we are considering there must be a particular material object that follows a 
particular track through space-time, but it must also be identifiable as a painting, as 
something that belongs to a certain class of art objects. Thus to identify the object of 
aesthetic judgment we need two abilities: the ability to identify material objects in 
general, and the ability to categorise something as a particular type of object suitable 
for aesthetic judgment. We may, when we make the judgment, only be thinking of it 
in tenns of its membership of a class of art objects, but we must also be willing to 
identify it as the painting that is a particular material object. So if we are asked which 
painting we are thinking of, we will perhaps identify it as "the one painted by 
Leonardo in the Louvre", that is, the one that started its particular space-time track 
when it was painted by Leonardo and at this point on it is hanging in the Louvre. 
Do we, in a similar way, need to have some abilities analogous to the two needed for 
aesthetic judgment, in order to make moral judgments? To count as an action suitable 
for moral assessment, the action must be a response to the relationships the agent has 
in what I am calling the moral network. Although when making a judgment about 
such an action, we may only think of it in those terms, must we not also be willing to 
identify it as a particular movement or sequence of movements by the agent. We may 
think of a payment as resolving a debt between two individuals, but if asked what 
payment we are talking about we must surely be able to say something like "Joe 
handing £50 in used tenners to Jim last Friday evening". This suggests that to identify 
an action we need to be able to identify both a sequence of movements by the agent at 
particular places and times, and to identify the same agent as being related in certain 
\vays, relevant to the action. to others in a moral network. Part of the Fundamental 
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Ground of Difference of an action can be the movements comprising it, but to make 
moral judgments about the action we need to be able to locate ourselves and others 
not only in physical space but in a moral network; in the same way that we can say the 
Fundamental Ground of Difference of material objects is their spatio-temporal 
location when we are making purely material judgments, but will have to be expanded 
to include location in the realm of art objects if we are making an aesthetic judgment. 
In fact I feel that all actions, not just ones susceptible of moral judgment, will need an 
Fundamental Ground of Difference that is more than the movements that comprise 
that action, they will all be locatable in some other space as well, if they are to count 
as actions as opposed to involuntary movements. So perhaps it would be better to say 
that the fundamental ground of difference of an action requires that it be a response to 
a relationship between the agent and others who are themselves located both spatio-
temporally and in a network of commitments, responsibilities and expectations, and 
also a movement or series of movements locatable in space and time. We might then 
have to consider whether moral actions are a subset of actions in general which is 
identified by the sorts of commitments, responsibilities and expectations that may be 
peculiar to the moral sphere. 
Of course the case is also different from aesthetic judgment in that in aesthetic 
judgment the object that is being judged is located both in physical space and in some 
class of art objects. So it is the object itself that is located in two arenas. In the case 
of actions, the action itself is located in physical space as a movement or sequence of 
movements, but what is located in moral space is the agent and the other elements of 
that space that he is related to. This location of the agent and others in moral space is 
not just what makes the action the action it is, but what makes it an action at all, rather 
than just a series of movements. The action itself is a response to one or more of 
those relationships between the elements in moral space. That is it is the type of 
action it is because it is a response to a type of relationship. but it is the particular 
action it is because it consists of a particular movement or sequence of rno\'ements. 
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and is a response to a particular moral relationship. It differs from all other actions of 
its type both in the spatio-temporal location of its movement component, and in the 
moral location and relationships of the agent who supplies its intentional component. 
The other point about thinking of physical objects was that we could think of the same 
object at different times and still capture that object because of the continuity of its 
track through space-time. That is, all thoughts about the Mona Lisa capture the Mona 
Lisa if there is a unique object that travels on a unique and continuous track through 
space and time, and it is this object that is identified by the thinker. Actions. however. 
do not seem to travel or be continuous in physical space and time, or in moral space, 
in the same sort of way. They are one-off events, they happen only once, although 
they may have repercussions long after they happened. So what could it be that 
allows us to think of the same action at different times? What ensures that we are 
judging the accused for the crime he was arrested for, or praising someone for what 
she actually did? The important continuity here is continuity of the agent and other 
protagonists in both moral and physical space. What makes it the case that we are 
now thinking about the same debt payment between Joe and Jim as we were 
previously, is that Joe and Jim each follow a continuous space-time track in both 
physical and moral space. Thus in both physical and moral space they may no longer 
be related as they were when the action took place, in fact if the debt is paid off they 
cannot be, but they have continuity in both spaces, and it is this continuity that allows 
them to be identified and re-identified in both spaces, and thus the action to be 
identified and re-identified. 
4.7 Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that for moral judgments and decisions to be objective. to 
be susceptible to truth, they must be about something, and they must be sensiti \'e to 
the situations on the basis of which they are made. In the first part of the chapter I 
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considered the sorts of things we take into account when we make moral judgments or 
decisions, and concluded that one of the things we have to identify and be sensitive to 
is the situation the maker of the judgment or decision is considering. This situation 
consists in, among other things, a structure of relationships between what I have 
variously called the elements or the protagonists of that situation. These are not 
spatial relationships, but social, political, economic and moral. As spatial 
relationships are structured by the causal powers of the objects located in space, I shall 
argue in the next chapter that personal relationships are structured by their 
commitments, responsibilities and expectations. We need to be able to identify these 
relationships in order to decide what to do in this situation, in Wright's terms how to 
apply the discipline, to come to an objective decision or judgment. 
In the second part of the chapter I considered what moral judgments and decisions are 
about, and concluded that some, if not all of them, are about particular actions. I 
argued therefore, that in order to make judgments and decisions about actions we must 
be able to think about types of actions and particular actions. Using Gareth Evans' 
constraints on thinking of material objects, the Fundamental Ground of Difference and 
the Generality Constraint, I argued that for actions to be the sorts of things that are 
susceptible to moral judgment we must be able to identify them not only with a 
movement or sequence of movements, but also with a relationship between the agent 
and others in moral space. The action is not itself located in moral space or part of the 
relationship, although it may contribute to how the relationship develops, or fails to 
develop, but it is a response to that relationship. The identification of the action 
depends on the identification, location of and relationships between elements in moral 
space. 
In the next chapter I want to consider one model of how we are located and locatable 
in moral space. I will start from the consideration that to make moral judgments and 
decisions we must be related to others in the way I suggested is necessary for all 
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actions above, that is our relationships must have commitments, responsibilities and 
expectations. I will consider how we might identify such relationships and what our 
ability to identify them tells us about their nature. In the course of this I hope to show 
how what some might be tempted to call mere social, political or economic relations 
with no moral import are in fact moral relations to some degree or another, although 
some may think that this is not a strong enough understanding of what morality is. I 
will also consider how this view of moral space allows for development of different 
and sometimes conflicting moral disciplines, but also for resolutions of the conflicts; 
that is how the constraints of objectivity might operate in moral space. 
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Chapter 5: Moral Relationships 
So to summarise the progress so far. I have shown that moral language and thought 
can be objective, that is moral claims are candidates for truth, and that truth here is not 
a special kind of truth relative to the moral way of thinking in general or to particular 
moral systems or discourses. Although the approach of the Sophisticated Moral 
Realist is not to start with metaphysical claims, she does, as a result of analysing 
moral discourse with respect to truth, arrive at the position that there are moral truths 
or facts which are facts about how the world is as seen from the moral point of view. 
This position is, therefore, a cognitivist position. The Sophisticated Moral Realist 
holds that our moral beliefs are beliefs about the moral environment we are part of, 
and the fact that we have in part created this environment does not mean that our 
beliefs about it cannot be true. There are moral facts to be got hold of. The next 
question to be addressed is whether this is an intemalist or an extemalist cognitivist 
position. In J Dancy's first chapter of his 'Moral Reasons' he describes the difference 
between these positions in terms of Humean beliefs and desires and the requirement 
that moral judgments motivate us, that we are moved to do what we judge to be right. 
For non-cognitivists the position is relatively simple; since they believe that moral 
judgments express desires and the job of desires is to motivate, those judgments 
motivate. Of cognitivists he says 
"Cognitivists have a choice, however. They can be intemalists, holding 
that moral judgements express peculiar beliefs which, unlike normal 
beliefs, cannot be present without motivating. Or they can be extemalists, 
holding that moral judgements express beliefs which rely on the presence 
of an independent desire if they are to motivate." 1 
IJonathan Dancy. Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). p.3. 
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Straightforward Humean beliefs do not motivate, so a cognitivist has either to hold 
that moral beliefs are a different, motivating, sort of belief, or she has to add desires to 
her beliefs to do the motivating for her. Dancy's solution, as a cognitivist, is to reject 
the Humean picture of beliefs as non-motivating representations of information and 
desires as essentially motivating states, in favour of pairs of representations, of how 
things are and how they ought to be, and the motivating is done by our perception of 
the gap between these motivations. This he does not only apply to moral action but to 
action in general. That is all our action is motivated by these two representations and 
none of it requires Humean beliefs and desires. 
I have claimed that we do have moral beliefs, but have said nothing much about the 
nature of those beliefs, other than that they can be true (that is what makes them 
beliefs) and that they are based on our understanding of relationships between moral 
agents and other elements of the moral environment. In this chapter I want to look 
more closely at our understanding of these relationships, and in the course of this 
investigation more about the nature of moral beliefs, as I understand them, will 
emerge. My position will be a little hard to categorise in Dancy's terms; it is 
intemalist in that it does not need to add on desires to motivate, but the beliefs the 
agent has motivate in a secondary sense because of what they are beliefs about. What 
motivates us is the relationships we are part of, and it is because the relationships have 
what I call 'pull' to them that the beliefs the sophisticated moral realist has motivate 
her actions. The story I want to tell could, perhaps, be told in terms of beliefs and 
desires of a Humean kind, but I do not think that this is what is fundamental to 
explanation of and decisions about actions. It will be my contention that in order to 
explain action in terms of beliefs and desires, those beliefs and desires have to be 
identified or individuated, and this cannot be done without reference to the 
relationships between participants. The fundamental level of explanation will be in 
terms of beliefs about relationships that motivate, and because there are these 
motivating relationships, we can identify belief/desire pairs in terms of which we 
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could explain action. It is because I am someone's friend that my beliefs about her 
situation and my desires to help her can be used to explain my action. Those beliefs 
and desires, however, are individuated in terms of that relationship of friendship, and 
my action could be explained simply by saying that I believed she needed help and 
that our friendship moved me to help her. If beliefs are representations of 
information, them some of the information that beliefs about personal relationships 
represent has the power to motivate. They have, as Dancy puts it, a mind-to-world 
direction of fit, they have to fit the world, but the world is such as to motivate us, to 
move us to action. This may, I think, be something that is peculiar to thought about 
such relationships, but as I argue at the end of the chapter, this gives a wide enough 
scope to cover many areas of human activity. Before we get there, however, we need 
to consider how we understand the relationships that are the basis of our moral 
judgments and decision-making. 
5.1 Egocentricity and Objectivity 
In the last chapter I identified two ways in which relationships grounded the 
objectivity of moral judgments and decision-making. These judgments or decisions 
might, in general terms, be thought of as judgments or decisions about what ought to 
be done. Since talk of 'what I ought to do' or 'what ought to be done' might suggest 
that this automatically brings in a system of rules and principles, I prefer to talk of 
having reasons for what we do in a situation in the hope that this has more neutral 
implications. That is, talk of moral decisions and jUdgments, such as I used in the last 
chapter, might be taken to be talk of morality as Bernard Williams understands it as 
opposed to more general ethical talk.2 So firstly, in order to have reasons for making 
a judgment or deciding to act, we need to recognise a situation in the context of which 
the judgement or decision is made. This situation, I claimed, is recognised in tenns of 
2Bemard Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana 
Press/Collins. 1985). p.6. 
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the various relationships between those involved, and the relationships are ones that 
have responsibilities, commitments or expectations as essential components. 
Secondly, what we make judgments or decisions about in such situations are actions 
, 
and to do this we need to be able to identify these actions, we need to be able to talk or 
think about this particular action, not just an action of this type. Adapting some ideas 
from Evans' 'The Varieties of Rejerence'3 I tried to identify a Fundamental Ground of 
Difference of actions. I concluded that actions have two components, a movement 
component, that is the physical movements (or lack of movement) which would be 
part of the action, and the intentional component, which gave the movement 
component some purpose. Neither component cans serve as a Fundamental Ground 
of Difference on its own, so both are needed to identify the action and the intentional 
component requires us to locate those involved in some relationship which has 
responsibilities, expectations and commitments. 
So when we look to our moral practices we discover that a pre-requisite for making 
moral judgments and decisions is to locate those involved in relationships that have as 
essential components responsibilities, commitments or expectations. That these are 
essential components is shown by the fact that the reason for action depends on the 
nature of the relationship in terms of its responsibilities, commitments and 
expectations. If there were nothing about a relationship that laid certain 
responsibilities or expectations on those involved, then there would be no need to 
know how they were related in order to decide what to do, or whether a particular act 
was the act it was. For example, if all there is to a situation is the spatial relationships 
involved, then the fact that I have a two metre long pole in my hand and am standing 
one metre away from a lamppost would give me no reason not to swing it round my 
head. If it were a person I was one metre away from, it is because people have 
responsibilities and commitments towards and expectations of other people that it 
3Gareth Evans. The Varieties of Reference. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1991) 
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would be wrong to swing the pole, and the action would be a different action, it would 
be an attack, or an injuring, not just a swing of a pole. In other words, it is the 
personal as well as the spatial relationships that people are involved in which provide 
reasons for what we do, and those reasons are provided by the commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations we have of other people in virtue of being in such 
personal relationships with them. If there were no responsibilities or expectations 
involved in personal relationships, then those relationships could not be part of the 
reason for acting in a particular way, and would be no help in identifying an action. In 
fact the responsibilities, commitments and expectations need to be what makes the 
relationship the one it IS. Certain types of commitments, responsibilities and 
expectations make up a type of relationship, and particular responsibilities, 
commitments and expectations make up particular relationships. The relationship 
between me and the person to whom lowe money is a debt because a debt is a 
commitment, responsibility or expectation to pay back money borrowed. To take on a 
debt is not merely to receive money from someone and then later consider whether or 
not we are required to repay, it is to take on the requirement to repay. If we dispute 
about the requirement to repay we do so not on the grounds that debts do not have to 
be repaid but that it was a gift not a debt or some such thing. If the relationship 
between a policemen and a dangerous criminal he is about to arrest involved no 
expectations about what would be appropriate behaviour, then it would play no part in 
deciding whether the behaviour involved was appropriate. If we came upon two 
people wrestling another to the ground, and their relationship to one another was 
unimportant we would have no grounds for identifying what was going on (an arrest 
or an attack) or deciding whether it was something we should interfere in or not. It is 
the nature of the relationship between a policeman and criminals that allows the 
policeman to tackle someone who is escaping arrest and requires others not to 
interfere in the process. 
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The next important question is whether this identification of relationships which is 
necessary for moral decision-making or judgment is sufficient for it. If we recognise 
these relationships as ones with commitments and leading to expectations of 
behaviour appropriate to them, does this take us as far as morality, as it has 
traditionally been understood. Does it lead to general moral laws or principles, does it 
ensure that similarity of situation leads to similarity of judgment, or that what we do 
in one case, or a set of similar cases should guide our actions in future cases of that 
kind? It may be that the relationships we are involved in, although they constrain our 
behaviour in some ways, do not constrain it morally. As a Christian I should go to 
church regularly, as a driver I should drive on the left, as a chess player I should stick 
to the rules, as an MP I should vote with the whip, as a doctor I should have qualified, 
as a parent I should register the birth of my child. But are any of these moral 
requirements, and if so which? In order not to beg the question about morality, I will 
initially call these relationships, personal relationships. These are the sorts of 
relationships that people enter into or find themselves engaged in, which involve 
commitments, responsibilities or expectations. I will also talk about making personal 
decisions or judgments, by which I will mean decisions or judgments about what to do 
in a situation based on these sorts of relationships, without yet committing myself to 
their being moral decisions or judgments. 
In order to attempt to answer the question about whether our personal relationships are 
sufficient as a basis for morality in the traditional sense, I want to consider what 
capacities we need to be able to recognise such relationships, and to be able to make 
objective judgments about them. Whether these are moral relationships or not, if they 
function as a pre-requisite for the decisions or judgments we make. we need to be able 
to recognise them and to do so in a manner subject to correction; we have to be 
capable of being right or wrong about them. In investigating this I shall use ideas and 
arCTuments analoCTous to those used by Evans with reference to location in physical b b 
space. I think that this is a useful analogy because what EYans is doing is showing 
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how understanding spatial location objectively requires both an understanding from 
no particular point of view and an understanding from a particular egocentric point of 
view.4 To think of something as 'over there' requires the ability to locate it with 
reference to the thinker, in a egocentric representation of space, but for the thought to 
be one that can be constrained by the truth, can be objective, the object must be 
something that is located in space. Further, this location can be represented in ways 
other than how the egocentric perspective perceives it; the spatial relationship between 
thinker and object must be representable on a cognitive map, an impersonal 
representation of spatial relationships. 
This combination of egocentric and objective understanding is also something we 
think necessary for decisions about how to act. In such cases we have to take account, 
both of how things look to us from here, and how they are. We may well hold that 
one of the factors in such personal decision-making is how things look to the people 
involved. But if we think, as we seem to, that people can be wrong in the decision 
they have made, that there are better and worse decisions to be made in a situation, 
then we are also holding that how things look to those involved is not the only basis 
from which the judgment or decision can be made. We think that we can achieve at 
least some independence from how things look to the decision-maker and validly 
criticise their decision. This suggests that we feel that decisions and judgments in 
personal terms can be made from perspectives other than that of those involved, and 
that relationships can be identified by others who are not part of those particular 
relationships. That is, if the relationship two people are involved in is a friendship, 
then what it is appropriate to do in a particular situation will be something that others 
who are not part of that particular friendship can make judgments about. The nature 
of the relationship can be recognised from other egocentric perspecti ves and 
judgments made from those perspectives. In saying this. however. the claim is not 
-tEvans. Chapter 6. section 3 for a discussion of egocentric thinking in spatial tenus. 
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that the correct view of a relationship or situation is constructed out of the different 
views the thinker and others may have of it, but that people will understand it and 
perhaps come to agree about it because of the way this situation is. This is to take 
Wiggins' second mark of truth seriously, that the truth commands convergence, that 
we agree about how things are because of the way they are, not merely because of a 
preference for agreement over disagreement. 5 If relationships are identifiable by 
different people, this is because there is something to be identified objectively. I am 
not someone's friend merely because I or others think that I am; to count as friendship, 
our relationship must surely conform to some normative constraints, the 
responsibilities, commitments and expectations that go to make it up, and as a result 
my friend and others will tend to concur in this judgment, and recognise the 
relationship. In the identification or recognition of relationships, as in the judgments 
based on that recognition, objectivity requires the possibility of being mistaken about 
things. If I have to get the relationships right in a situation in order to have reasons 
that will stand up to criticism for the judgments and decisions I make, then I must also 
have the possibility of getting them wrong. This means that the relationships I am 
part of cannot of necessity be constituted by my understanding of them. Stalkers, for 
example, often think that they are involved in a romantic relationship with a public 
figure, and behave accordingly, but they are mistaken; their devotion is not 
reciprocated and the object of their attention wants nothing to do with them. Personal 
relationships may be reciprocal or not, the problem with stalkers is that they think that 
they are involved in a reciprocal relationship, but they are wrong about that, the 
relationship is a one-sided one. People can misunderstand the nature of the 
relationship that they are actually engaged in, or can come to realise that they have 
misunderstood it; for example, people who do not realise that they are in love 
although it is obvious to all their acquaintances and friends. The nature of the 
50avid Wiggins. Needs. Values. Truth. 2nd. ed .. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,. 19~ 1). pp. 
149-50. For my discussion of the marks of truth and their apphcabIlIty to 
sophisticated moral realism see chapter 2. 
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relationships we are involved in cannot, if we can be mistaken about them, be 
constituted by our understanding of them. So there are these two elements in our 
understanding of personal relationships, the individual perspective on them and how 
they are objectively. I now want to consider in more detail how Evans uses these two 
ideas in thinking about material objects before seeing if and how they can be applied 
to thinking about personal relations and the actions appropriate to them. 
5.2 Objective and egocentric spatial thinking 
In Chapter 6 of Varieties of Reference6, Evans claims that we require two sorts of 
spatial location abilities to make objective spatial judgments He calls them egocentric 
location, an understanding of spatial relationships from the subject's perspective, and 
objective location, an impersonal representation of space, the possession of a 
cognitive map. A cognitive map favours no particular perspective, every place is 
represented in the same way as any other place, it is from no point of view. It is this 
cognitive map which allows the truth/judgment distinction to have a hold in spatial 
claims. It is this map that tells us whether Warwick is really between Stratford and 
Coventry, or whether my house is the last one before our road opens up into a green. 
Thus possession of a cognitive map is the ability to think objectively about space, to 
think about it in a way that makes claims about locations, spatial relations and objects 
candidates for truth. 
To be able to think of space in this objective way, however, we also need an 
egocentric understanding of space. There are two reasons for this. The first is that to 
use our objective understanding, an understanding from no particular perspective, or 
to be credited with possession of such an understanding. we need to be able to think of 
ourselves as being at some place in this objective space. The second is that to 
6Evans. p 151-170. 
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understand spatial relations at all we have to have experience of a world of causally 
related objects. The objective understanding, the cognitive map is from no particular 
perspective, but we cannot use the map to think of space unless we can locate 
ourselves on it, that is, it is of no use unless a perspective can be inserted into it. A 
street map of Warwick will only help me to find the Castle if I can locate myself both 
in relationship to my immediate surroundings and to how those are represented on the 
map. Only if I know that I am standing by St. Mary's Church facing up Northgate 
Street, can the map tell me that if I tum round I will be facing the Castle. The capacity 
of egocentric location is one that places me in relation to the objects surrounding me; 
St. Mary's Church, Northgate Street and the Castle. The capacity of objective location 
is one that uses my egocentric location, my relatedness to the surrounding objects, to 
locate me on a cognitive map, a representation of space from no particular 
perspective. 
Egocentric location is not simply, however, a particular perspective on space, 
obtainable by someone or something that has inputs from that space, it is not merely a 
theoretical understanding.. Our understanding of space and spatial relations depends 
also on our ability to act in that space, on the relation between input from that space 
and our output to it and how that modifies subsequent input. A sound comes from our 
left and we tum towards it, something bars our progress forward and we move around 
it, something falls from above us and we duck or jump to avoid it. Evans says that 
egocentric spatial tenns "derive their meaning in part from their complicated 
connections with the subject's actions".7 A similar point is made by Charles Taylor 
when he relates the orientation of our perceptual field to how we move and act in that 
field. 8 It is not just the receiving of infonnation from our surroundings that allows us 
to understand how we are located in a particular part of space, but the response to that 
7Evans. p.155 
8e Taylor. -The Validity of Transcendental Arguments'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
SOciety. lxxix (1978-9). 151-65. (p.154). 
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information, actually being in that space and causally interacting with the things in it. 
We understand spatial concepts because we are embedded in a causally connected 
environment. Our physical environment is one we learn about through our responses 
to it and feedback from those responses. That is, the objective spatial relations we 
think about are relations between objects that have causal connections which affect 
those spatial relations. 
Despite this being egocentric location, spatial relations are not discovered or thought 
of primarily as relations to the individual. That is, what I come to understand in 
egocentric space are terms such as 'in front', 'above', 'to the left' not 'in front of me', 
'above me' or 'to my left'. The latter would require me to have primarily identified 
myself and then to locate directions or objects relative to that self, and this, Evans 
thinks, is not possible. Also, if what I have learnt in the way of directions are all 
relative to me, then I cannot understand that the Castle is to the south of Warwick. 
since I have not understood 'to the south of but only 'to the south of me'. Evans claim 
is that the understanding and identification of the self is not prior to and separable 
from that of the space it finds itself in, but that it finds itself, or learns about itself as a 
spatial object, by being in space and responding to it, by being part of this causal 
network. Further he says that the spatial relations I understand in egocentric thinking 
are of the same sort as those that apply to other objects. That is, egocentric thinking in 
spatial terms has to regard the thinker as an object among other objects, having the 
sorts of relations to them that objects have to one another. 
So these egocentric spatial relations are neither purely to do with having information 
from space. but depend on our being part of the causal network of spatially related 
objects, nor are they relations essentially related to the individual. but relations that 
can hold between any objects in space. That is. they are neither entirely theoreticaL 
nor are they subjective. A third point to make about them is that they are not relations 
in a special space. What we have here is not an understanding of egocentric space. 
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but an egocentric understanding of space. That is the space and the spatial relations 
that we come to understand egocentrically are exactly the same space and exactly the 
same kind as relations that we understand objectively. We have a cognitive map of 
how things are spatially related in which we can locate ourselves egocentrically, but 
the egocentric space, the part of that space immediately surrounding us, is such that 
we have to be able to impose the objective way of understanding on it. Thus there is 
only one space and only one type of spatial relationships. 
We need to remember this because talk of a cognitive map brings with it a tendency to 
think of it as like a street map. The problem with this is that such a map need not 
relate things spatially. For example, a map reproduced on a computer screen may be 
created from information which is not stored spatially, but in terms of differences in 
electrical potential, or in terms of formulae. This suggests that a cognitive map is not 
essentially spatial at all. This is the idea of a map as Crispin Wright uses it to talk 
about modest realism. He claims, drawing on an example of Frege's, that realism sees 
human thought as mapping the world but, although maps may "better or worse 
represent the terrain which they concern ... nothing about that terrain will owe its 
existence, or character, to the institution of cartography or to the conventions and 
techniques therein employed. ,,9 That is, a map may represent features of what it maps 
without itself having those features. This is not, however, either what Evans is 
suggesting, nor what is required for the possibility of being mistaken about spatial 
relations. The egocentric understanding and the objective understanding are 
understanding of the same relations. What objectivity requires is an understanding of 
how things are spatially related independently of the subject's particular perspective, 
but not necessarily independently of any perspective at all. There is a tendency to 
think of this, and Evans sometimes talks of it so, as how things are spatially related 
from no perspective at all, and the idea of a map encourages this. But if the objecti ve 
9Crispin Wright. Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Unin:'rsity Press. 
1992), p.2. 
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understanding is perspectiveless, has no perspectives in it, then it is difficult to see 
how we could locate a perspective within it, especially if it could go so far as to have 
no spatial relations in it at all. To be able to use it as a corrective on egocentric 
understanding we have to be able to impose it on our egocentric understanding. to 
bring it into coincidence with egocentric understanding. That is, any point on the 
cognitive map has to be a possible origin of an egocentric perspective. The egocentric 
perspective has equally to be locatable on the cognitive map, it has to be a perspective 
on that map. So they both have to be the same sort of understanding; the egocentric as 
an orientation within a particular portion of the objective, and the objective as an 
understanding that encompasses the possibility of orientation at any point on it. The 
egocentric understanding will be the subject's appreciation of how things look from 
here, but it will be correct or not in tenns of how things are, seen from here, and this is 
what is represented on the cognitive map. 
That is, that what changes in moving from the egocentric to the objective 
understanding of spatial relations is not perhaps best spoken of as the move from the 
personal to the impersonal understanding and certainly not from the subjective to the 
objective. In a sense both the egocentric and the objective spatial understanding are 
impersonal and objective, they are both an understanding of ourselves as objects 
amongst other objects and of the relationship between those objects. It is just that the 
egocentric understanding looks at these objects and their relations from a frame of 
reference of which the thinker is the origin. It is in this frame of reference, from this 
point of view, that the thinker learns about herself as an object among other objects 
and about the sorts of relations that can obtain between objects. Within this frame of 
reference, however, the thinker can be mistaken about how things are. The objecti\'e 
understandinO" does not have to be from any other frame of reference. but it is an 
b 
understanding of objects and their relations that, because they are real. contains the 
possibility of their being represented in another frame of reference with another 
origin. being understood from another point of \'iew. It is a consequence of the spatial 
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relations between things being objective that they will be recognisable by other 
people. When the individual thinker makes mistakes or is deluded she may think of 
objects and relations between them that are not objective. Things will look a 
particular way to her in her frame of reference, but if things are not objectively that 
way, then precisely because of that they will not be understood to be that way from 
some other frame of reference. 
What makes me right to say that there is a desk in front of me is that there is a desk in 
front of me, that is that there are spatial relations between the desk and me. These 
relations are objective, they are candidates for truth, and because of that both I and the 
desk will be understood by others to be in that relationship. I could, however be 
mistaken about the desk, and if I am there is not a desk in front of me, and a 
consequence of this is that others will not understand there to be a desk in front of me; 
the putative desk and I will not be understood to be in that relationship from other 
perspectives. Perhaps, rather than saying that the difference between the egocentric 
and the objective understanding is that the egocentric is personal and the objective 
impersonal, it would be better to say that the egocentric essentially occurs in one 
frame of reference, but that is a frame of reference within, a perspective on, the 
objective understanding which contains and supports many frames of reference and 
perspecti ves. 
What is important here is that the possibility of different perspectives is not what 
makes the understanding objective. It is because the understanding is objective that 
there is the possibility of different perspectives. Thus the objective understanding is 
not constructed out of or constituted by different perspectives, but because it is an 
understanding of how objects, whether they are people or not have certain causal and 
spatial connections, it encompasses the possibility that a variety of perspectives can be 
taken on the same objects and their relations, they can be understood from a number 
of points of view. Any thinker has a perspective on space. the egocentric 
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understanding, but they also understand that it is a perspective on a space that does not 
depend on any perspective or collections of perspectives for its correctness, although 
it encompasses and supports a variety of perspectives on it. It does not require the 
adoption of any particular perspective, but it does require the possibility that different 
perspectives be adoptable. If a spatial relationship is objective then a number of 
perspectives on it may be adopted. So the requirement of objectivity is that the 
thinker is able, not exactly to move away from their perspective so much as to 
disregard it, to regard themselves as an object among other objects, and make sure that 
the relationships they are attributing to themselves are subject to the same sorts of 
constraints as the relationships they recognise to hold between other objects. 'To the 
south of must be used in the same way in 'To the south of me' as it is in 'to the south 
of London', and 'in front of in the same way in 'the desk is in front of me' as in 'the 
engine is in front of the train'. 
So to be able to make spatial judgments that are candidates for truth, that are subject 
to a truth/judgment distinction we need to have both an egocentric understanding of 
spatial relatedness, and an objective understanding with which our egocentric 
understanding can be brought into coincidence. That is, the requirements of truth are 
an understanding that allows us to disregard our own particular perspective, but to 
understand spatial relations at all we have to be located in, perceptive of and active in 
space. Both having a particular location, knowing what it is to be located in space, 
and having the imaginative ability to think of ourselves as one object among others 
located somewhere on an objective cognitive map of some area of space are necessary 
for our moving around in space and making judgments about that space and its 
occupants. As Evans says 
"If that place is conceived by him [the subject] to be real ... he must 
know what it is for a place identified in one of these ways [i.e. haying 
a designation in his system of egocentric spatial relations] to be that 
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place - a knowledge which must bring in a conception of the spatially 
extended causal processes that underlie his afferent and efferent 
connections with the place. ,,10 
5.3 Objective Personal Understanding 
If maintaining a truth/judgment distinction in moral discourse requires an ability to 
identify situations of personal relatedness, will a similar state of affairs obtain to the 
one Evans suggests? We will certainly need to understand how others can be 
personally related to one another, and understand it as a relationship that does not 
depend on how we see it. Consider the case of suddenly seeing two people attacking 
another in the street. My immediate perception may be that this is a mugging, but 
perhaps it is street theatre, or two plain clothes policemen arresting a violent criminal. 
In order to judge the situation truly it needs to be the sort of thing that is assessable 
from some stance other than just my immediate perceptions. In deciding how to 
behave towards a colleague, friend or family member, I need to consider what our 
relationship is, not just how it looks from my point of view. Point of view is 
something we have to be careful about, here. It could be taken to mean how things are 
subjectively, or it could mean having a particular perspective on an objective state of 
affairs. In the second sense the individual will always see things from their point of 
view. Even if they imaginatively take another's point of view this entails adopting it 
as their own, imagining what it would be like to be so placed. But this is not the same 
as seeing, understanding or considering things subjectively. The fact that I cannot in 
some sense get out of my own perspective does not mean that how things look to me 
is how they are, or that this perspective I have is not a perspective on some objective 
situation. So when I say that we need to consider what our relationships with other 
are, not just how they look to us, what I mean is not that we need to abandon a 
lOEvans p.167. The material in square brackets is mine. 
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perspective on those relationships which will give us a distorted view of them. In the 
way I am using perspective, we will always have that sort of perspective. What I am 
claiming is that the relationships we are considering are things that are independent of 
how they happen to look subjectively. What relationships we are involved in, 
however, will affect how they looks to me and to others, and will affect our behaviour 
in response to them. A teenager may feel resentment at being given a curfew when 
they have school next day, but from the parent's point of view this is for the child's 
benefit, and it is one of the responsibilities of being a parent to help them organise 
their life. The parent may feel upset or annoyed at the state of the teenager's room, yet 
acknowledge that their child is becoming an adult and has some control over and 
responsibility for their private environment. So the sorts of relationships we use as a 
basis for judgment must be recognisable by us as holding between others, they cannot 
be just as we perceive them to be, and they will be the sorts of things that people can 
have different perspectives on. 
In order to make objective judgments about actions and situations we need, therefore, 
to be able to recognise personal relationships objectively, to be able to get them right, 
to have a truth/judgment distinction in our assessment of personal relationships. If 
this is so then the personal relationships in a situation cannot be constituted by how 
they look to the individual; there would be no possibility of his being wrong about 
them. Also his understanding of personal relationships in general cannot be based on 
his understanding of his relationships with others. To get the personal relationships in 
a particular situation right then, what an individual thinker needs is to have an 
understanding of what it is to be a friend, colleague or family member that does not 
solely depend either on how he sees such relationships, or on what it is like for him to 
be a friend. colleague or family member. There are two reasons for the second 
restriction. Firstly, the thinker would be unable to make any judgments about 
relations between others, which would affect his judgments about others' actions and 
his decision-making about situations where more than his own relations to others were 
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involved, and secondly he would be unable to compare and prioritise his own 
relationships even where only these were involved in decision-making. 
To take the first case. If a relationship were not just merely recognisable from the 
individual's perspective, but constituted by how it looked from that perspective, it 
could not serve as a basis for personal judgment in any situations in which that 
individual was not part of the relationship concerned. They would have no concept of 
what it is to be a friend, but only what it is to be their friend, or what it is for them to 
be a friend. The individual could only understand relationships in which they were 
involved, and only those could form the basis of judgments about what to do, only 
those would be relationships at all. Then, however, they would have no basis for 
deciding what to do in situations where more than their relationships with others are 
involved. If those are friends wrestling I should not interfere, if they are muggers 
attacking a victim, perhaps I should. But if all I know about relationships is my type 
of relationships, if relationships are only relationships because I am part of them, then 
those others are not related at all and I cannot decide what to do in that situation. 
Most situations in which we have to make decisions involve relations between others 
as well as between ourselves and others, so we have to be able to get the relationships 
between others right as well as the ones we are involved in. 
Furthennore, it is not only our own reasons for making decisions that we criticise, we 
also judge the actions of others, and sometimes use them as a basis for our own 
decisions. Here again, someone for whom relationships were constituted by how they 
looked from his perspective would have no basis for judgments about what others 
ought to do in particular situations, because they would not be involved in the same 
sorts of situations and relationships that he was, or more strongly, would not be 
involved in relationships at all. If we are to be able to base judgments on personal 
relationships, then those relationships have to be to some extent independent of the 
people who are part of them. If I can compare my friendship with Julie with some 
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other friendship, then friendship as a relationship, does not depend on the relationship 
between me and Julie or the one between those other people. Personal relationships 
are relationships between people that to some extent disregard which particular people 
they are between. Friendships can occur between many different people, and 
understanding that some relationship is a friendship does not depend only on who the 
friends are and how they feel about each other. There are friendships between David 
and Jonathan or Achilles and Patrocles, that do not depend solely on David or 
Jonathan or Achilles or Patrocles or their understanding of or feelings about their 
relationships for these being friendships. It is not that it is a relationship between 
David and Jonathon that makes it a friendship, nor is it their recognition of their 
friendship that makes it one, it is because it is a token of a type of relationship that it is 
a friendship. So an understanding of the relationships to be used as a basis for 
decisions about what to do in situations cannot be constituted by how those 
relationships looks to the decision-maker. 
The second concern is that even when I am considering situations where the only 
relevant relationships are my own relationships to others, it is hard to see how my 
relationships, if they are the only ones there are, and are constituted by how they look 
to me, could guide me in their future conduct. It may be that the history of a particular 
relationship involving commitments and responsibilities will raise expectations about 
future behaviour, will indicate how I should continue to behave if the relationship is to 
have some sort of consistency and coherence. This, however, would only be 
sufficient, if indeed it were, if that was the only relationship I was involved in. In fact 
we have a variety of relationships, both with different individuals and with the same 
individual. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, a couple may also be working in 
the same company. If conflicts arise between the two relationships it is not clear to 
me how consideration of them alone can guide my decision-making. How am I to 
compare them? And if the situation involves relationships with different people, how 
do I compare these to decide what to do? If I am tom between baby-sitting for my 
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friend Julie as I promised to do, and going to Casualty with my son who has broken 
his arm, how can considering the individual relationships and what they require of me 
help? One requires that I go to Casualty and the other that I baby-sit. It may be 
obvious what to do, but the reasons that I have for deciding one way will be to do with 
comparing the relationships as types. I will decide because, in this context, caring for 
my son is more important than caring for someone else's son. And this is not just 
based on feeling more strongly about my son than Julie's. Under other circumstances, 
where Julie's needs are greater than David's, she has to go into hospital, whereas 
David would prefer me rather than his father to read his bedtime story, the friendship 
we have and the promise I made will win out against my son's needs. 
Decision-making then which requires consideration of others relations to one another 
and the comparison or prioritising of the decision-makers relations to others requires 
that relationships be constituted by something other than how things look to the 
decision-maker. What is needed here is objectivity on the same pattern as for spatial 
relations. It is only if the relationships between myself and others are of the same type 
as the relationships others have between themselves, that I can make the comparisons 
necessary for judgment and decision-making. As in the spatial relationships 'to the 
left of is a relationship that is of the same type when it holds between a thinker and 
some object as when it holds between any two objects, so with personal relationships, 
friendship as it holds between a thinker and others is the same type of relationship as a 
friendship between two other people. If it were not then there would be no possibility 
of comparison between relationships, they would be incommensurable. Even the 
history of the relationship would be no guide as to future behaviour because as it 
changed the subjects conception of it would change and thus it would cease to be the 
same relationship if it was constituted solely by the subjects conception of it. Only if 
a relationship was thought of as entirely static and unchanging could its past be a 
guide for future conduct within it, and this would depend on the subject's conception 
of it not changing. If the subject's conception of it changed it would become a new 
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relationship and could be no guide for behaviour or decision-making. It is likely, 
however, that how we act within a relationship changes our conception of it. Actions 
strengthen or weaken relationships, the more I do with or for my friend, the stronger 
our friendship becomes, its nature changes and so does our understanding of it. I 
would argue that the understanding changes because the nature changes, but if it is 
held that the understanding of the relationship constitutes its nature, it still seems 
likely that the things we do within a relationship change how we understand it and 
therefore, on this account, change its nature and it could no longer serve as a guide to 
future decisions. 
So what is it that constitutes a personal relationship? I claimed above that the 
relationship is the basis for deciding what to do in a situation because it is made up of 
commitments, responsibilities and expectations, that these are its essential 
components. If this is so then types of relationship will be constituted by types of 
responsibilities, commitments and expectations. How could my past behaviour to my 
friend Julie lead to expectations of particular patterns of future behaviour, unless it 
was itself an indication that the relationship was of a particular type. It is because I 
have behaved as a friend does towards Julie that she can continue to expect me to 
behave as a friend would, and that I can consult, at least on difficult occasions, the 
patterns of friendship behaviour to guide my future behaviour. It is because Julie is a 
friend not a lover, that it is no threat to our friendship for both of us to have other 
friends, in a way that it might be if we were lovers. The type of relationship, as well 
as the growth and history of the particular relationship, has something to tell us about 
what is behaviour appropriate to it. This sounds like a rather fonnal set of procedures 
for what usually happens in a friendship, but all I am really claiming is that for the 
recognition of personal relationships to play the role I claim for it in judgment or 
decision making. the relationships need to be identifiable objectively, from a wider 
basis than that available to the individual's personal experience. I need to be able to 
disregard my egocentric perspective, to regard myself as a person amongst others. 
183 
whose relationships with others are subject to the same sorts of constraints, the 
commitments, responsibilities expectations appropriate to it, as the relationships that I 
recognise hold between other people. 
So an objective understanding of personal relations such as friendship requires that we 
understand not just what it is to be friendly with some particular person, but what it is 
in general for people to be friends. For a relationship to be a friendship there need to 
be various commitments, responsibilities and expectations which hold between the 
people who are friends. This must be the case if the friendship is to be something that 
gives us reasons for making the judgments and decisions we do in a situation. These 
commitments, responsibilities and expectations will hold in any relation which is a 
friendship, regardless of who the people involved are. So any relationship will be the 
same type of relationship regardless of whether it is recognised as one of the thinker's 
relationships to others or as one that relates others to each other but not to the thinker, 
provided that it is constituted by the same type of commitments, responsibilities and 
expectations. It is interesting to note that if these commitments, responsibilities and 
expectations do in fact constitute relationships, then it may be possible for it to come 
as a surprise to someone that the relationship they have with another is a friendship; 
they will be engaged in such a relationship regardless of whether they have thought of 
it that way or not, precisely because they have certain commitments, responsibilities 
and expectations. 
A result of this understanding of relationships as constituted by the commitments. 
responsibilities and expectations which are the basis for judgment and decision-
making is that others, as well as the thinker, will be able to recognise the relationship 
as the one it is. That is the relationship will not be constituted by peoples recognition 
of it, their recognition of it will be a result of its constitution. It \vill be the sort of 
thing that can be recognised by other people than those who are part of it. This 
suggests that the objective understanding we need to be able to identify even our own 
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personal relationships is an understanding that can disregard our own particular 
perspective on a relationship and recognise it as the same sort of relationship that 
others can be part of, constituted by commitments, responsibilities and expectations, 
and as a consequence recognisable by others. This understanding is an understanding 
from no particular perspective because it can disregard the thinker's perspective. It 
does not require adopting another point of view, but it does require understanding the 
relationship as something that is potentially comprehensible by others because of the 
sort of thing it is. 
To be able to identify relationships, therefore, even our own relationships, and to use 
them as a basis for decision-making and judgment, we need an objective 
understanding of personal relationships. This is one which is independent of the 
subject's perspective in the sense that the objective understanding of spatial 
relationships was independent of the subject's perspective; the nature of the 
relationship does not depend on the subject's perception of it so that disregarding the 
subject's perspective does not change the nature of the relationship. This 
understanding favours no particular perspective, every location in personal space is 
represented in the same way as every other one, and there is no favoured vantage 
point. Do we, however, need an egocentric understanding to be able to attain this 
objectivity, and do we acquire this understanding in a similar way to the way we 
acquire an egocentric spatial understanding? 
5.4 Egocentric Personal Understanding 
We saw that m the spatial case, to be credited with possessmg an objective 
understanding we had both to be able to bring our egocentric understanding into 
coincidence with it, and to understand the spatial relations in tenus of our causal 
interaction of the sort that we could have with objects in our egocentric space. That 
is, to use the objective understanding we had to be able to orient ourselves within it. 
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adopt a perspective within it, and doing this requires an understanding of spatial terms 
which depends on the causal relations between objects of which the thinker is one. In 
an analogous way I want to argue that to use an objective personal understanding we 
need to be able to orient ourselves in something like a personal space, to adopt a 
perspective within it, which requires and understanding of personal terms which 
depend on personal relationships being affected by the actions of the parties to those 
relationships. That is, as our understanding of spatial terms and relationships depends 
on an understanding of how objects can affect one another causally, our understanding 
of personal terms and relationships depends on an understanding of how parties to a 
relationship can affect one another and the relationships between them. 
If the objective personal understanding is one that represents personal relationships 
from no favoured perspective, but as potentially recognisable from other perspectives, 
then to make any use of it we surely need to have the ability to adopt a perspective. If 
the objective personal understanding represents all perspectives equally, like the 
objective spatial understanding, it is not representing no perspective but many 
perspectives, and to use it we need to be able to adopt those perspectives. In the 
spatial case, to be able to use the objective understanding, to understand that this 
spatial relationship is of the same sort as that which obtains between others, we saw 
that we had to be able to locate and orient ourselves in a cognitive map. To 
understand that Bristol is to the west of London we have to understand what it would 
be like to be in London and that Bristol would then be to the West of us. Equally, if I 
am to be able to make judgments and decisions based on the relationships I and others 
are part of, then I must be able to understand what it is to be part of a relationship. If a 
relationship is objective, and is therefore the sort of thing that is recognisable from 
different perspectives, then to recognise a relationship we must be able to locate 
ourselves in a network of relationships as one of the members and understand what it 
would be to be involved in their relationships. To recognise that two people are 
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friends is to understand what it would be like to be one of them and to understand how 
the other is related to us. 
So it sounds as if, to make use of our objective understanding of personal 
relationships, we need to be the sorts of things that engage in personal relationships. 
It might, however, be argued that we do not need to engage in relationships to 
understand them, we could make do with a theoretical understanding of relationships 
which does not require actually having engaged in such relationships. After all there 
are some types of relationships that any individual cannot or does not engage in; I 
cannot be a brother or a father. If I am to understand these relationships it must in 
some sense be a theoretical understanding that I have, so why should this not be true 
for all relationships? There are two sorts of problem here because there are two things 
I could mean by having a theoretical understanding. What I mean by it generally is an 
understanding in terms of rules rather than experience, but there are two ways that 
rules could be part of personal relationships. It could either be the case that the rules 
constitute the personal relationships, or that they attempt to capture them. I I The first 
case would to be to consider personal relationships to be similar to the relationship 
between game players. If two people are playing chess or snakes and ladders there are 
lIThe follOwing discussion has some similarity with Rawls' summary and practice 
conceptions of rules (see 'Two Concepts of Rules', Philosophical Review, 64 (Jan 55), 
p.3-32). However, although Rawls practice conception of rules is like my constitutive 
rules, the difference is that Rawls does not envisage them, as Wright might, as 
operating in isolation from the possibility of the practice changing in response to 
some legislative decision. A theoretical understanding, in my terms, is meant to be 
one which subjects could have without ever engaging in relationships. In this case 
constitutive rules would be all there was to the relationship, and this would rule out 
the possibility of the nature of the relationship forCing a change on the rules. In 
Rawls case, what forces a change of practice, and therefore of relationships. would 
be something like a recognition that the practice did not best fit the legislative moral 
principles. which it might be too difficult to apply in the individual cases. Since I do 
not believe that principles are primary. but relationships. this route is not one I 
would take. and therefore I cannot hold that we operate on the basis of practices 
which constitute relationships. This is why I prefer Rawls' summary conception of 
rules. but do not lose sight of the fact that there are both legislative and judicial 
functions in moral decision-making. which might be put in terms of judging 
respectively whether the discourse's discipline was the right one for its subject 
matter or whether deCisions were in accord with the discipline of the discourse. 
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rules that tell them the sorts of things they can and cannot do, the moves they can 
make, perhaps the time they are allowed, and their relationship is limited to these 
rules. In fact I think even this model is inadequate because there are many rules which 
are implicit in our understanding of how games are played which are not part of the 
rules of the game; for example, that we should obey the rules of the game. 
Nonetheless in this sort of picture the rules of a relationship would be something 
created by society perhaps, but would constitute the relationship. As in the game 
playing case, what was covered by the rules would be all there was to the relationship. 
We would not be understanding the relationship as something that exists in its own 
right, but as something that is created by and limited to the rules. In the second case 
the model would be more like the scientific enterprise, that relationships exist in their 
own right and that the rules are our attempt to capture them, to say what they are like. 
In this case the question would be whether such relationships can be captured by rules 
and whether it would always be a provisional understanding we had, as is the case in 
scientific understanding. In the first case the rules are laid down in advance of the 
relationships, in the second the relationships are primary. I think there are problems 
with both pictures individually, and some that apply equally to both. 
In both cases the idea is that the relationship is, or is discovered to be, equivalent to a 
set of rules. Perhaps we could feed into a computer the commitments, responsibilities 
and expectations of various types of personal relationships and expect it to tell us what 
to do in various situations. Could the commitments, responsibilities and expectations 
of a relationship be reduced to a set of rules which we could learn in order to decide 
what to do in a situation? There are two things wrong with this picture I think and 
they may both be part of the same point. The first is the idea that commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations are the sorts of things that could be fed into a 
computer as sets of rules, and the second is that what comes out of the computer may 
tell us what we should do but need not motivate us to do it. Both of these objections 
are connected with the nature of personal relations and what it is to understand them. 
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In terms of the analogy drawn with spatial relationships, this is the second basis of the 
need for an egocentric understanding. The nature of spatial relationships is such that 
we cannot understand them properly if we are not the sorts of things that engage in 
them. What I now want to consider is whether such a claim can be sustained with 
reference to personal relationships. 
5.5 The Nature of Personal Relationships 
I have argued above that personal relationships are constituted by their commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations because only if these were essential to such 
relationships could those relationships give reasons for acting as they do. Further, in 
order to possess an objective understanding of these relationships, an understanding 
that encompasses a variety of perspectives on them, we need to be able to have a 
perspective on relationships. Having a perspective on personal relationships is 
understanding what it is to be part of a relationship, understanding what you are 
committed to in that relationship, what others who are part of that relationship can 
expect of you. But why should this not be the sort of thing that can be reduced to a set 
of rules? Many personal relationships have sets of rules attached to them. My 
relations with fellow club members, fellow citizens, my supervisor, students and 
colleagues are all rule-governed to some extent. 
The first thing to notice about these sorts of rule governed relationships is that the 
rules provide a necessary minimum of behavioural constraints. They do not, and 
cannot, tell us what to do in every situation; human relationships and the situations 
they are part of are too rich, varied and complicated to have their every aspect covered 
by rules. It may, for example, be a rule of friendship in general to be loyal to a friend. 
but situations arise where loyalties to two different friends conflict, or the loyalty we 
feel to a friend conflicts with some other aspect of our relationship. The problem is 
that rules cannot be specified precisely enough to cover every particular situation. So 
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the rules of my club or work organisation do not tell me how to behave towards fellow 
members or colleagues in every situation, but set out minimum standards that oU<Tht to 
o 
be conformed to. Even here there will be situations where it is accepted that the rules 
do not cover these circumstances and we are justified in breaking them. That is rules 
are not sufficient for governing what is appropriate behaviour under all circumstances. 
So my relationship to fellow members or colleagues must have some other 
constraints, something else that guides behaviour in those situations not covered by 
the rules. The point here is that relationships with fellow club members do seem to be 
the sorts of things that are understood to be something other than merely what the 
rules specify. If they were restricted to the rules then of course the rules would be 
adequate for dealing with them, but our experience of even limited relationships is 
that rules are not always adequate. They do not, for example, cover situations not 
envisaged by the rule makers, which nevertheless sometimes arise, or perhaps they do 
not take account of other relationships which members are a part of but which 
nevertheless affect their conduct towards fellow members. They could not, in fact do 
this sort of thing. To take into account all possible other relationships that members 
were involved in, or any possible change of circumstances of the club, would seem to 
involve an infinite number of ceteris paribus clauses for any rule. That is why the 
rules are in fact regarded as a set of provisional minimum standards, to be obeyed in 
most circumstances by most members, perhaps regarded as something that members 
should aspire to. So if we try to regard relationships as constituted by rules, even in 
those cases that come closest to the ideal we find that our idea of such relationships is 
richer than what would be generated by the rules, and that even if it were not rules 
could not take sufficient account of the complexity of human circumstances. 
Another important point is that if the rules constitute the relationship then we ha\'e a 
problem with the development of relationships and with non-standard relationships. If 
relationships are consitituted by rules we cannot say that a relationship develops and 
then we create rules to control it, that would be to get things the \\tTong way round. 
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We are therefore limited to relationships for which we already have rules, and it 
appears that there can be no aspects of a relationship that are not rule-governed. What 
it is to be in such a relationship is to follow the rules, if there are no rules there is no 
relationship. This is contrary to our ordinary understanding of relationships as things 
that grow and develop, that change to suit situations, that may not conform to others' 
views of them. This latter will not be a problem if the relationship comes first, since 
others can come to recognise it as they come to recognise the commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations that develop along with it. If the relationship comes 
into being, grows and develops we may recognise that it has something in common 
with other relationships, some of its commitments, responsibilities and expectations 
may be similar to those of other relationships and we will be able to say that this is a 
type of friendship or rivalry. This, however, is to take the second sort of picture, to 
understand relationships as primary and the rules as attempting to capture them. If the 
relationship is constituted by rules it is hard to see how it might develop rather than 
spring full blown to life, or how it might change gradually from one sort of 
relationship to another. Enemies do sometimes become friends, but rarely is it a 
radical overnight change, it is a gradual process to do with coming to know one 
another, with the relationship changing, perhaps imperceptibly. 
If this is what relationships are like, things that change and develop, where each one 
may be different from others of its type, then even though there are types, and perhaps 
some patterns of appropriate behaviour can be extracted from recognition of such 
types, in the case of personal relationships we seem to have a very different situation 
from what goes on in the physical sciences. There the assumption is that rules can be 
discovered that will govern physical relationships, despite the fact that different 
elements are involved on different occasions. Things can, of course, develop in 
accord with rules, that is presumably how plants grow and develop, and this sort of 
development can happen with personal relationships. However, personal relationships 
are things that can develop in ways that do not have to be in accord with rules. they 
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can move forward in ways that do not match with previous patterns and structures. If 
the situation in Northern Ireland is to be resolved it will have to be because people can 
find new ways of living together that are not determined by their previous patterns and 
structures of behaviour, and although this may be difficult, we do not think it 
impossible. People can change their ways of behaving and relating to others in new 
and original ways. The assumption of the natural sciences is that the elements 
involved have no individuality and cannot affect the generalisations being made, they 
cannot choose to behave differently. One of the problems with the social sciences in 
general as a scientific enterprise, is that its elements are individuals who can decide 
not to conform to the rules we think we have discovered, they are not interchangeable, 
indistinguishable, mindless components and can develop new ways of behaving and 
relating. Surely the problem with trying to regard personal relationships as 
conforming to general descriptive rules is that this does not take enough account of 
the individuality of different people and their situations. That is not to say that we 
cannot discover some patterns of behaviour which we might use as a guide in other 
situations, but it could only be that, a guide, not something that forced us to behave in 
particular ways. 
So an understanding of relationships as constituted by rules fails to fit with our 
conception of relationships not as fixed static things but as things that grow and 
develop in unexpected ways. Even if relationships were static, however, the 
overlapping and interaction of relationships that people are involved in and their 
changing situations would preclude rules being able to deal with their complexity. If. 
however, the relationships are not constituted by rules but our understanding of them 
is supposed to be capturable in rules, then we find that the particularity of personal 
relationships is what is important in considering how to respond to them, and then. 
although we may detect patterns of behaviour that can help our deliberations, rules are 
too general to provide specific solutions. So it seems that a theoretical understanding 
of relationships in terms either of constitutive or descriptive rules will always be 
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inadequate for the sorts of decisions and judgments we have to make with regard to 
personal relationships. 
Further how an individual responds to a relationship depends on how committed they 
are to the relationship and what responsibilities they feel to the others involved. The 
problem here is not just that rules cannot be adequate to the complexities of personal 
relationships but that rules do not provide motivation, whereas the commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations of a relationship do. The rules of a club only provide 
motivation in conjunction with something else, perhaps the desire to remain a member 
of that club. Commitments, responsibilities and expectations, however, are not just 
theoretical reasons for action they are practical ones that motivate us to act. As 
Aristotle points out in the Nicomachean Ethics 12, the difference between practical 
reasoning and theoretical reasoning is that the former results in action, not just 
affirmation of a conclusion. To be committed to someone, or to a relationship, to 
acknowledge its responsibilities, is not just to know what is appropriate behaviour to 
that relationship, it is to want to engage in that behaviour. That is, personal 
relationships as well as justifying how we act give us reasons to act that motivate. 'I 
did it because she's my friend' is a reason for acting in both senses, it tells us what 
justifies the person's action and why they felt moved to act that way. It is my claim 
that recognising a relationship as one that makes claims on us means not just 
theoretically identifying the claims it makes, but feeling the pull of those claims. In 
order for a particular relationship to be a basis for acting in a particular way for an 
individual, he must not only recognise what he has reason to do but also feel moved to 
do that. So personal relationships could be said to give rise to the desires that the 
Humean model would use to explain action. But the dependence is this way round. It 
is because we are part of relationships that are constituted by commitments. 
12See for example Book VII. ch 3. 1147a27-8. 
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responsibilities and expectations that the desires and beliefs can be identified, not that 
we have desires for and beliefs about friendships antecedently to being friends. 
This point has a special significance if personal relationships are to have a chance of 
being sufficient for morality. Although I am avoiding talking specifically about 
morality as such, as Mackie 13 pointed out, moral properties are queer in that they 
motivate us to act. If relationships and their commitments did not do this, then they 
would fail to have the distinctive quality, the 'ought-to-be-done-ness' as Mackie puts 
it, that belong to moral qualities. In this respect they would be insufficient for 
morality. In addition to this problem, however, we would have the problem of finding 
something else that provided the motivation for action. If we claim that there are 
moral principles or rules, but they do not provide motivation for our action, we either 
need a meta-level reason for following these rules or principles, which threatens a 
regress (what motivates us to follow these meta-rules?), or we need to bring in some 
other factor to account for our motivation. This is a recurrence of the problem posed 
for the cognitivist by Dancy that I noted at the start of the chapter. Either our beliefs 
about relationships will have to motivate us, or we may have to add in something like 
desires to account for motivation. If we adopt the second option this raises the 
problem, which I shall address in the next section, of how these desires could arise 
and how we could individuate them if they were independent of the relationships we 
were part of. Motivation here is not concerned with why this set of rules rather than 
another, but with why, even if we have adopted a set of rules, we will feel moved to 
act in a particular way. Rules only tell us what to do not why we should obey them. If 
we had a set of rules we could perhaps programme them into a computer and get the 
answers to our problems out of it. In such a case the computer might be said to know 
what the rules were and, supposing they were comprehensive, could provide the right 
answer about what to do without feeling in the least moved to do that. 
13J L Mackie, Ethics: inventing right and wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) 
p.38 and following. 
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So my claim is that a theoretical understanding of personal relationships is inadequate 
because it is not rich enough to provide guidance in the situations we find ourselyes 
in, because the relationships we hold with one another are themselves too variable and 
adaptable to be consitituted by rules, and because such rules would not provide the 
motivations to act. If, as I claim, the commitments, responsibilities and expectations 
of a relationship do provide this motivation, then I shall have to explain why it is that 
some people can apparently have a theoretical understanding of relationships without 
feeling motivated to act by it. That is I shall have to explain how someone can be 
weak willed, or not feel the pull of relationships at all; how anyone could understand 
what is expected of a friend, but not behave like one. First, however, I would like to 
consider the second possible solution to the problem of motivation noted above. This 
is the claim that relationships do not need to motivate us to act, that job can be done 
perfectly well by desires. 
5.6 Desires 
Someone could agree with me as far as the claim that we need to recognIse 
relationships as a basis for action and judgment but argue that relationships do not 
play the starring role I have cast them in. We will need beliefs about relationships in 
order to provide the information on the basis of which we act, but what makes us act, 
what provides the motivation for our action is desires. In order to explain why people 
do what they do we do not need to suppose that people are motivated by relationships 
whose commitments, responsibilities and expectations they have to learn to recognise. 
This would be to suppose an unnecessary ontology, that of relationships, whereas all 
we really need to explain action is people and their desires. We will perhaps still need 
some understanding of relationships, that is we will need to know what to do in a 
situation, as well as being motivated to do it, but relationships would then be 
something invented by societies or communities and constituted bv a set of rules 
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Thus, for example, in the case of the Good Samaritan what motivates him to act is a 
desire of some sort, and what it is appropriate to do in that situation is given by some 
set of rules. Of course if we were to accept this sort of explanation we have already 
lost the special ought-to-be-done-ness of moral properties. It will not be anything 
about the situation we find ourselves in that will motivate us to act, it will be our 
desires that do this. Putting this aside however and ignoring for the moment my 
argument that any set of rules is inadequate for deciding what to do. there is still a 
problem with the desire part of the model. If we suppose an individual has theoretical 
reasoning to tell him what to do in a situation and a desire to motivate him, how 
would this work and what sort of desires would he need? 
One way of thinking of it might be that the individual has a general desire for pleasure 
and happiness. The individual's desires are selfish and he only does unselfish acts 
because he has a desire for approval, or a desire to conform. But then he needs to 
know how to conform. That is he must be able to recognise appropriate behaviour in 
situations, and therefore recognise relationships and know what to do in such a 
relationship (i.e. relationship and it's rules). The first problem we encounter is that if 
this is what moral behaviour amounts to then there is no distinction between virtuous 
behaviour and simulated virtuous behaviour. We make use of the notion of simulated 
virtue in moral discourse, that is of doing the right things but with the wrong 
motivation. For example, I help my friend not out of concern for her but because it 
will make me look good. In the case of moral behaviour as conforming to a set of 
rules because conformity satisfies my desires, the wrong motivation must be located 
in the desire part of the explanation of action: that is simulated virtue must be acting 
because of the wrong desire. But what is a wrong desire here? We do not have 
different types of desires, there is only one desire, a general desire for approval. This 
desire cannot be the wrong desire under such conditions because it is the only sort of 
desire there is, any desire here is the individual subject's desire for pleasure or 
approval. So there is no possibility of doing the right thing for the wrong reason. 
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except possibly for incorrect reasoning leading to the correct conclusion which is not 
simulated virtue; we will always either be doing the wrong thing, we will be mistaken 
about what action is appropriate, or if we do the right thing it has to be for the right 
reason. The only way the reason could be wrong would be if there were different sorts 
of desires and we were acting on the basis of an inappropriate desire. 
Furthermore, if this simple model of a desire for pleasure in terms of approval or lack 
of disapproval is the reason for action, then there are problems with criticism, 
comparison and disagreement. If what gives reasons for action is desires and sets of 
rules for any relationships, then the individual's response to a situation can be wrong 
either on the grounds of being mistaken about the rules for that situation, or because 
he would gain more pleasure from failing to conform than from conforming. The 
former does not appear to be a case for moral condemnation, however. Someone who 
is ignorant of how to behave in a particular situation may be pitied for his poor 
upbringing, but is not generally thought to be blameworthy. It is rather like playing a 
game and being mistaken about the rules. If you make an illegal move out of 
ignorance you are not condemned in the way that you are if you know the rules but try 
to cheat because your desire to win is overridden by your desire to play fairly. The 
latter case, however, is that of weakness of will, something that we do generally 
condemn people for. Yet if our model of having good reasons for behaving a 
particular way in a situation is that our desire pushes us to behave that way, there does 
not seem to be room for this criticism. Whichever way our desire leads us to behave 
will be correct, unless we make room for the notion of different types of desire and 
their appropriateness to a situation. 
The same problem affects both disagreement and companson. \\' e may disagree " '-
about the rules that apply to a situation. either between individuals or between 
communities, societies or cultures, and these will be ways of comparing behaviour in 
different situations. The debate I am considering here is not a debate due to ignorance 
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of the rules on the part of one disputant, it is a debate as to the correctness of the rules 
whose substance is agreed by the disputants; whether these rules are the right ones for 
this situation or relationship. If we just have a set of rules and we conform to them 
out of a general desire for approval, what would be the basis for discussion as to the 
correctness of the rules? These are not, after all, rules that are developed in response 
to the relationships themselves, since we are positing that we have no need for an 
ontology that includes relationships, the relationships would be constituted by the 
rules. So the basis for discussion would have to be people's desires. That is. a good 
reason for behaving this way in this sort of relationship is that it satisfies the desires of 
those involved. If we ask what these desires are, however, the answer would appear to 
be to do with the sort of relationship we are talking about. If the desires are just 
general desires to conform to rules, they cannot tell us which rules to conform to. So 
to use desires as a basis for deciding which set of rules is better in a particular 
situation we will need to use more specific desires. But if the desires need to be more 
specific, then they are the desires people have in that sort of situation, or even that 
particular situation, and then the desires derive from the situation and are individuated 
with respect to it. That is, the basis for deciding whether some behavioural rules are 
the right ones in a situation involving friendships is that people who are friends have 
desires that come from being involved in a friendship; particular desires that belong to 
friendship. To have disagreements about or make comparisons between the rules that 
apply in a situation, we need the desires that would have to act as a basis for the 
disagreement of comparison to be specific to that situation, not just a general desire to 
conform. 
If, on the other hand. people agree about the rules but would still behave differently in 
the same situation, the sole reason for their different behaviour would be that their 
desires lead them in different directions. This, however, gives no grounds for saying 
that one's actions were better in this situation than the other's, or that the same person 
changed his moral position between two occasions where he behaved differently 
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because of different desires. The only possible reason for criticism or comparison 
would be if we could claim that these people were not acting from some general desire 
for pleasure or approval, but from more specific desires, and that they could be 
criticised, or could compare their actions, on the basis of whether the desires were the 
right sort of desires, the ones appropriate to the situation. 
So if action IS explained in tenns of rule-governed situations and desires that 
motivate, then criticism of action in moral tenns is not possible either about the rules 
governing a situation, or about the desires, without supposing that the desires that 
motivate us, and that ground the rules governing relationships or situations are desires 
that are specific to those situations or relationships, rather than general desires. Thus 
instead of a general desire for pleasure or approval being the reason why we act in 
particular ways, it will have to be specific desires such as the desire to please a friend 
or to help a neighbour. These more specific desires allow the distinction between 
doing the right thing for right or wrong reasons, since the right reason for doing 
something for my friend will be a desire to give my friend pleasure not to acquire a 
good standing in the neighbourhood. Similarly they will allow discussion of the right 
ways of behaving in situations in tenns of the specific desires of those involved in 
those situation, and criticism and comparison of behaviour in similar situations can be 
based on whether the right desires were being brought into playas the motive for 
behaving that way. 
However, if we are going to base our reasoning about behaviour on an ontology of 
specific desires, the desire to please a friend, to help a neighbour, to encourage a 
student. to protect a child, or indeed to hann an enemy, to beat a rival, or to annoy an 
antacronist we have to ask how those desires develop, where we get them from, how b , 
they are discriminated. When we do this it is hard to see how they might ha\'e 
developed in the absence of the relationships they refer to. How does the desire to 
please a friend develop in the absence of friends. or the desire to protect a child or 
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beat a rival if I have no experience of children or rivalry? To have friends, children 
and rivals is to engage in relationships to which certain responses are recognised as 
appropriate and which give rise to desires to continue in, to enhance or to run down or 
discontinue the relationship. The appropriateness of responses might, to some extent, 
be learnt from second hand experience of relationships; stories, myths, reading or 
hearing about other's relationships. The desire to please a friend or beat a rival does 
not seem to be available second hand. We can learn from stories that it is appropriate 
to beat rivals or please friends, but surely the desire only comes from having a rival or 
a friend. That is, if we suppose that there are such things as relationships, we can 
account for desires which arise out of the relationships, but if we try to start with the 
desires, it is difficult to see how we could get such specific desires. It is because 
someone is a friend that we want to help them, we do not seem to have a desire to help 
a friend and then look around for someone to fix it on. Of course we may desire to 
have a friend, that is have a general desire for friendship, but again this is the sort of 
desire that arises from having had friends and missing the experience now. It is 
because I have had friends that I know that friendship is a desirable state and can 
aspire to it. 
Similarly, if we have such specific desires, how do we individuate them in the absence 
of pre-existing relationships? If we explain someone's behaviour, or they explain their 
own behaviour in tenns of a desire to help their friend, or hann their enemy, we could 
perhaps claim that these specific desires are individuated by being the ones that are 
aimed at the person who is the friend or enemy not the specific relationship that we 
are involved in with them. It will not be sufficient, however, just to identify them 
with respect to the person they are aimed at, since we may have different relationships 
with the same person. We explain Macbeth's killing of Duncan surely on the basis of 
his rivalry with Duncan, not on the basis that he is Duncan's subject, and yet he is still 
Duncan's subject until he kills him. So the desire that explains his action is 
individuated with respect to the particular relationship that is relevant to the action. 
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not just with respect to the individual it is aimed at. Also it can be the case that our 
relationships with others change and then the desires would change. If someone who 
was an enemy becomes a friend I will surely have desires to act differently towards 
that person, but the person may not have changed, they remain the same person. So 
the desires cannot be individuated just by being the ones I have towards that person. 
this will not account for the changed desires, it must be the changed relationship that 
accounts for this. If this is the case then, although we can and do use people's desires 
to explain their behaviour, to suppose that those desires can arise or can be 
individuated in the absence of involvement in a relationship which is productive of 
them is a mistake. That is, we can if we like explain people's behaviour in terms of 
desires, but this is a derivative sort of explanation, since these desires could not arise 
or be individuated without recourse to the relationship which gives rise to them. We 
can explain both the justification and motivation of action by identifying the 
relationship the agent is part of, without mentioning desires, but we cannot explain 
action in terms of beliefs and desires without referring those beliefs and desires back 
to the relationships. 
So far, therefore, I have shown that we need an objective understanding of personal 
relationships in order to make objective judgments based on them. The relationships 
we understand, however, are the sorts of things that are recognisable from different 
perspectives, and, to be able to recognise the personal relationships between ourselves 
and others we need to be able to orient ourselves within that objective understanding. 
to adopt a perspective upon it. So to have an objective understanding we need to be 
able to adopt a perspective on personal relationships, to know what it is like to be part 
of such relationships. This, I argued, requires being involved in these sorts of 
relationships, not just having a theoretical understanding of them, partly because a 
theoretical understanding is not adequate to the complexities of such relationships, 
partly because it does not allow for changing and developing relationships, and partly 
because it does not provide motivation for action. In the case of the last problem I 
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have considered whether desires could provide the motivation required and concluded 
that, even if we assume that they do, we cannot consider them as primary but as 
dependent on an ontology of relationships since specific desires could not develop or 
be individuated independently of the relationships which give rise to them. This 
seems also to be the case with the commitments, responsibilities and expectations that 
I argue constitute personal relationships, and I would now like to consider them in 
more detail. 
5.7 Commitments, responsibilities and expectations 
One of my earlier objections to commitments responsibilities and expectations as 
rules constituting relationships was that they were not the right sorts of things to be 
expressed in tenns of rules, that rules could not capture their richness and complexity 
or their motivating effect. To this should be added, I think, a further point that the 
commitments, responsibilities and expectations that belong to a relationship, as is the 
case with desires, cannot be specified or developed independently of the relationship. 
When we speak of rules capturing some situation or state of affairs, the model we 
have is of something like the scientific enterprise. There is something going on which 
we try to understand in terms of descriptive rules. We try to formulate a set of rules or 
laws which describe the regularities we discover going on around us, and I think that 
something of this sort does go on when we try to formulate general principles of 
behaviour. The picture of rules constituting a relationship, however, suggests that the 
rules are things that can be understood independently of the relationship. that we can 
describe various commitments, responsibilities and expectations independently of 
relationships. 
The point I want to reiterate here is that if we are to understand relationships 
objectively, as things it is possible to have a perspective on, this means that we must 
understand what it is like to be involved in such a relationship. to feel the 
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commitments, responsibilities and expectations that make it up. To be committed or 
to have a responsibility is not to be in possession of the relevant rule and then to 
consider whether to obey it or not. If I can ask whether, despite knowing that this is 
what is involved in commitment, I shall do it, then I am not committed and I do not 
properly understand the commitment involved. To have the responsibility for 
bringing up a child is not just to know what to do but to be motivated and committed 
to doing that. The motivation is not some additional extra, something like a Humean 
desire that needs adding in to our beliefs to get us moving. We do not need to ask if 
someone who has accepted a responsibility, or is committed to a relationship, has a 
desire to act in the way those commitments and responsibilities require, because if 
they do not, then they are not committed, they have not accepted the responsibility. 
The pull is not a desire separate and separable from our commitments and 
responsibilities, although we can recognise it as an element of them. To have a 
relationship with its commitments and responsibilities is to feel the pull, to be 
motivated to act. It is precisely under those circumstances where people say that they 
know what to do but are not going to do it that we classify them as irresponsible and 
uncommitted. That is, what it is for something to be a commitment or a responsibility 
is for it to compel us, to motivate, to have a pull. If, however, responsibilities and 
commitments are the sorts of things that have a pull, we surely have to ask how we 
identify them, how we come to recognise them as such. The individual could not 
recognise the pull of relationships, requiring them to act in particular ways, to 
confonn to particular patterns, if they had no experience of feeling both compelled to 
act and that others are compelled to act because of the personal relationships they and 
the others are part of. That is, we can know that a relationship has a pull without 
experiencing that particular relationship, but it is difficult to see how we could know 
what it is for a relationship to have a pull if we had not experienced the pull of 
relationships at all. Understanding commitment requires having commitments. 
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Actually being engaged in such personal relationships and feeling the pull of them is. I 
think, the equivalent of understanding spatial relationships because we are part of the 
causal network of physical space. IT we do not understand expressions such as 'to the 
left of in terms of what will happen if we rotate in such a direction, or reach out in 
such a direction, we do not, on Evans' account understand them properly at all. I only 
understand 'St. Mary's is to my left' if I know that I will see it if I rotate counter 
clockwise, or that I will bump into it if I move far enough in that direction. That is we 
can affect such relations by acting in particular ways, and we understand them as the 
sort of relations that can be so affected. It is part of what makes something a spatial 
relationship, that it can be changed by moving the elements of the relationship in 
space. To understand the inevitability of a world of spatially located, causally 
interacting objects, we need to be such a causally interacting spatially located object. 
The analogy of this in terms of personal relationships is that, to understand a world of 
personally interacting and related subjects, we need to be such a personally interacting 
and related subject. Just as to understand spatial relations we need to understand how 
we can causally affect and be affected by spatially located objects and their spatial 
relations, so to understand personal relations we need to understand how we can affect 
and be affected by the participants in those relationships and thus change the 
relationships themselves. The claim here is that we do not properly understand, or do 
not have a proper conception of personal relationships if we think of them as 
abstracted from involvement. To fully understand what it is to be a friend, a lover, a 
colleague we have to conceive of those relationships as the sorts of ones we can be 
involved in, that have a pull to them, that require things of us, that are altered by our 
actions. My friendship with Julie can be strengthened by the things we do together or 
for each other, and weakened if we let each other down without good reason. where 
the sorts of reasons that are accepted are ones that are recognised as appropriate to the 
context of friendship. I do not just learn theoretically what are appropriate reasons. I 
learn in terms of the hurt expression on my friend's face. and the fact that she 
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withdraws from me. We see children learning the constraints and requirements of 
friendship as they switch who they are best friends with and who they are not speaking 
to from week to week. They may learn theoretically what behaviour is appropriate to 
friendship from models, myths and stories; from David and Jonathan, the Sword of 
Damocles and the Famous Five, but they can only learn from these because they 
recognise them as the same sorts of relationships as the ones they are involved in. 
They have experience of relationships that require things of them and that motivate 
them to fulfil those requirements, and only because of this could they understand that 
those characters in myths and stories are motivated by the same sorts of things and 
that is why the patterns of behaviour they exhibit are appropriate to their relationships. 
Without this understanding of relationships as things that have commitments, 
responsibilities and expectations that pull us in particular ways, they would neither be 
able to identify with the characters in the stories nor understand their reasons for 
behaving as they do. All these give us pictures of friendship, teach us what count as 
good and bad reasons for action within a friendship, show us how friendships are 
enhanced or diminished by ways of acting. But they surely only do this because we 
can relate such friendships to our own, because we know what it is like when a friend 
lets you down or backs you up, or what it is like to support or let a friend down. Such 
stories work because we can put ourselves in the place of the characters. We can only 
really conceive of personal relationships properly if we are the sorts of things that 
engage in them. 
There is, however, a further point here. I have claimed that in order to have even a 
theoretical understanding that relationships have commitments, we need to have 
experience of being committed. I would also like to suggest that. as in the case of 
desires. that the general idea of commitment or responsibility is not enough either. 
These commitments and responsibilities are things that give reasons in both senses of 
the word, as I remarked above. They do not just provide the pull or motivation. they 
also provide the justification for action in situations. If that is the case. then 
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commitments and responsibilities need to be specific. We saw above that one of the 
problems with regarding general rules or principles as sufficient for the sorts of 
decisions and judgments we are making is that they are not specific enough. The 
distinctive feature of personal decisions and judgments is their specificity. Then, 
however, the reasons we use to justify our decisions and judgments must also be 
specific, and what gives us those reasons are the commitments and responsibilities of 
the relationships we are part of. This suggests that these too must be specific to those 
relationships. So developing and individuating those commitments and 
responsibilities is something that is specific to the particular relationship we are 
considering. That is, my various commitments to Julie are not just to Julie as a 
person, an individual, but to Julie as a friend, to Julie as a fellow Christian, to Julie as 
a woman, a mother, a colleague, and possibly many other relationships. 1 may have 
many relationships with Julie, and it will not provide an adequate explanation of my 
behaviour towards her on any particular occasion to say 'I did it because she is Julie'. 
Sometimes 1 will have acted as a friend, sometimes as a fellow believer, sometimes in 
support of her as a colleague. The reasons and the motivation will be different on 
different occasions, and so the commitments and responsibilities which provide those 
reasons and that motivation need to be specific to the particular relationship involved. 
Neither will it be adequate to say that it was friendship in general, or the type of 
commitments 1 have to fellow believers or colleagues that motivated me and gave me 
reason to act. This is not specific enough either. My commitments to Julie do have to 
be recognisable as types of commitment, but nonetheless the commitment 1 have to 
Julie as a friend is still different to the commitments of my other friendships. Some 
will be stronger or weaker than others, some friendships will involve more or less 
time spent together, perhaps more or less discussion of personal problems. These 
commitments, therefore, will develop within the context of the particular relationship. 
and will only be capable of being individuated with respect to that context. 14 
14This conception of commitments and responsibilities as specific. ~o .and 
individuated with respect to particular relationships can be seen to have SlI1111anties 
206 
So both the understanding of personal relationships as essentially involving 
commitments and responsibilities, understanding what it is to be committed and 
responsible, and developing and individuating those commitments and responsibilities 
requires involvement in such relationships. That is, to understand a world of 
personally interacting and related subjects, we need to be such a personally interacting 
and related subject; to understand commitments and responsibilities we need to 
develop them in the context of such relationships. 
There are, however, still a couple of problems with this picture of relationships as 
made up of commitments and responsibilities which we need to experience in order to 
understand and be able to apply justificatory reasons for our actions and the 
motivation to carry them out.. The first might be put this way. In physical space there 
is only one set of relationships which we all experience. We all know how 'behind' is 
related to us because we all experience things being behind us. So Evans can argue 
that we have a common experience that underlies and is responsible for the way we 
understand spatial relations. 15 But is the same true of personal relations? We may all 
experience being friends at one time or another, but we will not all experience being 
lovers, or brothers, for example. Will this mean that we will not be able to understand 
properly those relationships in which we are not involved? I think what is important 
here is that what our involvement in personal relationships gives us is an 
understanding that commitments and responsibilities have a pull. If this is so then we 
will be able to recognise that relationships in which we are not involved will be the 
to Dancy's particularism of reasons, see Moral Reasons, chapter 4. and D 
McNaughton's emphasis on sensitivity to the moral facts of a particular situation. 
see his Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) particularly chapter 13. 
l!Yfhis may, of course. be an accident of our history. It seems quite likely that 
someone who had only ever lived in free fall, for example, would have a somewhat 
different understanding of spatial relations. 'Above' and 'below' would not have the 
same causal relations to the subject as they do for someone who is stationary with 
respect to a gravitational field, they may be closer to 'left' and 'light' than is the case 
for us. 
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same sort of things as the relationships in which we are involved, they will have a pull 
to them. Just as understanding any spatial relationship requires that we understand the 
causal consequences of action within that relationship without necessarily engaging in 
them, so understanding a personal relationship requires that we understand the 
personal consequences of action, that it affects the strength and pull of the relationship 
without necessarily being a part of that relationship. What is important is that every 
relationship has pull, has a motivating effect, and to conceive of a personal 
relationship as one that does not have a pull is to fail to understand it properly. I think 
that what is necessary here is that we experience some relationships, so that we know 
that the proper understanding of a relationship is that, among other things, it 
motivates. We understand that if we enter into a new relationship, it will bring 
commitments and responsibilities, it will pull us to behave in certain ways, and that 
the ways that we behave will affect the strength of that pull. In relationships we are 
not involved in we understand that there is a pull to them although we do not feel it in 
the same way as those who are involved, but we could not understand the pull of a 
relationship at all if we were not involved in any relationships ourselves. When I 
claim that a relationship is strengthened or weakened by our actions, is affected by our 
responses to it, I am claiming that it is the pull of the relationship that is affected here. 
When I do things with and for my friend and the relationship is strengthened, my 
commitment to it is increased and the demands it makes on me are strengthened. If I 
let it lapse or act to weaken it, then its pull may be lessened. 
So we come to the second problem. If this is what it is like to be part of a personal 
relationship, how do we account for the person who does not seem to feel this pull. 
Where does the amoralist, someone who does not seem to feel the pull of personal 
relationships, who does not think of them as reasons for action, fit into this picture? 
What I am claiming is that, to have reasons for our actions that are based on the 
personal relationships we and others are engaged in, we have to be the sorts of things 
that engage in such relationships, not just view them theoretically. The amoralist 
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seems to be someone who does just that, who views them from the outside and asks 
why he should be expected to take this sort of thing into account when he acts. To 
this extent he fails to understand that relationships motivate others to act. He may 
claim that he understands that others do feel moved to act by the commitments and 
responsibilities of the relationship, but I would argue that in so far as he does not 
understand why they feel so moved, what it is to feel so moved, he does not really 
understand what commitments and responsibilities are and so does not really 
understand personal relationships. We have to be sure here that we are talking about 
someone who feels no such constraints on his actions, not about someone who feels 
different constraints from ours. The latter has reasons for actions that are based on his 
personal relationships, he just has different relationships, or prioritises them 
differently from ours. This is the person who would be asking why we feel moved by 
this sort of relationship rather than that sort. The amoralist, however, appears to be 
someone who does not think of personal relationships as reasons for acting and cannot 
understand why they pull us to act at all. 
This, however, should not be a problem for my claims. I have claimed that if 
someone bases the reasons for his actions on the personal relationships involved in a 
situation, then he must be the sort of person who is actually engaged in personal 
relationships, not just a disengaged observer of such relationships. But this says 
nothing about the personal engagedness or otherwise of someone who does not admit 
such relationships as the basis for actions. The amoralist, as I am picturing him, is 
either someone who has come to reject personal relationships as reasons for acting, or 
never has seen them as such. It may be difficult to see how someone who is engaged 
in personal relationships and feels their pull can come to fail to acknowledge that pull 
as a reason for action. Nonetheless perhaps it could happen as the result of a major 
betrayal of a relationship and a consequent determination not to commit oneself to 
personal relationships any more. It may also be difficult to concei ve of how someone 
could fail to be engaged in personal relationships in the first place, but if they have so 
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failed then they will not be able to conceive of such relationships as the sorts of things 
that might motivate people to act, and will therefore not base their actions on them. 
Both of these approaches are asking the question from the wrong viewpoint. I have 
not shown that everyone must be engaged in personal relationships, come to feel their 
pull and thus base their decisions-making on such relationships. I have only shown 
that if we do, as we seem to in moral discourse, base our decisions on personal 
relationships and their pull, then we must have experience of being engaged in such 
relationships. I feel the true amoralist is a very rare creature, and may be explicable in 
terms of the effects of early relationships, or lack of them, but he does not pose a 
problem for my position. 
More of a problem is perhaps caused by weakness of will. In this case we have 
someone who does recognise the pull of a relationship but does not act on it. Perhaps 
they recognise that they should offer to help a friend in difficulty but do not because 
they don't feel like it. The problem here is that I have been arguing that the 
commitments responsibilities and expectations of relationships are things that 
motivate people, that compel them to act. Why do they not compel the weak-willed 
person? One possible solution is to say that, although personal relationships do 
motivate people to act they are not the only things that do so. For example, I claimed 
that there was a problem in individuating desires independently of the relationships 
they belonged to, but this would not seem to be a problem with selfish desires, since if 
they were, so to speak, dependent on a relationship with myself. that is one I cannot 
avoid having, so there is no problem with either the generation or individuation of 
selfish desires. It seems perfectly possible for us to have self interested desires that 
can conflict with the pull of personal relationships. In fact something along these 
lines must be what motivates the amoralist. It also seems perfectly consistent with 
what we take to be moral behaviour that some of our actions can be self interested and 
moral. We hold that people sometimes have a moral duty to do things that benefit 
them. We say that people owe it to themselves to develop this or that particular talent 
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or skill, or have a duty to keep themselves fit or preserve their health. On this picture 
the weak-willed person is mistaken about his priorities, the amoralist is right at one 
end of the scale of reasons for action and perhaps what some would call a saint is at 
the other end of the scale. The amoralist takes no account of personal relationships as 
reasons, most of us, including the weak-willed person take some account of 
relationships but have to balance them against other concerns, and the saint takes no 
account of anything but personal relationships. Actually I think both extremes are 
equally unlikely and undesirable, but that does not, I think, matter very much. What is 
important is that a large part of our judgment and decision-making takes place in the 
context of relationships with others, and to do this properly we need to be the kinds of 
things that are involved in such relationships. Only then will we understand such 
relationships properly as things that have a pull that is affected by how we respond to 
the relationships. 
So the requirements of objectivity are that we have an understanding of personal 
relationships that is independent of the individual's subjective understanding of them 
and represents them as recognisable from a variety of perspectives. To use this 
objective understanding as a guide to action and judgment requires us to be able to 
adopt a perspective and feel the pull of the personal relationships that are part of that 
perspective. Thus we need both an objective and an egocentric understanding of 
personal relationships. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that neither of these modes of understanding 
is prior to the other, and that they are not understanding of different sorts of 
relationships. In fact, that is one reason why one is not prior to the other It is not that 
we need an egocentric perspective before we can have an objective understanding or 
vice versa, but that both are necessary for understanding the same personal 
relationships. In the spatial case our ability to engage in thought with a material world 
requires objectivity, the ability to be right or wrong about spatial relationships, a way 
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of understanding which can disregard our particular take on a situation and think of 
ourselves as objects among others, with the same sorts of causal and spatial relations. 
But this, in tum, requires that we are the sorts of things that can have causal and 
spatial relations with other things. Having a point of view is having a particular set of 
objective relationships to the objects in our immediate environment. Thus the 
objective and egocentric understanding of spatial relations are two sides of the same 
coin -like love and marriage 'you can't have one without the other'. 
Similarly for the egocentric and objective understanding of personal relationships. To 
engage in thought with others in an arena of personal relationships requires 
objectivity, the ability to be right or wrong about personal relations and to understand 
ourselves and our relationships as the same sorts of objects and relationships as we 
find others to be and engage in. That is, if we are to understand our own and others' 
personal relationships objectively, we have to understand them to be the same sorts of 
things. All relationships need to be viewed from a perspective, they are the sorts of 
things that people engage in and so the people engaged in them have a perspective on 
them. If the relationships I engage in can be viewed from my perspective, then the 
relationships others engage in can be viewed from their perspective. They are also 
relationships that are independent of that perspective. If we can be wrong about them 
and their requirements, then what they are and what they require does not depend on 
how they look to the subject, but on how they are, seen from this perspective, they are 
objective not subjective. To be objective they do not need to be perspectiveless, in 
fact they cannot be. If they were perspectiveless we could not have a perspective on 
them, we could not know what it was like to be part of them, and then the objective 
understanding would be of no use at all. Neither can we have a purely theoretical 
understanding of them, again because this ignores the importance of having a 
perspective, but also because such an understanding is inadequate for our conception 
of relationships and their pull. If these points of view and pull are not part of the 
objective understanding, then they will not be available to someone with that 
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understanding. But if points of view are part of the objective understanding, then only 
someone who knows what it is to have a point of view and feel the pull of a 
relationship will be able to make use of the objective understanding. And if the 
objective understanding of relationships is of their having a point of view and a pull, 
then having a point of view will be having objective relationships to others in our 
immediate environment, and feeling the pull of those relationships. That is, the 
relationships through which we engage with others and learn the meaning and pull of 
commitments and responsibilities will be objective relationships, ones to which a 
truth/judgment distinction applies, ones which we can be right or wrong about. 
Further, to engage in the sorts of relationships that can be identified as of a particular 
type, a friendship for example, we have to be able to recognise relationships as 
conforming to some ideas of what is or ought to be involved in such relationships that 
is wider than the understanding the individuals involved have of their particular 
relationship. This is not to say that there are hard and fast rules as to what makes 
something a friendship, but that the sorts of relationships we are talking about, ones 
that have as necessary components responsibilities, expectations and commitments, 
are ones that fit into patterns of behaviour that are wider than our own experience of 
them. That is, there are no constitutive rules that make some relationships the type of 
relationship it is and determine behaviour within that relationship. There are, 
however, patterns of behaviour and interaction between people into which our 
relationships fit and within which they are recognisable as the types of relationship 
they are. Of course my friend and I have a particular relationship which will perhaps 
be unique, but if it is to be the basis for decisions about what to do that can be right or 
wrong, better or worse, then it must fit into a patterns of relationships and their 
associated behaviours that extends beyond my friend, me and our particular 
relationship to each other. 
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5.8 Patterns of Relationships 
I want to talk a little more about patterns in personal relationships and their use in 
decisions about what to do. It might be argued, as I suggested above, that what to do, 
how to behave in a relationship is something that is appropriate to the way that the 
relationship has developed. The relationship has a history, it is made up of people 
interacting in various ways, it grows and develops, and is unique. So why do we need 
a pattern to help us decide what action is appropriate to it? Surely we have a case for 
action being in some sense consistent with what has gone before in this relationship as 
a sufficient constraint on future behaviour. I think that this is inadequate for two 
reasons. There are two things that we need if we are to engage in relationships and 
use them as a basis or reason for action. Firstly we need to learn how to do this sort of 
thing, that is how to engage in relationships and how to recognise them and their 
commitments and responsibilities, and secondly there needs to be the possibility of 
criticism and comparison. In fact the second is necessary for the first. We cannot 
learn about something unless we can criticise what we do and compare it to alternative 
behaviour. 
I would like to suggest that moral education and the practice of moral criticism and 
comparison requires the identification of types and patterns of relationships. In 
education we introduce someone to ways of behaving that are appropriate to 
situations. This is as true in teaching mathematics as in personal education. We teach 
people how to recognise patterns and act accordingly. It is not just that this is the way 
we happen to do things, but that learning requires recognition of patterns. If every 
mathematical problem or relationship were unique there would be nothing to guide us 
about how to approach it, previous experience would be no help at all in solving the 
problem or deciding what to do in this relationship. This would be as true of others 
experience of situations as of my own, I could neither be taught or learn. If there are 
no recognisable patterns in solving mathematical problems. baking cakes or making 
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and sustaining personal relationships, then there seems no way of learning. there is 
nothing to point to to show how we should go on. It is not feasible to teach someone 
by suggesting that they look at this situation, this problem or this relationship and they 
will just see what to do. Even if we are not taught, if we learn from experience, we 
learn by recognising patterns. We decide what to do in this situation by comparing it 
with other similar situations and remembering what was the right or wrong thing to do 
there. In solving simultaneous equations you eliminate one variable; in baking cakes 
you mix the ingredients before cooking them; if you have promised to do something 
you should try your best to do it. 
The first two examples suggest that what happens here is that we recognise a situation 
to which a formula applies and so we apply the formula. This is not necessary, or 
even desirable for all forms of learning and I do not want to suggest that learning 
about relationships is like that, that ways of behaving towards others and interacting 
with them could be reduced to a series of algorithms. We need not have a set of rules 
that may have to be adapted to different situations, but which will unequivocally tell 
us what to do once the situation has been correctly identified. This may be the case 
with simultaneous equations, but it does not have to be the case for everything we 
learn. There are other things we learn to do which are not reducible to written rules. 
When I learn to drive a car, for example, or playa musical instrument, there are some 
actions or sequences of actions which can be reduced to rules to some extent, to do 
with the mechanical operation of the car or instrument. I must declutch before I 
change gear, or I must cover these holes to play G#. There may also be other general 
requirements that can be suggested by general rules, what a driver needs to be aware 
of in a situation, generally how posture and breathing affect playing. But expertise is 
acquired not by following rules but by getting a feel for driving or playing. by 
practising in different situations and discovering what to do and what works best. 
This feel is for driving or playing as a whole, not as a series of isolated situations each 
governed by their own rules. 
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As I argued above (in section 5.5) this sort of behaviour goes beyond what can be 
written down and is not reducible to rules. Rules do not constitute personal 
relationships nor determine behaviour within them. Rules cannot account for 
unenvisaged situations and changes in circumstances, or for the complexity of the 
interaction of the personal relationships we are involved in. Rules and principles 
work in something like scientific predictions precisely because the situations involved 
can be considered as isolated from other influences, but practical personal situations 
are not like that. It is precisely the interaction and involvement with other personal 
relationships that makes decisions and judgments so difficult. When we learn to cope 
with such situations and relationships, if it cannot be by learning a set of rules then it 
must be either learning from others by example not instruction, it is shown not said, or 
learning from experience. Either way it still works on the basis of recognising types 
of relationships and situations, of learning to see patterns. This will be true of 
mathematics and cookery too at a certain level. Simple arithmetic and algebraic 
manipulation can be done by formula, but there comes a stage in trying to prove 
something, for example, when what you do is guided by recognising general 
similarities and knowing the sorts of things that will work. What you get a feel for, 
what you learn, is what to do in these sorts of situations, what to do if things are like 
this. You learn by comparing and contrasting situations, by trying out appropriate 
behaviour, and learning that sometimes the differences between situations are enough 
to make different behaviour appropriate, and why this is so. 
Even when we are beyond the learning stage the patterns and types of relationships are 
something we need to use in decision-making. As I pointed out before. if all we ever 
had to consider was one relationship in isolation, then it might be that the nature of 
that relationship and the way it had developed may be a sufficient guide. But that is 
almost never the case. We live complicated lives involved in a variet\' of 
relationships. different ones with the same person. the same type with different 
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people, and many of our decisions about what to do are taken in circumstances where 
these various relationships pull in different directions. Or sometimes they reinforce 
one another. I may expect my husband to give more time to criticising my work 
academically because he is both an academic and my husband. To decide what to do 
we may need more than just our understanding of those particular relationships We 
need a feel for personal interaction that comes from being part of a variety of 
relationships and understanding what behaviour is appropriate in a variety of 
situations. These are, however, relationships like those that hold between others, and 
what is appropriate behaviour with respect to them is the same sort of behaviour that 
is appropriate with respect to other relationships of that type. Dancy, although a 
particularist who holds that each situation must be judged individually on its merits, 
nevertheless recognises the importance of experience in moral judgment. He says 
"Of course, a comparison with other cases may help us to decide how 
things are here, just as a long experience of car engines may help us to 
diagnose the fault this time. . . . it would be surprising if a long and 
varied moral experience did not serve to sharpen one's sensitivity for the 
future."16 
This ability to recognise relationships as tokens of some type and make comparisons 
between them is also necessary for criticism, both of our own and of others decisions. 
If every situation were unique, there could be no criticism. Yet criticism too is a part 
of the sort of discourses we are considering. If we think that it would have been better 
or worse if we or others had acted differently, we have to be able to compare the 
actions in this situation with other, similar situations, and therefore to compare the 
relationships in those situations. 
16Dancy. p.63. The point here is being made in tenus of the recognition of the 
situation and not particularly the appropriate behaviour. Dancy however makes a 
similar point about behaviour in tenus of the particularists use of moral principles 
on p.67-8. 
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So education, criticism and decision-making in general reqUIre that we recognIse 
relationships as being of some type, where the type has an effect on the decisions we 
make. Patterns or types of relationships can guide us in our behaviour, there are 
things it is appropriate to do because the relationships are of a particular type. 
Nevertheless the type of relationship does not give definitive reasons for action. To 
say a relationship is of a particular type is to give some indications of appropriate 
behaviour, to allow us to compare situations and see if they are similar enough that 
similar behaviour is appropriate. We decide what to do in a situation because the 
situation contains relationships of particular types in a particular configuration. We 
will have met those types of relationship before, but much will depend on the strength 
of the pull of these particular relationships compared to one another, and not only do 
we not seem to have a neat formula for deciding priorities in situations, but we cannot 
have. It is in this sense that situations are unique. We have never come across this 
exact combination of these relationships, each at this stage in their history before, but 
we have acquired a feel for how to behave in situations of this type.. So in deciding 
what to do, in using these relationships as reasons for the decisions we make, their 
type can only be a guide. Just as each driving situation is a new one and decisions 
have to be made each time, yet they are made on the basis of recognising the type of 
situation and assessing how similar it is to others of that type for them to be useful. 
So each personal situation is new, and yet decisions can be made using experience of 
previous similar situations and relationships. 
Types of relation are used as reasons for action then, but we need to be careful as to 
how we think of them. These types of relationship have the same sorts of features as 
individual relationships, they give reasons to act both because of the sort of 
relationships they are, and because they motivate. David's being my son gives me the 
same sorts of reasons to act, both in the justificatory sense and the motivational sense. 
as anyone's being a son gives his mother reasons to act, although not precisely the 
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same reasons. The mother/son relationship is one I learn about from seeincr it in 
o 
action, from hearing stories, anecdotes and jokes about it. But the particular 
relationship I am in and the way it provides reasons for my actions is also dependent 
on the way it has developed between us. We have both built it up perhaps by using 
elements of the type of relationship as it is presented to us, but the particular mix of 
those elements and the ways we combine them with other things that become 
important in that relationship and how it fits into the other relationships we are 
involved in is what gives our particular mother/son relationship the justificatory and 
motivating force it has for our actions towards one another. 
So there are two aspects of learning about and making moral decisions. The first is 
the ability to recognise our relationships as of a particular type, and that their being of 
this type may give some reasons for behaving in particular ways. The second is 
learning to recognise the individuality, the particularity, of a relationship, how it 
differs from others of its type, and how those differences may give reasons for acting 
in different ways. On my account of relationships as the basis of moral judgments and 
decisions we would need to be sensitive to the particular moral situation and the 
relationships involved, which suggests that part of our moral education and experience 
must help us recognise those types of relationship. The type of relationship will also 
give some guidance as to how to act, what sorts of behaviour are appropriate to it. It 
will not, however, determine how we should act. As I argued earlier, relationships 
can grow and develop in new and original ways, and therefore the behaviour 
appropriate to them may be different from what is appropriate to other relationships of 
that type. We also learn from past mistakes as well as successes. Recognition of the 
failure of some response to be appropriate to a type of relationship, or a particular one, 
is also a guide as to how to go forward in this case. In both cases a recognition of a 
relationship as a token of some type can guide us in how to act but does not determine 
how we act, each relationship is different and each situation is a different combination 
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of relationships. It is on the basis of the actual situation and its relationships that we 
are engaged in that we make our decisions and judgments. 
5.9 Personal Relationships and Morality 
I could not hope, in these closing sections, to provide a definitive account of what 
morality is and what exactly is its relationship to this structure of personal 
relationships that I have been discussing. I would like, however, to make some 
general suggestions as to how we might see an understanding of personal relationships 
as related to morality; the questions I posed right at the beginning of the chapter. 
There I asked whether recognition of these relationships was not only necessary for 
moral decision-making but sufficient for it; whether it would lead to general moral 
principles or to similarity of action in similar situations and whether some personal 
relationships were moral and others not. I am not sure whether the first two points are 
taken as definitive of morality or sufficient for it, but both certainly seem to be things 
that people associate with morality. In the case of similarity of action in similar 
situations, I hope it is obvious from the above discussion that I think that decision-
making based on the recognition of personal relationships not only leads to but 
depends on at least recognition of the similarity of situations. If there were not such 
similarity we could neither learn nor decide on appropriate ways of behaving, not just 
in personal situations, but in any situation. So that I take it that recognising 
relationships and similarities between them is necessary as the basis for action. In the 
moral case it has often been assumed that this will lead to similarity of behaviour. 
While this may be the case in some of the areas we need to be trained in (if the engine 
stalls, switch off and start again), I do not think it is always the case in moral 
behaviour. This sort of constraint is not definitive of moral behaviour or decision-
making. It depends, I think, on the ways in which situations and relationships are 
similar. My point is that it is the individuality of the situation that grounds the 
judgments we make. Sometimes situations will be similar enough that similar. 
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although not identical, responses will be appropriate. Sometimes, however, the whole 
point of identifying the similarities will be to avoid making the mistakes made last 
time. And sometimes the recognition of similarity will also point out the differences 
that make a difference to how we should act. So although recognition of the similarity 
of situations and relationships is necessary, I do not think that this has to lead to 
similarity of decisions. 
Is the other element, having general principles, definitive of morality? If what is 
essential to morality is having a set of general principle that can be applied in a variety 
of situations to find out what to do, then such principles do not themselves seem to be 
sufficient for morality, because they cannot tell what to do in situations where they 
conflict, and cannot take sufficient account of the complexity of overlapping and 
interacting personal relationships or their development and change. What to do in a 
situation does not seem to be the sort of thing that can be captured by a set of rules, 
and I have argued that while relationships, both as tokens and types, act as the basis, 
or give reasons for deciding what to do, they do not do so in terms of supplying rules 
or instructions. From this I hope it is clear that I do not regard morality as the 
possession of a set of rules to guide behaviour. This is not to deny that some guiding 
principles could be abstracted from consideration of different situations and 
relationships, but even here they would have to be principles that contained the 
concepts of relationships and their commitments and responsibilities. That is we 
could perhaps abstract some useful guidelines from particular situations, but they 
could not be abstracted enough that they disregarded the concept of relations as 
constituted by commitments and responsibilities. Thus a very general principle such 
as 'Love thy neighbour as thyself might be regarded as a guiding principle, but 
following it will require asking and answering questions about who my neighbour is 
and what my relationship with them commits me to. 17 
17For similar pOints see Dancy. p.66-71. and McNaughton. p.20 1-203 
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Another alternative VIew is that morality is to do with acquiring virtues, building 
character. If this is what morality is I would want to ask why some character traits are 
virtues and others vices, why some sort of character is preferable to another. My 
answer here, I think, would be that what makes virtues virtuous, or what makes an 
excellent character, is to do with the ways we relate to other people. Virtues such as 
those suggested by Aristotle, generosity, courage and justice are all appropriate ways 
of behaving towards others or in situations where others are involved, and mean-
spiritedness, cowardice and unfairness are not. 18 We may think them desirable for 
the individual, it may seem that the important part of my moral behaviour is acquiring 
the right sort of character, and that this matters for me as an individual, independently 
of how it affects my relations with others. This I think is mistaken, it is to regard one 
aspect of morality in isolation, without asking why this sort of character is desirable. 
It recognises the idea that a virtuous or excellent person is so because he possesses 
these traits, but ignores the idea that this is so because he is a person, someone who is 
involved in personal relationships.1 9 It is also the case, I think, that it would be very 
hard to identify or acquire the various practical virtues, at least, without some 
reference to personal relationships. The same point can perhaps be made about them 
as can be made about desires, commitments and relationships. Such virtues cannot be 
acquired or practised by someone who is not already related to other people, and they 
are identified precisely by his behaviour towards others. 
IBSee The Ethics oj Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. trans by J A K Thomson. rev 
by Hugh Tredennick. Introduction and Bibliography by Jonathon Barnes (London: 
Penguin Books. 1976) 
19Artstotle of course argues that practice of these virtues is desirable because man's 
function is to be rational and the practical reasoning used in practicising \irtuous 
behaviour is exercising or fulfilling man's function. If. however. we are reluctant. as 
I am. to accept this picture of what it is to be fully human. then we must provide 
some other reason why the behaviour we think virtuous is so. 
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The other line that can be taken on morality is that it is the application of some 
abstract and universal principle of reasoning. Now obviously I think that reasoning, in 
the case of personal relationships, should be objective, it should be the sort of 
reasoning that others can understand if they can understand the nature of the 
relationships we are involved in. It should fit in with other patterns of behaviour. and 
it should treat others as things like ourselves, who can be involved in such 
relationships, who are the recipients at least of commitments and responsibilities, if 
not always the makers of them. On the other hand I do not think that the reasons we 
have for acting are independent of the relationships we are engaged in, or could be. If 
there are rational subjects who do not engage in, or understand engaging in such 
relationships, then I would not expect them to understand or be able to use the sorts or 
reasoning involved. If abstract and universal reasoning requires that there be some 
notion of rationality that is independent of the environment people find themselves in 
and their explanation of their actions within that environment, then I think it requires 
too much. To return to the pictures introduced in chapter one, this sort of concept of 
abstract, universal reasoning seems to derive from the picture of the detached subject 
thinking about a separate world. If, however, we accept the second picture of a 
subject/world/concept interaction, then we must expect our rationality to fit inside this 
picture, not to be something independent of its constraints; to be particular and 
embedded in our understanding of our environment, not universal and abstracted from 
that environment. 
My reply to the question of whether morality requires abstract principles or reasoning 
is that these are either inadequate for decision-making in the sphere of personal 
relationships, or that they impose too strict requirements. That is, that these are not 
definitive of morality. So what do I think morality is? That is a little hard to say. I 
am tempted to claim that it is anything to do with deciding what to do in situations 
which involve personal relationships, as is suggested above. Some would argue here 
that many of the relationships between people are in fact regulated or prescribed by 
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other things, they are legal, social religious or work relationships and are not 
particularly the concern of morality. I do have rules to tell me what to do as a citizen. 
as a church member, as a member of the university, so where does morality come in? 
One way of looking at this might be to suggest that the relations between social, 
religious, legal and moral constraints is that what society, the law and religions 
attempt to do is to model or capture moral requirements, perhaps from different 
perspecti ves, in something like the way that scientific theories try to model or capture 
the material world and its relations. If this were the case it would perhaps explain 
why we feel that moral considerations can be stronger than, or override social, 
religious or legal requirements. We can have moral objections to social, religious or 
legal constraints. We sometimes feel that a particular law is wrong, that certain social 
conditions condoned by a society, or constraints laid down by religion are morally 
wrong. On the other hand it may be thought that this priority of the moral over the 
social, legal or religious is merely a modern way of looking at things. Our ancestors 
might well have claimed that it was more important to stick by your social obligations, 
despite qualms about them, than to disrupt the social order. Such phrases as 'My 
country right or wrong' suggest that loyalty to ones country overrides personal 
morality. Or perhaps personal morality would not have been an appropriate phrase to 
use, some societies or groups may think the individual is not capable of deciding for 
themselves what is right, but should submit to the group's decisions about moral 
behaviour. The implication of the above position is that patriotism is a moral 
requirement, and perhaps that the unity of a country, confidence in it and commitment 
to it are all more important than whether its policies are right. And yet the distinction 
is made, my country can be wrong, and presumably wrong when measured against 
some standards. There is still a distinctions between the codes. rules and standards a 
country develops and their rightness. And the individual still has to make the decision 
whether to accept patriotism as a moral position or not. Ideologies that claim that the 
individual ought to follow the constraints of their system still say that they ought to. 
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not that they have no option or that they will. There is always a gap between what 
some group thinks should be the behaviour of its members, and what those members 
do, how they behave and think. 
What I would like to suggest is that, although these distinctions are made, between a 
system and its rightness, or what the system claims the individual should do and what 
he or she decides to do, this is based not on a distinction in kind between moral and 
other discourses, but that the relationship between moral claims and social, religious 
or legal claims is that of truth to judgment. If the social, legal political and religious 
systems are all attempts to codify behaviour about how people should live together, 
behaviour based on personal relations, at least in some restricted spheres, then what 
forces us, our societies and communities to rethink these systems is that they have got 
it wrong. This is not claiming that there is some morality, defined as a system of rules 
or principles, which has got it right and everything should be measured against that, 
but that moral behaviour is the attempt to get our personal relationships right, and 
work out what behaviour is appropriate to them. Social, legal, religious and political 
systems all attempt to do this by setting up codes, rules and principles, and so all fall 
short. They try to capture the feel for acting in relationship with others that we all aim 
at and perhaps they succeed in setting up some minimum standards that cover the 
majority of cases, or the more common situations and relationships most of the time. 
But where they fail, as they must, what brings them up short is moral concerns, 
considerations of how this set of personal relationships cannot be addressed by the 
rules, the rules are not sufficient for them. That is, I am claiming that social, legal, 
religious and other personal relationships are all in the domain of the moral. 
If I am right here, if what constitutes morality is the attempt to get personal relations 
right, to act appropriately with respect to them, then basing our behaviour on the 
relationships we are involved in, are part of, will in fact be sufficient for moral 
behaviour. Behaving appropriately in personal relationships. responding appropriately 
225 
to other people in a variety of situations requires having reasons for our behaviour that 
stand up to criticism. Learning what sort of reasons we can have and justify and 
continuing to practise decision-making based on such reasons requires that we 
recognise the individual relationships, and types of relationships involved in a 
situation, and what they require of us. This recognition of relationships needs to be 
both objective and egocentric, subject to truth constraints, and the sorts of things we 
can be part of and motivated by. These relationships provide us with reasons for 
acting the way we do and also the motivation, they have a pull to them. But if this is 
so then nothing more is needed to account for how and why we act in particular ways 
in personal relationships. 
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